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PREFACE

The research for this study entailed a thorough
canvass of records in the National Archives in Wash
ington, D.C., primarily those of the State Department,
the Office of Strategic Services, and the Military
Intelligence Division.

Manuscript collections which

proved to be most useful were the Henry L. Stimson
Diary at Yale University and the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Papers at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde
Park, New York.

The William Castle Papers in the Her

bert Hoover Library at West Branch, Iowa were consulted
as were the Cordell Hull Papers at the Library of Con
gress in Washington, D.C.

The Jefferson Caffery

Papers at the University of Southwestern Louisiana and
the Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Papers at Hyde Park yielded
little useful information.
An important source for this study also were
the interviews with Salvadorans who lived during the
Martinez era.

Ambassador Hector Escobar Seri'ano provided

detailed accounts for the period during which he served
as Ambassador to Mexico 1937-19^0 and as Minister of
Finance in 19*j4.

The son-in-law of General Martinez,

Sr. Victor Barriere, kindly shared his recollections of
ii

the General and the events during the period as well
as his role as a participant in the negotiations during
the Bondholder's dispute in 19^3®

Sr. Jose""Antonio

Penate, an Army officer during the period, discussed
his role and that of his father, an Army Major and
confidant of General Martinez.

The attitudes and

feelings of the common man during the regime of General
Martinez were reflected in conversations with Sr. and
Sra. Felix Dominguez Revelo (an engineer), Sra. Amana
Calderon (a student at the time), and Sra. Lolita Barauna
(a teacher at the time)*.
The completion of this study marks the culmination
of several years of graduate study during which time the
author has incurred a large number of debts which cannot
be adequately repaid.
along the way.

I want to thank all who assisted

To Dr. Jane de Grummond, who filled in

after Dr. J. Preston Moore's departure, I wish to express
my slncerest gratitude.

To Dr. Leonard Cardenas, for

his invaluable assistance, thank you.

Likewise, I wish

to thank Drs. Miles Richardson and S. Lee Richardson
for their guidance and assistance during my graduate
studies.

And lastly, I want to thank Dr. Burl Noggle

for reading the manuscript.

To Mrs. Miriam deHart, who

did so much of the leg work during my years at the
Latin American Studies Institute, thank you.
iii

To my

sisters, Sonia, Fenita and Marling who typed the
drafts, my wife Nelia and my family for their support,
salamat.
While all of the above mentioned assisted me
greatly, the responsibility for this study is mine.
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ABSTRACT
This is a case study of relations between El
Salvador and the United States during the presidency
of General Maximlliano Hernandez Martinez, 1931-19^*
Of all the Caribbean and Central American nations, El
Salvador had steered the most independent course in
its relations with the United States since the turn of
the century*
While there existed a lack of drama in the ear
lier relations between the two nations, the Martfnez
era, 1931-19^ *

reflects the traditional ingredients

of Latin American domestic politics pitted against
changing national priorities in a changing world situa
tion, the threat of European intervention and more
significantly, a test for the Good Neighbor policy of
the United States.
In 1906 and again in 1923* encouraged by the United
States, the Central American nations signed treaties
designed to insure regional political stability.

Non

recognition was the instrument to deter would-be rebels
from carrying out their plots.

On the other hand, a

1922 financial agreement became a source of problems
for both nations.

El Salvador, on the brink of bank

ruptcy, had borrowed over sixteen million dollars from
viii

private lenders in the United States.

These issues

shaped events during much of the rule of General
Maximlliano H. Martinez.
When General Martinez became president in 1931» as
a result of a. coup the United States, bound by the 1923
Treaty, refused to recognize his government.

Non

recognition combined with the economic depression and
the subsequent collapse of coffee prices had serious
economic and political repercussions•

As a result, a

Communist-inspired revolt occurred in January 1932.
The attempted overthrow failed, but severe retaliatory
measures taken by General Martinez resulted in the death
of over ten thousand Salvadorans.

Furthermore, the

economic and political crises prompted El Salvador to
suspend payment on its 1922 loan.

Non-recognition and

default strained Salvadoran-American relations.
The presence of ill-prepared United States repre
sentatives in El Salvador, the emergence of Hitler*s
Germany and Mussolini*s Italy in Europe and the attrac
tion of General Martinez to totalitarianism and
authoritarian rule, provided a potential breaking point
for the proclaimed Good Neighbor policy of the United
States.

However, unlike the experience of Nicaragua,

Cuba and the Dominican

Republic, El Salvador was spared

external intervention in its domestic affairs by the
larger nation,
ix

A common interest in hemispheric defense against
possible European subversion during the years 1939-1944,
helped to overcome major differences between the two
nations.

World conditions prompted the United States

to modify its policy on the recognition of governments,
while economic considerations tempered General Martfnez’s
admiration for authoritarian rule and a corporate
economy.

The United States generously assisted El Sal

vador through Lend-Lease, Export-Import Bank loans, and
the Inter-American Coffee Convention of 194-0, while El
Salvador cooperated fully with the United States in the
war effort.
The Martfnez Era represents an accommodation of
interests by nations of unequal size and power in the
light of world realities.

Plagued initially by serious

differences, the Martinez period marks a stepping stone
in the expression of good-will by the United States
towards El Salvador and by extension, to Latin America
during those critical years.

x

CHAPTER I

SCOPE OF STUDY

Although formal diplomatic relations are only a
part of the whole pattern of international relations,
commercial, cultural and political intercourse between
nations can be severely restricted without them*
Because of the great influence of the United States in
the Western Hemisphere, a Latin American government
with no diplomatic relations with the United States has
traditionally found it difficult to engage freely in
the community of nations.

Normal diplomatic relations

presuppose formally declared acts of "recognition of
governments®"
The national interest, powerful domestic interests,
or a changing world situation have dictated the criteria
applied to the recognition of new governments®

In the

early years, the United States found such fairly
objective requirements as de facto control of the state
and the ability to discharge International obligations
sufficient to establish normal diplomatic relations with
a foreign nation.

Continued and uninterrupted diploma

tic relations with Latin American states were important
to the expansion of private trade and investment
1

activities in the region.
However, real and imagined abuses by foreign
creditors in Latin America and the chronic financial
difficulties faced by many of the nations there, sug
gested the possibility of European intervention and
a threat to the security of the United States.

Because

the domestic affairs of Latin American countries now be
came a matter of United States concern, the kind of
government to be recognized assumed a new Importance.
Subsequently, the "willingness" of a new government to
fulfill the commitments of previous regimes was demanded
and, in many cases, followed by precise and detailed
agreements.

Under President Woodrow Wilson a new

government must have also come into power by constitu
tional means and represent the will of the people before it
could be recognized by the United States.

It was the

emergence of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor"
policy that marked a return to less demanding conditions
for the initiation of diplomatic relations, thereby
decreasing tensions in United States-Latin American
1
relations.
United States relations with El Salvador during

C.
Neale Ronning, Law and Politics in InterAmerican Diplomacy (New York; John Wiley and Sons, 1963),
PP. 1-5.

the presidency of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez
1931-19^» provides a good subject for a case study of
relations between two nations of the Western Hemis
phere, one large and the other small#

El Salvador is a

good example because of all the Caribbean and Central
American nations it had steered the most independent
course in its relations with the United States since
the turn of the century#

It had avoided serious entan

glements with its powerful neighbor to the North and
had escaped the direct intervention in its internal
affairs unlike the experience of Nicaragua, Cuba and
the Dominican Republic.
While there had existed a lack of drama in the
earlier relations between the two nations, the Martfnez
era 1931-19^4, has provided students of Salvadoran
history with events of significance.

It was General

Martfnez who, in his effort to uphold his position and
his country's national integrity, resisted United States
pressure to resign during the early 1930’s.

By his

successful resistance, he proved decisively that the
outmoded non-recognition policy of the United States
was untenable and thus forced the United States to
abandon it.
On the other hand, it was also during the Martfnez
era that the United States proved its sincerity in the

4
application of the ’’Good Neighbor” policy during the
bond default controversy when it decided (much to the
dismay of American bondholders) not to intervene in
the internal affairs of El Salvador,2
Later during the Martfnez era* as the war in
Europe expanded, both nations cooperated freely with
one another in the effort to maintain the security of
the Western Hemisphere,

The cooperation was such that

General Martfnez, enamored as he was with authori
tarian ideas and totalitarian rule, tempered his
personal ideological beliefs sufficiently to work with
the United States for the best interests of the region.
The United States made cooperation much easier with
very generous programs of assistance such as Lend-Lease,
coffee ”subsidies” through the Inter-American Coffee
Agreement and loans from the Export-Import Bank,

As a

result, the two nations, the smallest and the largest
in the hemisphere, one totalitarian, the other democra
tic, worked with a great deal of unanimity of interest
during the war years.
The study which follows relates the development
of the diplomatic, economic and war-time relations
between El Salvador and the United States during the
1 9 3 1 - 1 9 ^ period — the Martfnez era,

2

The term American, as used in this study, refers
strictly to the United States of America.

CHAPTER II

THE SETTING

Roots of the Problems
At about 10 P.M. on December 2, 1931* elements of
El Salvador’s First Infantry began firing at the
Presidential Palace directly across the street from
the infantry barracks.

The shots marked the begin

ning of the revolt which made General Maximlliano
Hernandez Martfnez the ruler of El Salvador.

The

gunfire also marked the start of a new era in
Salvadoran-American relations.
To many American observers, the sudden rise of
General Martfnez to power was characteristically
Central American, in nature.

To them, power acquired

through a coup d ’etat was as natural in Central Amer
ica as considering the banana to be the main export.
But such coups d ’etat were also often followed
by another characteristic which in itself was Central
American in nature.

This was American intervention

Minister Charles B. Curtis (El Salvador) to
Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, December 5» 1931»
file 816.00 Revolutions/35, R.G. 59, N. A.
5

6
in the internal affairs of the revolutionary governments.
Such meddling in Central America occurred numerous times
during the early twentieth century.

Invariably such

Interventions were the result of lingering problems that
had plagued the Meso-American region for many years.
Part of the blame for the misunderstandings can defi
nitely be placed upon the shoulders of the United
States because whatever her motives, she did intervene
in the internal affairs of some nations in the area.
Some of the reascns for American activities which
caused misunderstandings can be explained.

First,

the United States desired a secure and stable Caribbean
area to insure free passage through the Panama Canal
and hopefully, at the same time, to assist the economic
2
and political progress of the nations there.
Secondly, the United States competed with Mexico and
Europe for political and economic dominance In the
region.

A third factor, more difficult to gauge but

still significant In some cases, was the detrimental
effect of the way some American officials and private
citizens conducted themselves during their stay in

^William Appieman Williams, The Tragedy of
American Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing Co.,
1971), p p . 172-7841 Bryce Wood, The Making of the
Good Neighbor Policy (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1961), pp. 14-15.

3
the area.-'

To be sure, there were other factors,

however, those mentioned prompted the errors in
judgements in the early twentieth century which later
caused more serious difficulties.
The effort to achieve stability was a commend
able objective for the United States, but the problems
which emanated from these efforts were such that
animosity rather than goodwill often resulted.
After the United States acquired the territory
for the Panama Canal, concern for the security of
the future waterway influenced the relations between
America and the countries in the surrounding area.
Early in the century, American leaders were greatly
concerned with the threat of European intervention in
the region.

To allay this fear of European Involvement,

the United States acted to stabilize the area by re
ducing political tensions among the various Central
American nations.

Accompanying this desire to

minimize unrest in Central America for security reasons

•^Interview with Ambassador Hector Escobar Serrano,
December 1975* San Salvador; New York Times, August 16,
1929; Dana Munro, The United States and the Caribbean
Republics, 1921-1933 (Princeton; Princeton University
Press, 19W , P» 8.
Raymond Leslie Buell, Research Director of the
Foreign Policy Association discussed the American attempts
to stabilize the area ini New York Times. January 11,
1931.

8
was the hope that through stability, political and
economic progress might be achieved by these nations.
For these reasons, in 1907* the United States, along
with Mexico, called for a conference of the Central
American nations to find ways to ease tensions which had
arisen from rivalries between leaders®

The most serious

problems stemmed from the bitter conflict between two
strongmen, Jose Santos Zelaya of Nicaragua and Manuel
Estrada Cabrera of Guatemala®
The Central American leaders agreed to meet in
order to lessen tensions, but at the same time they
harbored ulterior motives for participating®

The

Americans and Mexicans were also less than totally
idealistic in calling for the peace conference®

The

Americans planned to use the meetings to prepare the
ground for the economic penetration of the area®

The

Mexicans wanted to hold the conference in order to
establish a peaceful Central America, but one in which
the four smaller nations would be strengthened against
Guatemala while looking toward Mexico for leadership.-’
Moreover, the Central American leaders saw the confe-

Charles L. Stansifer, "Application of the Tobar
Doctrine to Central America," The Americas. 23
(January 1967), p. 252; Linton Wells, "Mexico's Eld
for Supremacy in Central America," New Republic® 50
(May 18, 1927), PP. 3^8-350.

9
rence as an opportunity to entrench themselves in

6

power.

Despite divergent motives for attending the
conference, the participants cooperated sufficiently
so that the resultant 1907 Central American Treaty of
Peace and Amity contained praiseworthy ideas®

One

was the creation of a Central American Peace Court as
a vehicle to settle differences®

7

over interstate disputes . 1

It had jurisdiction

The treaty also contained

clauses which dealt with the issue of recognition, a
subject brought up at the conference by the Central
Americans themselves®

The recognition clause was based

upon the ideas developed by the noted Ecuadorian jurist,
Dr. Carlos Tobar®

The essence of the "Tobar Doctrine'*

was that no diplomatic recognition would be granted
to any government which had gained power by means of
a coup d'etat or revolution until freely elected repreQ

sentatives had constitutionally reorganized the country®

^Stansifer, "Application of the Tobar Doctrine to
Central America," pp. 25^-255®
"^Chester Lloyd Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1936), p . ¥25;
Wilfred Hardy Callcott, The Western Hemisphere:
Its
Influence on United States- P o l i c i e s t o t K e End of World
War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968), p® 102.
Q
Theodore P. Wright, "Free Elections in the Latin
American Policy of the United States," Political Science
Quarterly, 75 (March 1959)* p. 93*

10
The United States, although not a signatory to the treaty,
felt "morally bound" to it
The effects of the treaty on the Central American
nations were minimal.

The Court of Justice proved

ineffective because of the highly political nature of
the cases brought before it.

Moreover, the Judges

seemed unable to keep their individual national interests
out of the decisions.

Before the ten years had expired,

the court had lost its usefulness.

10

However, it was the recognition clause of the
treaty which created the greatest difficulty between
the United States and Central America.

At the signing

of the treaty, the incumbent presidents were very
pleased with the recognition clause because it provided
them with "a guarantee of the status quo and a perpetual leasehold on office."

11

Furthermore, those

governments in office could simply pay lip-service to the
matter of free elections since they in fact controlled
all elections.

Thus the recognition clause of the

treaty served to defeat the intent of the United States
to have free and democratic elections.

On the other

^Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900, p« 425.
10Ibid., pp. 425-426.
■^Wright, "Free Elections in the Latin American
Policy of the United States," p. 93.

11
hand, while it did keep the area's politics relatively
stable, the price paid came in the form of oppressive
dictatorships which were perpetuated in office®

Thus

the Central Americans were deprived of the right to
revolt against abuse by the ruling government®

Such

was the case of the Melendez-Quinones dynasty in El Sal
vador which ruled the country from 1913-1927•

The long

rule of Manuel Estrada Cabrera in Guatemala was also
perpetuated to some degree by the 1907 treaty®

Overall,

however, the treaty did serve to lessen tensions between
12
the Central American nations for a while•
By 1920, when political conditions began to
deteriorate again, the idea of a united Central America
was revived and El Salvador proposed a conference among
the five Central American states to revise the 1907
treaty and consider a union.

As in previous attempts,

the union plan failed and by 1922 tensions between the
neighboring nations had become intense, especially along
the Nicaragua and Honduras border.

New hostilities

erupted and again an effort to pacify the area was made.
The result was another conference held in Washington,
D.C. from December

1922 to February 7, 1923®

Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes served as the
host with Sumner Welles steering the conference

1?
Jones, The Caribbean Since 1900, p. *J40.

12
most of the way.

Again, the United. States, though not

a signatory to the resultant 1923 Central American Treaty
of Peace and Amity, felt morally hound to abide by it.

13

The major difference between the 1923 treaty and the
one it replaced was the "strengthening" of the recog
nition article in the newer version.

Article II of

the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923 reads
as follows;
Desiring to make secure in the Republics
of Central America the benefits which are de
rived from the maintenance of free institutions
and to contribute at the same time toward
strengthening their stability, and the prestige
with which they should be surrounded, they
declare that every act, disposition or measure
which alters the constitutional organization
in any of them is to be deemed a menace to the
peace of said Republics, whether it proceed
from any public power or from the private
citizens.
Consequently, the Governments of the
Contracting Parties will not recognize any
other government which may come into power in
any of the five Republics through a coup d'etat
or a revolution against a recognized Govern
ment, so long as the freely elected repre
sentatives of the people thereof have not
constitutionally reorganized the country. And
even in such a case they obligate themselves
not to acknowledge the recognition if any of
the persons elected as President, Vice-President
or Chief of State designate should fall under
any of the following heads:
1)
If he should be the leader or one of
the leaders of a coup d'etat or revolution, or

13
^Munro, The United States and the Caribbean
1921-1933. p p . 118-125;
New York Times. January 11.
1931.

13
through blood relationship or marriage* be an
ascendent or descendent or brother of such
leader or leaders.
2)
If he should have been a Secretary
of
State or should have held some high
military command during the accomplishment
of the coup d*etat. the revolution, or while
the election was being carried on, or if he
should have held this office or command
within the siz months preceding the coup d ’etat,
revolution* or the election.
Furthermore* in no case shall recognition
beaccorded to a government which arises from
election to power of a citizen ezpressly and
unquestionably disqualified by the Constitution
of his country as eligible to election as
President, Vice-President or Chief of State
designate.1^1
Thus, the sanction of non-recognition was deliberately
designed to function as a coercive measure to promote
stability and constitutional rule.

1 *5
J

The idea for strengthening the recognition article
was proposed and insisted upon at the Washington
conference by the Costa Rican delegation.

The head of

the delegation was ez-president Alfredo Gonzales Flores,
whom Federico TInoco had ousted in a coup In 1917.
President Woodrow Wilson in turn, using the tactic of

iit
Conventions, Protocols and Declarations signed
at the Conference on Central American Affairs,
Washington, D.C., February 17, 1923*
”General Treaty of
Peace and Amity,M American Journal of International
L a w . Supplement XVII (l923), P P . 117-123.
”
”
1-^Raymond 0 1Connor, Force and Diplomacy. Essays
Military and Diplomatic (Coral Gables, Florida:
University of Miami Press, 1972), p. 108.

1^
non-recognition, forced Tinoco to resign from office two
years later.

The objective of the Costa Rican delega

tion at the 1923 conference was thus to show other
would-be revolutionaries that, like Tinoco, their
efforts would end in failure.

Costa Rica's own presi

dent at the time, Julio Acosta, was a strong supporter
of the article.1^
The 1923 Treaty was unanimously approved by all
the participants.

El Salvador’s national assembly

ratified it, but with reservations on parts of the
agreement, including Article II which dealt with the
recognition issue.

17
'

This objection to Article II was

later used by General Martfnez in claiming his legal
right to be president and thus entitling him to full
recognition by the United States.

Undoubtedly, the

1907 and 1923 Central American treaties had placed
serious responsibilities upon the shoulders of the
Americans.
The difficult task faced by the United States in
Central America was also due, in part, to its own de
sires to expand its economic influence in the area.

16

Richard V. Salisbury, "Domestic Politics and
Foreign Policy:
Costa Rica's Stand on Recognition,
1923-193^»" Hispanic American Historical Review, 54- no. 3
(August 197*0. pp. ^55-456.
’
17

New York Times. November 22, 1932; Munro, The
United States and the Caribbean,1921-1933. P- 126

15
This was evident in the Increased number of loans made
by American bankers to Central American nations.

For

the most part, American bankers replaced Europeans in
this part of the world.

However, while American

activities increased in Central America, so too did the
efforts of Mexico to exert more influence in the
region.

This spreading of influence by a rival na

tion concerned some American government officials
during the 1920’s.

1 fi

The rivalry between the two nations

led them to take opposite positions on many issues
dealing with Central American affairs.

Nowhere was

this contest more evident than on the question of
recognition of revolutionary governments.

The Mexican

support of governments which the United States refused
to bless with recognition created serious difficulties
for American officials.
Moreover, many of the problems faced by American
diplomats in Central America were made even more
difficult by the Individual shortcomings of the offi
cial representatives assigned there.

Within the

American diplomatic corps, it was generally believed
that a post to Central America was the least desirable
18

Wells, ’’Mexico’s Bid for Supremacy in Central
America," pp. 3^8-3^9; Wood, The Making of the Good
Neighbor Policy, pp. 1^-15.

16
appointment possible.
to comment thats

This prompted the New York Times

"Many men feel they are forced to

penance if they are stationed in one of
American

c a p i t a l s . " ^

do

the Central

This disdain was apparent in the

actions of some individuals sent to the

area.

El

Salvador had the misfortune of having one such man
who served there as American Minister during the period
1921-1925*

Montgomery Schuyler exemplified what has

come to be called the "ugly American" by his conduct
there.

He considered himself a "President maker" and

"let it pretty generally be known that what he said
was law."

20

Schuyler was also held responsible for

the resignation of the Salvadoran Minister of Foreign
Affairs Francisco Paredes in 1922, because of their
disagreement over America's role in Salvadoran internal
affairs.

Schuyler has been described as a man "muy

duro, muy violento."

21

To the sensitive Salvadorans,

this type of conduct was very insulting.
An editorial in the New York Times clearly

•^New York Times, August 1 6 , 1929.
20

Minister Warren D. Robbins (El Salvador) to
Assistant Secretary of State William Castle, May 6 , 1929,
folder "Salvador 1929-1931," Box 8 , William Castle
Papers, Herbert Hoover Library•
21

Interview with Ambassador Serrano, December 1975,
San Salvador.
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perceived the effect of such conduct on the Latin
Americans;

11It is doubly true in our relations with

Mexico and Central America that in diplomacy the ’tone1
is everything ~

that it makes the song, as Lord

Palmerston said®..what we need to correct is not so
much our intentions as our manners."

22

The arrogant conduct and condescending attitudes
of some Americans in El Salvador and other Central
American countries, although not always acting in
official capacities, often contributed to the problem.
Many businessmen and their wives were often guilty of
this attitude, some of them not bothering to learn to
speak Spanish in spite of their lengthy stay in the
region.

Such conduct made the task of badly under-

staffed American legations much more difficult.

Thus,

undesirable attitudes and behavior of some Americans
were in part responsible for the tarnished image many
Latin Americans had of the United States.2-^

99

New York Times. January 14, 1927.

2^Frank P. Corrigan, "Notes on Good Neighborli
ness," Frank P. Corrigan Papers, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt Library;
Interview with Sra. Amana
Calderon, July 1971, San Salvador;
Interview with
Ambassador Serrano, December 1975» San Salvador;
Munro, The United States and the Caribbean Republics.
1921-1933; Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor
Policy,"p. 299.
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Diplomatic and Economic Relations During the 1920’s
World War I was a watershed in the diplomatic
relations of the United States with the nations of the
world®

By the early 19201s , Woodrow Wilson’s policy

of non-recognition of governments established by force
had become entrenched in the conduct of American
diplomacy®

During his tenure as Secretary of State

Charles Evans Hughes attempted to correct some of the
mistakes of the past and establish a "Pas Americana’1
based on mutual respect and good will®

Oh,

The

Washington conference of 1922-1923 attempted to deal
with the problems of international relations parti
cularly in the Central American region.

However, it

was not until the late 1920’s, under the stewardship
of President Herbert Hoover and Secretary of State
Henry L. Stimson, that an evident change had begun to
evolve in America’s Latin American Policy®

Basically,

the Hoover-Stimson doctrine was a reversal of the
interventionist policies fostered by.the Roosevelt
Corollary and the moralistic non-recognition policy
advocated by Woodrow Wilson®

oh.

The change acknowledged

Alexander de Conde, Herbert Hoover’s Latin
American Policy (Stanford:
Stanford University Press,
1951)» P«
Joseph Tulchin, The Aftermath of War:
World War I and U. S. Policy Toward Latin America
(New York: New York University Press, 1971» P« 98.
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the problems with non-recognition in the past.

Later,

in a speech before the New York Council of Foreign
Eelations, Secretary Stimson maintained that in all of
Latin America, except the five Central American
republics, the United States policy was to grant
recognition when it became apparent that the new govern
ments were in control of the administrative machinery
of state, with the apparent acquiescence of their
people, and that they were willing and able to discharge
their international and conventional obligations.

In

the case of the five Central American nations the 1923
Treaty prevented the implementation of the new policy.

2«5
J

To be sure, this was just the beginning of the
transition since American intervention in Central
America was still evident in Nicaragua.

But the lesson

had been learned that such interventions served little
purpose.

As the new policy evolved the Central

Americans, appreciative of the improvements, returned
the courtesy by receiving President Hoover graciously
during his tour there in 1928.

27
'

Excelsior. Mexico's

^ N e w York Times . February 7, 1931 •
26
Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy,
pp. 24-25; Federico Gil, Latin American-United States
Relations (New York: Hareourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc•,
1971), P. 154.
^ D i a r i o del Salvador, November 17. 1928;
de Conde, Herbert Hoover's Latin American Policy, passim.
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leading newspaper and a frequent critic of American
activities in Latin America, acknowledged some of
Hoover's diplomatic successes at the end of his term
pO

in office in 1932.

Still, much more needed to he

done to correct mistakes of the past.
The economic prosperity experienced by the United
States during the 1920’s helped to foster closer
economic ties with Central American nations.

During

the period Americans became lenders to the world
replacing the Europeans.

American bankers practiced

a free loan policy so that many of them, unaccustomed
to international finance, lent money where more expe
rienced European bankers would have been reluctant to
lend.

Furthermore, many such loans were contracted

with somewhat onerous terms to offset the risk inherent
in dealing with politically unstable republics.

While

these measures protected the bankers, they also made
default almost Inevitable in a financial cris i s . ^
Because economic and political considerations

Excelsior. November 9, 1932.
29

^Max Winkler, ”Investment and National Policy of
the United States in Latin America,” American Economic
Review, XXII; Supplement (March 1932), p. l44; The
company which handled the Salvadoran bonds, F.J. Lisman
and Company, did very well with the 1922 loan. While
the average profit on all loans made to Latin America
during the 1920-1930 period was 5*06 percent, Lisman
made 11.36 percent on the Salvadoran loan. Tulchin,
The Aftermath of War, p. 7 6 .
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are closely intermeshed in a nation's foreign policy,
the State Department inevitably became involved in the
free lending practices of the bankers*

Although the

State Department officially disclaimed passing judgement
on loan proposals, it was active in dictating general
terms for many loans to Central American governments*
The setting of conditions for the loans by the Depart
ment, and participation in the negotiation of proposals,
was interpreted by many bankers and prospective bond
purchasers as tacit approval or disapproval of the
loans.

Moreover, unscrupulous banking houses,

despite State Department's disclaimers, advertised and
sold bonds as though the State Department guaranteed
them.

In a 1936 review of bond sales Minister Frank

Corrigan found that even in Britain buyers were under
the impression that the bonds had the full backing of
the United States government*^1

A 1937 Securities and

Exchange Commission investigation of the practices of

^°New York Times, July 20, 1923; de Conde, Herbert
Hoover's Latin American Policy, p. 68; Tulchin,
The Aftermath of War, p. 170.
•^Minister Frank P. Corrigan (El Salvador) to Hull,
April 3, 1936, file 816.5IC 3 9 / ^ 8 , R.G. 59, N. A.;
Fred Lavis, "The El Salvador Bondholders Protective Com
mittee Report," January 1937, file 816.51C 39/^93,
E.G. 59, N. A * ; Tulchin, The Aftermath of War, p. 182;
Munro, The United States and the Caribbean Republics.
1921-1933, P. 151.
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American "bankers characterized some of the financiers
as being "reckless and inept" and accused others of
indulging in "outright chicanery" in their foreign
lending practices.

32

El Salvador, like many other Latin American coun
tries, fell victim to the easy credit available during
the time.

It was among the very first to benefit

from the extravagance of foreign loans from American
bankers.

In 1922, the nation's economy was on the

verge of bankruptcy? the salaries of public servants,
the military, school teachers and the police were
badly in arrears.

Furthermore, the Salvadoran debt

to Great Britain was in default and the fear existed
that unless the situation was remedied the British
might be forced to intervene in the internal affairs
33
of the country. ^

In a desperate effort to solve its

financial crisis El Salvador turned to the United
States for assistance.

32

Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on
the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities.
Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization
Committees. Pursuant to Section 211 of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 193^» Part V Protective Committees
and Agencies for Holders of Defaulted Foreign Government
Bonds (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937)*
p. 8.
J

33
^^Lavis, The El Salvador Bondholders Protective
Committee Report".
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Montgomery Schuyler, the new American Minister to
SI Salvador, was anxious to help in order to avert
Salvadoran bankruptcy, as well as to assist American
financial institutions in expanding their operations
in the area®

The result of his efforts to aid

President Jorge Melendez was the signing of a consoli
dated loan between El Salvador and Minor C® Keith®
Although the loan was negotiated in 1922 it was not
consummated until the following year®

The loan was

acquired for the following purposes:
the nation*s internal debt;
Great Britain;

(1)

to retire

(2) to retire the debt to

and (3) to fund a public works program.

Included in the latter project was the construction
of sanitation facilities in the capital city of San
Salvador, asphalting of roads throughout the country,
and the subsidizing of a railway from the port of
La Union at the southeastern tip of El Salvador to the
capital.

The railway later became part of the Inter

national Railways System of Central America (I.R.C.A.)
which connected El Salvador to the Guatemalan town of
Ik

Puerto Earrios on the Caribbean side®^

This port was

The I.R.C.A. was a very Important adjunct of the
United Fruit Company throughout Central America. Fred
Lavis to Corrigan, February 16 , 1937® Corrigan Papers,
Franklin D® Roosevelt Library. Lavis succeeded Keith
to the presidency of the I.R.C.A. in 1929• Later on,
he became head of the Salvadoran Bondholders Protective
Committee®
J

24
El Salvador’s outlet on the Atlantic coast.
The bonds were issued under a loan contract
between El Salvador and Minor C. Keith the President
of I.R.C.A. and a founder of the United Fruit Company
of New York.

Keith had played a principal role in

the negotiations and at the conclusion earned a
substantial sum for his services.^

Moreover, his

railroad company, along with United Fruit, greatly
benefited from the loan to El Salvador.

The bonded

debt consisted of the following items:
(1)

An Eight Percent Customs First Lien
Sinking Fund Gold Bonds of 1923Series A- $6,000,000 U.S. gold.
Due July 1, 1948.

(2)

A Six Percent Second Lien Sinking
Fund Gold Bonds of 1923- Series B1,050,000- British pound sterling.
Due July 1, 1953.

(3)

A Seven Percent Third Lien Sinking
Fund Gold Bonds of 1923- Series C$10,500,000 U.S. dollars.
Due July 1, 1957.36

The bonds were guaranteed by a lien on seventy

'Tlunro, The United States and the Caribbean
Republics, 1921^1933, PP." 149-151.
36
Walter Thurston (Division of Latin American
Affairs) Memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State
McGeorge Bundy, September 3* 1931, file 816.51/643,
R.G. 59» N. A . ; Lavis, "The El Salvador Bondholders
Protective Committee Report."
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percent of all customs receipts on both imports and
exports.

Further, if seventy percent of the receipts

was not adequate to service the loan, the total customs
receipts would then be utilized.

Should that not be

sufficient, the deficiency was to be covered by El
Salvador from other sources of revenue®

As an added

security measure, the Metropolitan Trust Company of New
York was designated by Minor Keith to act as fiscal
agent for the loan.

The agent, in turn, appointed a

fiscal representative to reside in San Salvador to
certify and supervise the collection of revenues in
each of the customs houses in El Salvador,

The actual

collection of duties was carried out by a Salvadoran
agency and only in the contingency of a default was the
American fiscal representative authorized to undertake
customs collection.

This arrangement was different from

the Nicaraguan and Santo Domingo plans in which customs
revenues without reference to default were placed
directly under the administration of an American
Collector General with several American deputy collectors.
Provisions were also Included to cover the even
tuality of a dispute between the contracting parties.
In such a dispute the final referee was to be the Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court.

Should

the Chief Justice be unable to act the American
Secretary of State was then empowered to designate some
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other member of the Federal Judiciary of the United
States to act in his place*

The contract also provided

that in the event that El Salvador, for any reason,
default for thirty days in the fulfillment of its
obligations, the Fiscal Agent was empowered to create
a customs administration and appoint a Collector
General approved by the Secretary of State and the
37
government of El Salvador *
Through a series of
exchanges with the attorneys of Minor Keith, the
Secretary of State's office became committed to carry
out its obligations in the contract.

The commitment

was confirmed in a letter from Assistant Secretary of
State Robert Woods Bliss to Messrs* Robert Lansing
(former Secretary of State) and Lester H. Woolsey
(former Solicitor General) dated July 15* 1922, in the
following terms?
In this connection, I may inform you that
the Secretary of State on his part is
prepared to carry out the stipulations
...of the loan contract, should it become
necessary to do so.38
In other exchanges between the American Legation at San

37
-"Thurston to Bundy, September 3, 1931, file
816.51/643, R.G. 59, N. A.
•^Fred Lavis, "The El Salvador Bondholders
Protective Committee Report."
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Salvador and the Salvadoran government In June and
July of 1922, the willingness of the State Department
30
to carry out Its obligations was further confirmed. 7
During the period after the acquisition of the
loan, El Salvador was fortunate in that it had
adequate customs revenues to service the loan.
Although the Salvadorans did not like the stipulations
of the contract which required the presence of the
fiscal representative in San Salvador, no protests
arose primarily because of the tact and ability of
the representative, William Renwick, who "fell in love
with El Salvador" and ingratiated himself with the
people by his excellent conduct and unobtrusiveness.
During his long stay in El Salvador he married a
Salvadoran lady.

During the 1930‘s however, the

situation changed drastically and the loan became a
source of difficulties for the United States and the
regime of General Martfnez.
The loan of 1922 was the only source of signifi
cant economic problems between the United States and
El Salvador during the period.

Unlike the situation

in other Central American countries, there were no

■^Thurston to Bundy, September 3» 1931, file 816.51/
643, R.G. 59. N. A.
40

Interview with Ambassador Serrano, December
1975. San Salvador•
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large American landholdings or industrial investments
in 21 Salvador.
the two nations.

A healthy trade flourished between
21 Salvador exported to the United

States coffee* "balsam of Peru," sisal* reptile shins
and hardwood lumber.

In return* El Salvador imported

cotton materials* wheat products, processed meats,
rubber products, chemicals, medical instruments and
small machinery.

During the 1925-1929 period, the

United States maintained a favorable balance of trade,
exporting an average of $8*000,000 to the Salvadorans
while importing an average of only $3*000,000 from
them.

Of 21 Salvador's exports to her Northern

Neighbor, the largest proportion consisted of coffee,
which during the 1920’s increasingly became almost the
only Salvadoran export.

During the 1920-1929 period

the proportion of coffee in the total Salvadoran
exports rose from sixty-nine percent to ninety-three
percent.

The economic prosperity of the 1920’s thus

caused the Salvadorans to become dependent on coffee
sales as the primary source of Income.

When 1929

Ai

Henry C. Wallich and John H. Adler, Public
Finance in a Developing Country;
El Salvador - A Case
Study (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1951)*
~
p. 31» New York Times. February 20, 1937®
IAj o

Max P. Brannon, El Salvador, esquema estadjfstlca
de la vlda nacional (San Salvador, 193o), pp. 23-24.
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brought an end to the boom, El Salvador suffered severe
social and economic dislocations with corresponding
political repercussions.

A successful coup d ’etat

took place on December 2, 1931* which ushered in a
new era for El Salvador under the dictatorship of
General Maximiliano Hernandez Martfnez.

The Emergence of General Martjfnez
From the viewpoint of the United States, which
had for many years attempted to stabilize the turbulent
Central American nations by promoting freely held
elections, it seemed ironic that the violent coup d ’etat
of December 2, 1931 was triggered by such an attempt.
The ballots cast had barely been counted when the seeds
of discontent were sown.

But the revolt which brought

General Hartfnez to power had actually been brewing for
some time.

It started with El Salvador’s change from

a stable albeit repressive dictatorship and ended with
the ill-fated experiment with democracy.
In 1927 Dr. P10 Romero Eosque was elected president
of El Salvador, the choice of the Melendez-Quinonez
families which had ruled the country since

30
1913*

k3

Romero Bosque, however, disappointed his

benefactors®

His rule helped to unleash the

frustrations of Salvadorians who had suffered many
years of repression under the Melendez-Quinonez
dynasty®

During his term in office he allowed a

free press to function, restored the constitutional
rights of individuals, and generously allowed poli
tical exiles to return.

Unlike his predecessors,

he was honest and even shared power with other politi
cal groups, much to the dismay of the oligarchy and
the army.

44

One of the reasons for Romero Bosque’s willingness
to break with the family which had placed him in the
presidency was the degree of economic success which
the nation experienced at the start of his term in
office®

In the previous year (1926), the value of El

^The family rule began with Carlos Melendez from
1913-1919* He was succeeded by his brother Jorge
Melendez from 1919-1923* Jorge’s brother-in-law, Dr.
Alfonso Quinonez-Molina continued the rule^from 19231927® Under the Constitution of 1886, Quinonez could
not succeed himself, so he chose a close friend,
Dr® Pfo Romero Bosque, to be his successor, but also
dictated to the National Assembly that he be chosen
Vice-President with the intention that he would oust
Bosque and get back in power® Jones, The Caribbean
Since 1900® p. 442; New York Times, October 5» 1930•
44
^
Thomas P. Anderson, Matanza:
El Salvador’s
Communist Revolt of 1932 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1971), p. 8 .
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Salvador’s coffee export was the highest in the nation’s
h i s tory.^

The prospect for more years of record

exports encouraged President Bosque to feel more
secure in carrying out his political reforms*
Unfortunately, Bosque’s early economic successes
were followed by a disastrous ending*

By 1929® the

price of coffee had begun to decline rapidly and by
1930 had reached critical levels.

The effect on El

Salvador’s one-crop economy was devastating.

The end

of Bomero Bosque’s tenure had become a nightmare.

The

vitally needed customs receipts were dangerously low
while police and military salaries were badly in
arrears#

Moreover, as El Dia, a Salvadoran paper,

commented, the country needed more than liberal re
organizations.

"What is most apparent in the country

is the disorganization of the services of state.

On

all sides disorganization is felt...everybody does as
he likes and the soil hardly produces a small part of
that which it should."

Still, in keeping with his

^Brannon, El Salvador, esauema estad£stica de
la vida naclonal. p. 24. The value of the colon
fluctuated between 2 and 2*5 per dollar during the
time, but since 1934 has remained constant at 2.5 per
dollar.
^ C h a r g e ’ d ’Affaires W. W. Schott (El Salvador)
to Stimson, February 3® 1930, file 8I6 .OO/766;
August 24, 1930, file 816.00/773, R. G. 59, N. A.
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promise to carry out free elections, he once again
betrayed the oligarchy which had put him in office
by not ''appointing" his successor as had been the
common practice in the paste
The liberal reforms instituted by Romero Bosque
during his term in office appeared to backfire on
the Salvadorans when a combination of economic distress,
a restless military and police, and a welter of
candidates for the presidency gave the pending elec
tions the appearance of being anything but "free and
democratic."

The American Minister in San Salvador,

Warren D. Robbins had taken an active part in the
campaign.

He strongly urged President Bosque to carry

out his election reform pledge and hold constitutional
elections.

He suggested that "in light of what had

happened elsewhere in Latin America, it would make El
Salvador famous."

The free elections would be es

pecially signigicant coming on the heels of a successful
revolution in neighboring Guatemala.

Minister Robbins

observed that the State Department's refusal to recognize
Orellana in Guatemala had helped to maintain stability
in El Salvador because "there was a military clique here
that would have immediately followed the example set
U rp

there" (had they been recognized). '

His suggestions

h,n

Minister Warren D. Robbins (El Salvador) to
Stimson, January 2, 1931 * file 816.00/782, R.G. 59» N. A.
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were not lost on the Salvadoran leaders.
Thus, the American involvement in El Salvador's
election, although indirect, was significant.

As

early as 1930, aspiring candidates had consulted with
the American Minister to determine his views regard
ing their candidacies.

Because of the power and

prestige of the United States every American word or
deed regarding an issue or controversy was bound to
be interpreted as favorable or unfavorable to one side
or the other.

Arturo Araujo, one of the candidates in

the election, bluntly summed up the value of the
American Minister's support when he said that "the
slightest manifestation of interest by the United
States Minister in any of the candidates would pretty
much insure his success."

LlQ

The official position

of the State Department was that there should be no
participation by American representatives which could
be construed as "intervention" in the affairs of
another country.

Yet, it was not out of order, when

advice was sought, to suggest the proper course of
action to be taken.

Such action, however, was usually

based on the desire of the United States to maintain
political stability in Central America and thus keep

Schott to Stimson, February 13# 1930, file
816.00/767, H. G. 59, N. A.
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the area safe from the danger of revolution or outside
L

q

intervention. 7
The first ‘'free" presidential election ever held
in El Salvador took place without Incident during
January 11-13* 1931*

Of the six candidates who had

entered the campaign initially, two, Dr. Alberto C-omezZarate, the former Minister of War, and Arturo Araujo,
an engineer and respected coffee planter and rancher
became the front runners.-’0

One of the military can

didates, General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez,
agreed to withdraw at the last minute and gave his
support to Arturo Araujo.

For his support, General

Martinez expected and later received the Vice Presi
dency and a very important cabinet position as
Minister of War.'’1
The election results indicated that although

bright, “Free Elections in the Latin American
Policy of the United States,“ pp. 91-92; VJood,
The Making of the Good Neighbor Polic?/. pp. 142-143;
Munro, The United States and the Caribbean. 1921-1933.
-^Schott to Stimson, January 16, 1930, file
816.00/765, E.G. 59* N. A.
51

Robbins to Stimson, January 10, 1931* file
816.00/784, E.G. 59* N. A . ; Anderson, Matanza: El
S a l v ador^ Communist Revolt of 1932. pp. 50-51.

♦
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Arturo Araujo had a clear majority over his closest
rival, he did not have a simple majority of all the
votes cast.

Thus, the election had to be decided

from amoug the three top candidates by the National
Assembly as stipulated by the Constitution.^2

On

February 12, 1931 Araujo was unanimously chosen by
the legislative body.

His victory In the assembly

was insured when he was able to get the support of
deputies loyal to Gomez-Zarate and Enrique Cordova.
The price Araujo had to pay for the support was high.
He had to promise to reimburse the men their campaign
53
e x p e n s e s . T h e price he paid was much too high in
light of his short tumultuous stay in office.
President Araujo entered office a man highly respected
for his honesty and integrity.

American Charge*

W. W. Schott described him as a "splendid gentleman
who has done much for the progress of his country...
In his section of the country he is greatly admired
and respected and his people have a passionate
attachment to him."

Yet, despite his honesty and

-^Bobbins to Stimson, January 16 , 1931. file
816.00/791. R.G. 59. N. A.
-^Charge* d*Affaires Harold D. Finley (El Salvador)
to Stimson, Jnue 2, 1931. file 816.51/618, R. G. 59, N.A.
ejh,

Schott to Stimson, February 3. 1930, file
816.00/766, R.G. 59. N. A.
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Integrity he proved to be a poor choice during such
a critical period in Salvadoran history.
President Araujo's problems began soon after he
took office on March 1, 1931®

He found himself facing

an empty treasury, a floating debt of about $4,000,000
and with no apparent income®

The customs revenues,

after the loan of 1922 had been serviced, had already
been pledged by the preceding government to certain
external c r e d i t o r s . A l t h o u g h he was the candidate .
of the Labor Party during the election, labor problems
became prevalent when he took office.

The campesinos

who were promised higher wages and better working
conditions during the election sought the immediate
fulfillment of the promises.

When nonsmaterialized,

their discontent became vocal and their protests
became more vigorous.-/

Even his fellow coffee planters

were apprehensive because of their fear of Communist
activities in the countryside and the seeming inability
of the government to guard their fjmcas.

-^Finley to Stimson, May 27, 1931* file 8l6.51/6l4,
E.G. 59* M . A.
Robbins to Stimson, March 27, 1931* file
816.00/801, E.G. 59* N. A.
J

<7

*flncas - coffee farms. Finley to Stimson,
June 2, 1931, file 816.51/618, R.G. 59, N. A.
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The problems of the Araujo administration resulted
not only from a lack of administrative skill on his
part, but also from corruption involving his family
and friends who were able to get federal funds for their
personal use,

Araujo himself squandered large sums of

money for lavish entertainment at the Presidential
Palace,

This extravagance during a severe depression

caused a great deal of resentment among the Salvadoran
population,
In an indirect way, the United States was involved
during the critical period in El Salvador just prior
to the coup d'etat.

Ever since the "loan of 1922”

became effective, an American fiscal representative
had been present in San Salvador to oversee the proper
collection of customs duties.
the finances of El Salvador,

In effect, he managed
When the price of coffee

fell to the point where almost all of the customs
revenues was being used to service the loans and left
little for the national treasury, many Salvadorans
blamed the United States for their problems.

The pre

sence of the fiscal representative alone was enough
to prompt newspaper criticisms.

Even the able Mr,

Eenwick was overwhelmed by the attacks.

He was accused

^Minister Charles B® Curtis (El Salvador) to
Stimson, December 15. 1931* file 816.00 Revolutions/^,
E.G. 59. N. A.
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of meddling in the internal affairs of El Salvador
because of his role as an expert advisor in helping the
Minister of Interior, Auditor-General and even the
President (at their request) to draft decrees and
KQ

legislation affecting the finances of the country. ^
In an attempt to shore up the faltering finances of
the nation* President Araujo began to negotiate with
the external creditors.

A plan to declare a two-year

moratorium on the amortization but not on the interest
of the external loan was considered.

However, this

plan was abandoned when the creditors provided alter
native plans of their own.

After considering several

proposals. President Araujo verbally accepted a plan
presented by Earnest Berger of the Foreign Trade
Securities Company of New York.

The Berger plan called

for a $4,000,000 loan to El Salvador against which five
year notes at seven percent interest would be taken by
the lending company at a nine percent discount.

The

loan was to be secured by a first mortgage on revenues
from the manufacture and sale of aguardiente, the local
rum.

Also, during the term of the loan Berger's

company was to have an option on all future financing

*59

Interview with Victor Barriere, December 1975»
San Salvador; Finley to Stimson, May 27, 1931.
file 816.51/614, R.G. 59, N. A.
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of the government of El Salvadoi and act as the
republic’s foreign purchasing agent.

Berger was

assisted in his Salvadoran ventures by another American,
Ricardo Kriete who owned an aguardiente factory in
El Salvador.

It was rumored that President Araujo was

to become a partner in the new aguardiente concern.
This enabled him to vertically integrate his business
since he already owned a sugar plantation.

The Berger

loans ran into a great deal of opposition.

Demonstra

tions were held protesting the ”1922 loan” as well as
the ’’Berger loan” which was being negotiated.
Moreover, the President was accused of ’’selling out
the sovereignty of the country to the Colossus of the
North.The

December coup finally killed the plan.

It was apparent, however, that although the
criticisms and protests allowed the Salvadorans to vent
their frustrations, nothing they did could improve their
economic condition.

The effect of the world-wide

depression on the price of coffee was severe.

Brazil’s

effort to shore up the price by its valorization plan

^°Finley to Stimson, May 27, 1931* file 8l6.5l/6l4;
July 3, 1931, file 816.00/807;
July 15, 1931, file
816.00/808, R.G. 59, N. A.

^0
helped only temporarily.
was downward.

6l

The trend in coffee prices

While coffee exports remained strong, the

price at which it was sold continued to decline.

By

late 1931» it had become clear that the following year
was going to be economically disastrous.
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With the

collapse of the price of coffee, the only prop to the
Salvadoran economy was seriously weakened.

The result

was a military coup d* etat.
The revolution began when disgruntled soldiers in
the First Infantry barracks, angry at not being paid,
fired upon the Presidential Palace across the street.
The barracks were ideally located on elevated ground
overlooking the President’s mansion.

Still, President

Araujo managed to escape through a side door.

He

attempted to rally some of the loyal forces in the
neighboring departments of La Libertad and Santa Ana,
but his efforts failed and he was forced to seek refuge
out of the country.

On December

he escaped to

6l

Lavis, "The El Salvador Bondholders Protective
Committee Report."
62
New York Times, December 20, 1931; Anderson,
Matanza:
El Salvador's Communist Revolt of 1932. p. 68.
y
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Guatemala with a small retinue of followers.^

There

he was given sanctuary by his friend9 President Jorge
Ubico.

Araujo later attempted to use Guatemala as a

base of operations for a counterattack but was pre
vented from doing so by Ubico who ultimately forced
him to leave the country.
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The suddenness of the revolt surprised many
people, including the American representatives.

Only

eleven months before, Minister Robbins had reported
that "I cannot help but believe that in this very
thickly populated country where practically every acre
of land is owned by rich and poor, there is much chance
of a revolution for the reason that there are too many
property owners who have much to lose.”^

Similar

observations had been made before regarding the wide
spread ownership of land and therefore the belief that
no revolt would take place.

Furthermore, although

it was well known that there was a great deal of

^ C u r t i s to Stimson, December 5, 1931, file 8l6 .00
Revolutions/35;
December 8 , 1931. file 816.00
Revolutions/36; December 9. 1931* file 816.OO
Revolutions/37, R.G. 59, N. A.
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✓
Anderson, Matanza;
Revolt of 1932. p. 6 3 .

El Salvador8s Communist
"

^ R o b b i n s to Stimson, December 1 8 , 1930, file
816.00/781, R.G. 59, N. A.
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discontent In El Salvador, most Informed observers
believed that because Araujo had the loyalty of a
strong Minister of War, no military revolt would take
place.
The

e x a c t

role of General Martfnez in the revolt

remains unclear.

His supporters contend that General

Martinez did not take over the presidency but was
chosen as president by the military junta after the
latter had consulted the best legal minds of El Sal
vador.

Moreover, they contend that the junta acted

under the dictates of the Constitution which stipulated
that the vice-president take over after the president
has left the country.

The detractors of General

Martinez contend that he was responsible for the revolt
right from the start.
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Most commentators agree, however, that if he did
not have a role in initiating the uprising, he quickly
capitalized on the events that led him to the presiden
cy.^

By December 4, he was in full control of the

situation.
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Interview with Ambassador Serrano and Sr. Jose"
Antonio Penate, December 1975, San Salvador.
^ K e n n e t h Grieb, "The United States and the Rise of
General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez," Journal of
Latin American Studies. 3, 2 (November 1971)* PP« 154-156;
Anderson, Matanza;
El Salvador^ Communist Revolt of
1932, pp. 50, 62.

General Martinez was unlike other military
dictators of that period.

Whereas Rafael Trujillo

(Dominican Republic), Anastasio Somoza (Nicaragua),
and Fulgencio Batista (Cuba) were strongmen who derived
their power as much from their machismo as from their
political skill, the Salvadoran dictator was a thought
ful, frugal, somber-looklng man, more the unassuming
scholar than the flamboyant dictator.
was also

General Martinez

unusual in that he had become a vegetarian at

age 40 while in the

military®

Moreover,

he was a

teetotaler who drank only water even at fiestas.

His

most unusual characteristic however, was his belief in
"cromoterapia11 or cure by the colors.

He prescribed

to his friends water that had been placed under the
sunshine

in colored bottles to cure some illnesses. He

was also

a believer in Theosophy and the reincarnation

of the human soul.

His unorthodox beliefs earned

him the nickname El Bru.jo from his detractors.
Although he ruled a Catholic country, he did not
join the Catholic Church until late in life.

He was

brought into the Church by his wife who was devout in
her faith.

The death of his son because of a ruptured

Interview with Victor Barriere and Jose'" Penate,
December 1975* San Salvador.

appendix also led him to find consolation through con
ga
version to the Catholic faith. 7 In spite of his
unique personal characteristics, his leadership ability
was never in question.
The role of the United States before and during the
December coup had significant implications for
Salvadoran-American relations.

Minister Bobbins had

been very active in San Salvador during the presidential
campaign to the point of calling for a battleship to
stand by in Corinto, Nicaragua, in case of trouble.
While his involvement in Salvadoran affairs did not
result in any serious problems, the conduct of his
successor, Charles B. Curtis, during and after the
revolt led to a strained relationship between the two
countries.
The action of Minister Curtis during the crisis
exemplified the type of problem faced by the United
States when it did not have the best man on the post.
Unfamiliar with what his role should be in the event
of a revolt, he became deeply involved in the matter.
Based on his part experience, he advised the rebels that

go
^Military Intelligence Division Memorandum,
May 27, 1941, Item no. 3100, folder 3000-4000, Box 817,
El Salvador 2400-3020, G-2 Regional file 1933-1944,
R.G. 165, N. A.

General Martfnez would be their best choice for presi
dent.^7®

Under Article II of the 1923 Treaty. General

Martfnez clearly was not "recognizable. "'71
Secretary of State Stimson was very disappointed
with the way his Minister had acted during the emergency,
and placed the blame on the fact that Curtis was
"a promotion from the career men," and that "I took him
72
on their recommendation . " '

Curtis had served as

American Minister in Santo Domingo where, according
to Stimson, "he had done badly."

His tenure in El

Salvador was disappointing as well, prompting Stimson
to write in his diary that;

"It only shows that when

you have a man who isn't quite up to snuff, the
lightning is sure to strike wherever you put h i m . " ^
Secretary Stimson may have been too harsh on Minister
Curtis who had been on the job less than two months and
the revolution had been brewing long before then.
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Interview with Ambassador Serrano, December 1975*
San Salvador.
^Charge* d*Affaires W. J. McCafferty (El Salvador)
to Stimson, May 18, 1932, file 816.00 General Conditions/
31, R.G. 59. H.A.
"^Henry L. Stimson Diary, December 4, 1931. lale
University Manuscript Collection.
73Ibid.
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A special representative was sent in to assess the
situation.

Former Minister to El Salvador Jefferson

Caffery and his aide H. Freeman Matthews were dispatched
to the troubled country with instructions to "inquire
into the situation and make suggestions to the Depart
ment concerning the steps to be taken..• in order that
a constitutional government may be formed which will
not be barred from recognition... under the terms of the
oh,

General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923."

Secretary

Stimson described Caffery1s trip as a "rescue mission
to S a l v a d o r . T h e i r quick survey resulted in a recom
mendation not to grant recognition to the Martinez
regime and marked the start of an excruciating episode
in Salvadoran-American relations.

The United States,

restricted in its actions by the 1923 treaty, became
entrapped in the dilemma of opposing a revolutionary
government, while no longer willing to use force to
remove i t . ^

"^Stimson to Caffery, December 16 , 1931* file 816.01
Caffery Mission/6 , R.G. 59» N.A.
"^Stimson Diary, January 8 , 1932.
^Stansifer, "Application of the Tobar Doctrine to
Central America," p. 272.

SUMMARY

The deteriorated status, in late 1931* of the
once cordial relationship between the United States and
El Salvador caused a great deal of consternation in the
foreign affairs offices of each country.

Both sides

however, shared the blame for bringing about such a
state of events.

As must be expected, in the relation

ship between two nations, each in effect becomes an
adversary of the other because the foreign policy of
every nation dictates that its goals and interests take
priority over all other considerations.

If such goals

and interests are complementary, then the relationship
between them will not be strained.

The problem arises

when there is a divergence in their objectives.
Early in the twentieth century, the relationship
between the United States and El Salvador began on a
cordial footing.

Although the United States was at the

time gaining a tarnished image because of its interven
tion in other Latin American nations, her good relations
with El Salvador were never seriously threatened.

On

the matter of political stability in Central America,
a matter which greatly concerned the United States, each
nation agreed with the terms of the 1907 and I923
Central American Treaties of Peace and Amity although

46
El Salvador took exception to Article II of the 1923
Treaty which dealt with non-recognition of revolutionary
governments*

Apparently, the future implications of

such a policy were not foreseen and, as a result, no
big issue was made of it*
The economic views of both nations coincided
during the early twentieth century*

In 1922 each had

something to contribute to the other's benefit*

El

Salvador, in dire financial straits, needed the funds
that United States bankers offered*

The Americans,

aware of the growing Mexican and European influence in
the area, wanted to expand their economic influence
there*

One result was the 1922 loan of over $16,000,000,

the bulk of which was bonds sold to the American
public*

The terms were such that default was most

likely during times of financial crisis®

In 1923*

however, El Salvador's coffee exports were substantial
enough that no one foresaw any problems arising from
the loan.
The difficulty that the American Foreign Service
had in finding qualified individuals for assignment
to Central America, proved to be a source of problems.
Unfortunately, many in the diplomatic service considered
an assignment to Central America a demotion.

As a

result, the region did not have the full benefit of able
men with positive attitudes toward their assignments.

El Salvador had the misfortune of having two men of low
caliber assigned to head the United States mission to
that countrye

During the early 1920's the American

Minister9 Montgomery Schuyler served in a manner that
did not endear him (and therefore the United States) to
the Salvadorans®

He is remembered as a man who was

"muy duro, muy violento.1' His poor performance was
overshadowed somewhat by his successors Jefferson Caffery,
who endeared himself to the Salvadoran people*

In 1931

however, the United States suffered another setback
with the appointment of Minister Charles B. Curtis*
His personal shortcomings were vividly revealed with
his erratic conduct during the December 2-4, 1931
coup d'etat*
With the occurrence of the coup the dormant
political and economic problems between the United
States and El Salvador erupted as Article II of the
1923 Treaty prevented the United States from granting
recognition to the new regime of General Maximiliano
Hernandez Martinez.

Moreover, the already inflamed

situation was worsened when the severe drop in coffee
prices forced El Salvador to default on its 1922 loan
from the United States*

Thus, with the presidency of

General Martinez, an agonizing period in the relations
between the United States and El Salvador began*

CHAPTER III

TEE EARLY YEARS:

FOCUS ON RECOGNITION

Non-Recognition as a Tool
On December 20, 1931 the United States officially
informed the four other Central American nations of
its decision not to recognize General Maximiliano H.
Martinez as the President of El Salvador,

The reason

was that the United States would follow the dictates
of Article II of the 1923 Central American Treaty of
Peace and Amity,

But because recognition by Washington

was considered vital for the survival of any Central
American government, the position taken by the United
States meant, literally, the death sentence for the
new government.

In the past, other regimes had collapsed

under similar pressures.1

In fact, it was with this very

thought in mind that Central American delegations signed

•^Excelsior.January 6, 1932. Federico Tinoco of
Costa Rica was ousted in 1919 and Manuel Orellana of
Guatemala was forced out in 1930. For an extended
analysis of the recognition issue from the United States
point of view, see: Kenneth Grieb, "The United States
and the Rise of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez,"
Journal of Latin American Studies, 3* 2 (November 1971)»
pp. 151-172.
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the 1907 and 1923 treaties.

The initial paragraph of

Article II of the 1923 Treaty gave the rationales
Desiring to make secure in the
Republics of Central America the benefits
which are derived from the maintenance of
free institutions and to contribute at the
same time toward strengthening their stabi
lity, and the prestige with which they
should be surrounded, they declare that
every act, disposition or measure which
alters the constitutional organization in
any of them is to be deemed a menace to the
peace of said Republics, whether it proceed
from any public power or from the private
citizens.^
Thus, the signatories used the non-recognition article
as an instrument to preserve stability, as a threat
to any would-be revolutionary that his efforts were
doomed to failure because he would not be granted
recognition by the United States as well as his
neighbors.

In theory, the idea seemed worthwhile; but

in reality, as General Martinez would prove, it was not.
Privately, Secretary of State Henry Stimson ex
pressed doubts about the wisdom of the non-recognition
policy and took pride in the fact that the United States
had, for all intents and purposes, abandoned the non
recognition policy for all area of the world except
Central America.^

Yet, in a speech before the Foreign

2

Memorandum by Chief of Latin American Division
Edwin C. Wilson, February 4, 1932, file 816.01/283,
R.G. 59, N. A.

3

"stimson Diary, December 8 , 1930.
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Relations Council of New York on February 6 , 1931* he
praised the concept for having stopped bloodshed and
for helping to establish more democratic governments*

Ip

In a later assessment of the policies of the period,
historian-diplomat Dana Munro credited the non
recognition policy with helping to curtail revolution
ary efforts in the area*^

On the other hand, Raymond

Leslie Buell, Research Director of the Foreign Policy
Association of New York, charged the policy with
perpetuating dictators who could not be ousted in any
other way than by revolution.^

Ee further urged that

the State Department "lean over backward" to recognize
General Martinez and prevent revolution in El Salvador.
He feared such a revolt would ultimately spread to
neighboring republics.

The only solution to the

problem,he felt, was to amend the 1923 Treaty "in order
to give greater flexibility to its non-recognition
terms."'

Another diplomat, Lawrence Dennis, who had

served in Honduras and Nicaragua, also criticized the
non-recognition policy.

In an article In Foreign Affairs,

Nex'f York Times. February 7, 1931 •
^Munro, The United States and the Caribbean,
1221=1222. p* 280.
^New York Times, January 11, 1931•
7
Raymond Leslie Euell to Edwin C. Wilson,
February 25, 1932, file 8l6.0l/ll6^, R.G. 59, N . A.
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he urged that the United States abancon its adherence
Q
to Article II of the 1923 Treaty*
His article was
immediately criticized by Chandler Anderson* a
prominent international lawyer who proclaimed the
virtues of the 1907 and 1923 treaties *9
of Dennis’ article was clear:

BU-t the point

the value of Article II

had diminished to the point that it was potentially more
embarrassing than useful to the United States*

Accor

ding to Dennis, the potential danger lay in the
eventuality that a revolutionary government may defy
the United States and still manage to survive*

10

It was

the ezact situation that the Martfnez affair turned out
to be*

The United States, although not a signatory to

the 1923 Treaty, had become its strongest supporter in
1931,

Thus, the politics of recognition had become a

dilemma for American diplomats.

The feeling was summed

8

Lawrence Dennis, "Revolution, Recognition and
Intervention," Foreign Affairs* IX (January 1931)»
passim. Dennis served as the American Charge' d ’Affaires
in Honduras and Nicaragua during the Sandino Affair.
9

^Chandler P. Anderson, "Our Policy of Non-Recogni
tion in Central America," American Journal of Inter
national Law. 25 no* 2 (April 1931)» passim. Anderson
was an international law specialist active in Latin
American boundary disputes during the 1920’s.
10

Dennis, "Revolution, Recognition, and Inter
vention, " pp. 207-208.

up by Edwin C. Wilson, Chief of the Latin American
Division of the State Department, who exhibited his
exasperation with the recognition issue and the position
in which it placed the United States where f,we are
dammed if we do and dammed if we don't,"

11

The position in which the American diplomats had
been placed was the result of previous actions by their
predecessors in Latin America,

The desire for sta

bility in Central America had been the predominant
reason President Theodore Eoosevelt and Secretary of
State Elihu Root called for the 1907 conference which
resulted in the Treaty of Peace and Amity of that year.
The same desire, plus a bit of moralizing, prompted
President Woodrow Wilson to abandon the Jeffersonian
doctrine of de facto recognition to stable governments.
In 1913» when he refused to recognize the government of
General Victoriano Huerta in Mexico, President Wilson
hoped to teach the Mexicans that they could not
establish governments through revolution.

He used the

same tactics to oust Federico Tinoco from power in Costa
Rica in 1919®

12

During the presidency of Herbert Hoover

11

Wilson to Minister Sheldon Whitehouse (Guatemala)
November 4, 1932, file 816.01/258, R.G. 59, N. A.
12Munro, The United States and the Caribbean, 19211933, P® 118? Raymond O'Connor, Force and Diplomacy,
Essays Military and Diplomatic (Coral Gables, Florida:
University of Miami Press, 1972), p. 107®

Secretary Stimson used non-recognition to topple the
regime of General Manuel Orellana in Guatemala in 1930.
Thus, non-recognition was a tool used by American
officials to achieve specific goals in Central America,
namely, to maintain political stability, which in turn
enhanced the security of the Panama Canal and other
American interests in the area#

Moreover, it was used

as a coercive device to force the Central Americans to
maintain social and political order through the use of
democratic and free elections®

By using these methods,

it was hoped that they would ultimately be able to
progress economically and politically®

13

When the

efficacy of such methods became questionable, the non
recognition policy was abandoned by Secretary Stimson
in 1930 for all of the world except Central America.
There, the 1923 Treaty remained paramount.

Therefore,

guided by the treaty, on December 20, 1931 the United
States decided not to recognize General Martinez as
President of El Salvador.

13

O' Connor, Force and Diplomacy, p. 106; Munro,
The United States and the Caribbean. 1921-1933. p. 381;
Wright, ‘‘Free Elections in the Latin American Policy
of the United States," p. 99.
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Reaction to American Non-Recognition
The reaction from the press of Latin American
nations was expectedly vehement*

The Mexican press

was especially vitriolic in attacking the position
taken by the United States.

Excelsior criticized the

American non-recognition policy with such phrases as
"being too elastic for the United States" and "it
recognizes whenever it sees fit."

The paper also

accused the United States and certain Central American
countries of treating El Salvador like a "vassal."1^
El Universal Grafico, another Mexican daily, joined in
the protest, condemning the manner in which "...Yankee
imperialism interprets that treaty, which in its hands
acquires the aspects of fantastic elasticity."

It

compared the plight of El Salvador in early 1932 with
that of Mexico two decades past when "once the Govern
ment of Revolution was installed, it was not recognized
by the supreme censor, the United States."

Moreover,

the paper criticized the other Central American repub
lics of "servility" for "not recognizing the new
Salvadoran Government merely because the White House

1^

Excelsior. December 28, 1931*

•^Excelsior, January 6 , 1932.

16
has not given the example of assent.11

The official

stand of the Mexican government was based on her own
"Estrada Doctrine" whereby Mexico neither gave nor
denied recognition to a new government, but simply
maintained or recalled its representatives.

It did

not pass judgment on the internal conduct of other
17
nations• '
The press in the Dominican Republic likewise
disparaged the American policy regarding El Salvador.
La Opinion, a leading daily, conceded that the 1923
Treaty was "very good," but,
...in the hands of the North American
Governments which have liked to carry
out an imperialistic policy, it has
operated very capriciously because it
has served very seldom to secure the
high and noble purposes which seemed
to inspire it.
In short, it has served only to
keep in power in each of the Central
American republics people who were
acceptable to North American policy
since, if managed skillfully, this Treaty
permits the United States to take dif
ferent attitudes in different cases.
In fact, when the United States in
spite of the Treaty has wanted to
overthrow a Government, there have
occurred mysterious and apparently
’legal movements which have culminated .g
in the success of the movement desired.

^ B1 Universal Grafico, January 9» 1932.
17
'Callcott, The Western Hemisphere, p. 255*
•^La Opinion, December 2^, 1931*
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Costa Rica, the nation which had been the leading
proponent of Article II at the 1923 conferences had
reversed itself by 1932.

However, it faced a dilemma.

Because of an internal political situation which
existed in early 1932, it could not openly support
the regime of General Martinez without jeopardizing
its own stability.

In early 1932, a heated campaign

for the presidency of Costa Rica took place. Two men
✓
vied for the office, Ricardo Jimenez and Manuel Castro
Quesada.

Many Costa Rican officials feared that if

they rewarded the "revolutionary" efforts of General
Martfnez by recognizing him, the loser in their own
election might be encouraged to take similar measures.
Therefore, Costa Rica followed Honduras and Nicaragua
19
and refused recognition. 7
However, of all the Central American neighbors
of El Salvador, it was Guatemala which took the hardest
line against General Martfnez.

Certain Guatemalan

officials suggested to American Minister Sheldon
Whitehouse that the Communist threat was exaggerated
by General Martfnez.

Moreover, they suggested that

the other Central American nations and the United
States take "definite steps" to make General Martinez

1^Salisbury, "Domestic Policies and Foreign
Policy: Costa Rica's Stand on Recognition 1923-193^,"
p. 469.
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abide by the convention of 1923 and that "action
beyond breaking diplomatic ties" were necessary.

20

It was ironic that at the same time these officials
were protesting to Whitehouse, the President of
Guatemala, Jorge Ubico, was a comrade-at-arms of
General Martfnez in the struggle against Communism
in Central America.

In fact, in January of 1932

Ubico warned General Martfnez of the plans leftist
radicals had formulated to instigate coordinated
uprisings in both Guatemala and El Salvador.

21

But

the rivalries of the past had once again surfaced
and ill-feelings between El Salvador and Guatemala
were aroused once more.
Many supporters of General Manuel Orellana,
former President of Guatemala, also had second thoughts
about his resignation.

They had seen him forced out

of office in 1930 by Secretary Stimson through the
use of non-recognition.

After seeing the apparent

success of General Martfnez, they believed that he too
could have remained in office had he resisted the

Whitehouse to Stimson, February 8, 1932,
file 816.00/84-2, R. G. 59, N. A.
91

Interview with Ambassador Serrano, December,
1975* San Salvador.

6o
American efforts.

22

In 1932, however, all that they

could do was to jealously vent their anger at General
Martfnez whose resistance to the United States pressure
made him a hero to many in other parts of Latin America.
To many Salvadorans, non-recognition was a sad
disappointment.

They saw that General Martfnez was

able to provide stability after a period of chaos.
Furthermore, by his actions, many of them were able
to avoid mortgage foreclosures as well as benefit
from a moratorium on the repayment of debts.

Likewise,

prices of the most basic commodities went down because
of the efforts of General Martfnez*s administration.
Yet, in spite of such successes, the United States
could not see fit to recognize him.

After-Effects of Non-Recognition
The good-will between El Salvador and the United
States cultivated during the late 1920*s by Ministers
Jefferson Caffery and Warren D. Bobbins quickly

22Whitehouse to Wilson, October 19, 1932, file
816.01/858, E. G. 59, N. A.
^Interviews with Ambassador Serrano, Sr. Penate,
Sr. Barriere, Sr. Domfnguez, December, 1975* San Salvador,
McCafferty to Stimson, January 1 6 , 1932, file 816.00/
General Conditions-27, R. G. 59» N. A.
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disintegrated because of non-recognition.

The

American stand "consequently resulted in considerable
ill-feeling" particularly from the Salvadoran press
and the students.

On December

31,

1931» the latter

group organized a demonstration against the United
States and its Charge1 W. J. MeCafferty.

The Salva

doran government had to intervene to prevent any
disagreeable incidents from arising out of the demon2Ll
stration.
In the months which followed, the antiAmerican feeling manifested itself through continued
press attacks as well as through economic measures taken
against Americans by the Salvadoran government.
On February 23» 1932 El Salvador defaulted on its
1922 loan from American bondholders.

While the economic

pressures on El Salvador were sufficient to warrant
such extreme action, it may also be speculated that it
resulted partly from General Martinez1s anger with
not being recognized by the United States.

Evidence of

this can be seen in other economic actions of the
Salvadoran government.

On June 23» 1932, an American

firm, R. W. Hebard & Co., was notified by the Salvadoran
Minister of Interior that its contract to construct
sanitation facilities in the department of Santa Ana
as well as an agreement to build a system of highways

24

x

MeCafferty to Stimson, January 16, 1932, file
8l6•00/General Condltions-2?, R. G. 59» N. A.
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in El Salvador had both been cancelled by the Council o f .
Ministers effective June 30, 1932.

The reasons given

for the decisions were the financial problems El Salvador
had experienced and also because the contracts were
illegal.

The position of the Salvadoran government

was that the administrative contracts were revocable
at the will of the government.

According to the

American Charge' W. J. McCafferty, "since the government
is prepared to undertake the work itself, the contracts
are legal.

It is apparent that this is mere subterfuge

to evade its obligations."

2=!
J

Pan American Airways, Inc. also experienced similar
problems as the Salvadoran government invalidated a
previous agreement which allowed Pan-American to serve
as the transporting vehicle for alr-mail from El Salvador
to other nations.

These actions by the government

allowed the Salvadorans a release for their frustration
in not receiving recognition from the United States and
American businesses in El Salvador suffered.
It strengthened their resolve when, despite non
recognition, the regime of General Martfnez remained
in office.

Moreover, matters were taken a step further

2^McCafferty to Stimson, July 9. 1932, file
816.00/General Conditions-33, R. G. 59. N. A.
26Ibid.
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when Salvadoran officials boasted that they had been
able to prove "groundless the fear which has existed
from time immemorial that no Central American government
could remain in power without the approval or consent
27
of foreign governments*" f
While non-recognition placed a heavy burden on
the government of General Martfnez, an indirect but
immediate benefit may have resulted from it in neigh
boring Honduras*
Tegucigalpa!

According to Minister Julius Lay in

"the refusal of the Department to

recognize Martfnez has had a very strong restraining
effect on revolutionary leaders in this country.

In

fact it may have prevented an attempted coup d ’etat
in Honduras during the last few months*.. I have reason
to believe that these leaders will not be associated
with any such uprising because they realize its futility
in the face of the definite refusal of our government
pQ
to recognize Martfnez."
In El Salvador itself, leaders of the radical left
saw an opportunity to subvert what they considered to
be a weakened regime.

They believed that, like other

unrecognized governments in Central America’s past, the

27Ibid.
pO
Minister Julius Lay (Honduras) to Stimson,
February 18, 1932, file 816.10/852, R. G. 59, N. A.
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government of General Martfnez would also collapse under
such pressure from the United States.

On January 22,

1932 a small group of radicals led by Alfonso Luna, Mario
Zapata and Farabundo Martf, decided to increase the
pressure on General Martfnez and initiated an uprising
in the western provinces of El Salvador,

Without realiz

ing it, they had given General Martinez an opportunity to
show the United States how strong his anti-communist
beliefs were.

When the ’’Communist” uprising broke out

on January 22, 1932, he reacted violently.
Thus, to El Salvador in 1932, non-recognition by
the United States had far greater implications than
the mere non-acceptance into the world community.

The

leftist rebels initiated an uprising on the mistaken
idea that the government of General Martinez was
weakened by non-recognition.

In turn, the uprising

they initiated was crushed by a president rendered
nervously insecure, but ever alert.

The result was

the matanza, the senseless slaughter of thousands of
innocent Salvadoran peasants.

Anti-Communism as an Instrument to Gain Recognition
General Martfnez followed many avenues in his
efforts to get recognition from the United States.
Among them were his claims to be an ally in the fight
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against Communism.

When the January revolt occurred,

he saw an opportunity to improve his image in the eyes
of his "neighbor to the North."

Through his anti

communist endeavors, he hoped to convince them of his
worth as an ally in the same cause®

It was a reasonable

effort by General Martfnez because many in America
likewise fought the expansion of Communist ideas.
In the United States, the depression had brought
about many changes in the minds of Intellectuals and stu
dents.

The social and political conditions in the

United States at the time seemed conducive to the
germination of new, radical ideas.

Because of the

American government's inability to solve the economic
difficulties, some individuals began to openly question
the efficacy of the capitalistic system.

Others went

beyond and found their solutions in socialism.

When

they saw that the Soviet Union was not badly affected by
the worldwide depression, they concluded that socialism
2a
was the answer. 7
Thus, the American leaders, like General Martinez in
El Salvador, had to deal with the same kind of radicalism
in their own country.

Knowing this, the Salvadoran leader

hoped to have their sympathy and, ultimately, gain their

29

7Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt:
The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 196>0), pp. 1^7-153•
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recognition.

30

Although American officials were sym

pathetic with his efforts against Communism* they
nevertheless refused to recognize his regime.

31

The

result of the non-recognition was the continued lack
of credibility of General Martfnez's administration.
The seemingly unstable government of El Salvador*
further weakened by the economic distress brought
about by the depression* whetted the appetite of the
radical groups.

Agitators subjected various segments

of the population to a barrage of propaganda.

Labor

unions and unemployed farm workers were especially
attractive targets to the radical groups.

The social

agitation by leftists during the 1920’s had begun to
bear fruit as the depression-bred problems made many
poor Salvadorans quite responsive to the overtures of
the Communists during the 1930’s.-^2

^ David Shannon» Twentieth Century America (Chicago:
Rand McNally* 1967)» pp. 386-387;
New York Times.
February 2, 1932. General Martfnez was not the only one
to attempt to gain favor from the Americans by being a
staunch anti-Communist. The Grau regime in Cuba tried
the same measure in an effort to gain recognition.
Charles A. Thomson* ’’The Cuban Revolution*” p. 154, in
Ramon Eduardo Ruiz ed., Interpreting Latin American Histo
ry from Independence to Today (New York; Holt, Rinehart”
and Winston, Inc• 1970).
31
^ Stimson Diary, January 25, 1932.
-^2New York Times. May 29, 1931J Callcott, The
Western Hemisphere, p. 253; Rollie Poppino, International
Communism in Latin America: A History of the Movement
1917-1963~TLondon:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1 9 ^ ) ,
p. 1^ 1- 143.
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Host of the propaganda efforts emanated from
Mexico and Guatemala#

In fact* the Soviet Union

legation in Mexico City had become so active in training
agitators that the Mexican government was forced to
break off relations with Moscow.-^

The flow of pro

paganda materials however* continued to enter El Salvador
from Mexico which in turn received most of its
literature from Communist organizations in the United
States.
The activities of radical groups in El Salvador
during 1930-1931 caused a great deal of concern among
government officials.

According to the Chief of Police,

General Enrique Leitzelar, "the Soviet government has
decided upon El Salvador as the Central American center
for its activities."

Although President Eosque at the

time confirmed the suspicions of his Chief of Police, no
evidence of such a Soviet Union decision was ever
presented to the American Minister Warren D. Robbins.
Still, the fears continued as captured correspondence bet
ween a labor organizer in San Salvador, Miguel Angel
Martinez, and the "International Labor Defense," an

^ N e w York Times, February 23, 1931;
The Western Hemisphere, pp. 25^-255•

Callcott,

■^Finley to Stimson, May 20, 1931, file 8l6.00
B/38, R.G. 59, N. A.
-^Robbins to Stimson, October 31, 1930, file
816.00 B/22, R.G. 59, N. A.
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American Negro labor group, was made public.

The

American group urged its comrades in El Salvador to
unite and organize against "capitalists and imperial
ists," and urged that they boycott American
manufactured goods.

The Salvadoran government made

numerous requests of the American legation to do some
thing to stop the flow of propaganda material emanating
37
from the United States.-''
The fear of Communism in El Salvador existed not
only because of the disseminated propaganda literature,
but also from actual incidents of Communist activities
which occurred sporadically near the capital and along
the countryside.

The arrest of a known Communist

leader, Agustin Farabundo Marti', confirmed the existence
of radical agitators in the area.'*®

Marti had previously

been exiled for his efforts in agitating the campesinos.
He had also served with Agusto Sandino in Nicaragua.
To be sure, what were termed Communist outbreaks
were oftentimes merely labor disputes which arose from

®®Robbins to Stimson, January 12, 1931* file 8l6.00
B/29, R.G. 59» N. A; McCafferty to Stimson, April 2,
1932, file 816.00 General Conditions/29, R.G. 59* N. A.
-^Curtis to Stimson, November 19, 1931* file 816.00
General Conditions/2o• R.G. 59* N.A.
38Finley to Stimson, May 12, 1931, file 816.00/802,
R.G. 59, N . A.
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the economic dislocations brought about by the worsening
39
depression. ^

Also, many Salvadorans whose intentions

were merely social reform were likewise labeled
Communists when in fact they harbored no Communist
ideas.

As elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, the

leftist radicals became excellent targets for accusing
fingers and were blamed as the culprits in many
incidents for which they had no responsibility.

The

Communist rebels sporadically clashed with the forces
of General Martinez in the early part of 1932 and cul
minated in one of the bloodiest confrontations in
Latin American history.
At midnight on January 22, 1932, bands of Indian
campesinos began to attack isolated fincas in the
western part of El Salvador.

The uprising was for the

most part confined to the region between San Salvador,
Ahuachapan and Acajutla, the coffee growing center of
El Salvador.

Towns and villages were taken and sacked

by Indians armes with machetes and other small weapons.
There was no fighting in the capital city but there
existed the fear that some troops would be disloyal
to the government.

Ilq

■ ^ M c C a f f e r t y to Stimson,
816.00 General Conditions/29,

F e b r u a r y 5* 1932,

file

R.G. 59, N . A.

^McCafferty to Stimson, February 5» 1932,
816.00 General Conditions/28, R.G. 59* N . A.

file

The rebellious Indians were the descendants of
the Pipiles, the original inhabitants of the region.
Like in other countries, their lands were taken away
from their e.iidos during the latter part of the nine
teenth century and they became impoverished workers on
their own lands.

Moreover, the treatment of the

workers helped to worsen the situation inasmuch as they
were abused and exploited by the finqueros.

In 1932

many of them were convinced by the Communist agitators
that they had a justifiable case against the finqueros1
oppression.

They were promised a portion of land for

their families by the radical agitators.

Moreover,

they were to share in the redistribution of wealth after
the revolution.

42

Thus, the Indians attacked the

symbols of their oppression, the authorities and any
ladino.

The descriptions of the atrocities, looting

and general madness of Indians stimulated by alcohol
terrified the entire Salvadoran population.

The

government, which had been forewarned by Jorge Ubico
of the impending Communist-led rebellion, reacted
quickly and plans for counterattacks were immediately

41
42

Ibid.

~
Interview with Sr. Penate, December 1975, San
Salvador•

laid.

General Jose Tomas Calderon was given the respon

sibility of crushing the revolt.

On the whole, the

Salvadoran population supported General Martinez's
k3
actions because they too feared Communism. ^
As news of the attacks reached each village, panic
ensued as escaping ladinos described their eyewitness
accounts of maiming, eye gouging, and other brutal
activities of the rampaging Indians.

But the military

suppression of the uprising was quick and violent.
Towns and villages were retaken by well armed troops
whom the villagers welcomed as "saviours."

Brief but

violent confrontations occurred as soldiers machine
gunned "waves of onrushing Indians."

All suspected

rebels were executed on the spot by firing squads.
Many were suspected simply because they were Indians
and were summarily executed.

Many who had given support

to Communist programs in the past were likewise executed.
The basis for suspicion became so flimsy that many
people feared for their lives simply because they

A 3

_

^Interviews with Ambassador Serrano, Sr. Penate,
and Sr. Dominguez, December 1975» San Salvador.
L l Ll

Interview with Sr. Penate, December 1975, San
Salvador.
Sr. Penate was one of the soldiers assigned
to retake the town of Sonsonate from the Indians. He was
as terrified by the ferocity of the attacks as the
villagers although he was behind the machine gun.
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appeared to be Indians.

Between January 23 when the

government counterattack and reprisals began and
April 10 when order was completely restored, over
ten thousand Salvadorans were killed.

There were no

official counts of the number of people killed, but
some estimates place the total number killed at over
twenty-five thousand.

J

Because of his quick and effective action, General
Martinez became the champion of anti-Communism
throughout Central America.

He and his soldiers became

the "saviours'’ of the towns and villages in El Salvador.
He used the opportunity to strengthen his relationship
with his troops and solidify his position as President.
Moreover, he used the threat of further Communist out
breaks as an excuse to increase the strength of the mili<=*
l±6
tary and police.

^Jorge Schlesinger, Revoluci6n communista.
Guatemala en peligro? (Guatemala: Union Tipografica
Castaneda Avila y Cla 1946), p. 4; Poppino, Interna
tional Communism in Latin America, p. l4l; Interviews
with Sr. and Sra. Felix Dominguez Revelo, Sra. Amana
Calderon, July 1971® San Salvador;
Sra. Lolita Barauna,
June 1975, New Orleans. The interviewees all agreed that
General Martfnez exceeded the force required to crush
the revolt. At the same time, however, they also agreed
that they were terrified by the atrocities and felt the
need to crush the uprising at any cost•
46

McCafferty to Stimson, February 2, 1932, file
816.00/845, R.G. 59, N. A.
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The United States’ concern with the activities
of Communists everywhere helped to soften the harsh
reality of the massacre*

The efforts of General

Martfnez to put down the uprising received a favorable
reaction from the State Department®

Although American

and Canadian cruisers and destroyers were sent to
nearby ports, no foreign troops set foot on Salvadoran
soil.

Secretary Stimson was relieved that no American

troops landed, but noted in his diary that General Martfnez, "the man who is president and who is the only
pillar against the success of what seems to be a nasty
proletarian revolution®..we are unable to recognize
L7
under the 1923 rule." ' Thus, in spite of the sympathy,
recognition was not granted.

The change in the

American position did not take place until 193^ when
the New Deal changed many old ideas.

The Good Neighbor Grants Recognition
When the term of President Herbert Hoover ended in
March of 1933* a new era in United States-Latin American
relations was ushered in— the era of the '"Good Neighbor"
policy.

The serious economic condition of the United

^ S t i m s o n Diary, January 25, 1932.

74States at the arrival of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the
presidency did not leave him much time for foreign policy
matters.

Domestic problems required his full attention.

Thus, his advisors, primarily Secretary of State Cordell
Hull and Assistant Secretary Sumner Welles, were responsible for establishing the foreign policies.

4-8

In Latin

American affairs the Influence of Sumner Welles was sig
nificant.

During the pre-Inauguration period of Franklin

D. Roosevelt’s term, Welles presented his views on InterAmerican Relations in a memo to his newly-elected friend.
The memorandum provided the guidelines later followed by
the Good Neighbor policy and was an important keystone
to Salvadoran-American relations during the 1930’s and
194-0’s.

Welles stated that:

The creation and maintenance of the most
cordial and intimate friendship between
the United States and the other republics
of the American Continent must be regarded
as a keystone of our foreign policy.
The
erroneous interpretations given to the
Monroe Doctrine over a period of many
decades have constituted a constant cause
for apprehension and for misrepresentation
of the true purposes of the government of
the United States. The Monroe Doctrine
declares that the United States will not
permit any non-American nation to encroach
upon the political independence of any
American republic; and that the United

4-8
Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy
of the United States: An Historical Interpretation
(New York: Hareourt Brace and Company, 194-3. p. 258.

States will not consent to the acquisition in
any manner of the control of additional
territory in this Hemisphere by any nonAmerican Power* These principles have until
now been proclaimed solely on the authority
of the United States and they will not be
abandoned*
But they are essentially principles
of continental self-defense. And they are as
vitally important to every other republic of
this Hemisphere as they are to the United
States itself. I would welcome their adoption
by every American republic as a portion of its
national policy* Tn that manner alone, in my
opinion, can there be permanently abolished
the impression which has persisted that these
simple principles of self-defense can involve
a threat to the sovereignty or to the national
well-being of any republic of the Western
Hemisphere.
In addition, Welles suggested that the United States
should not resort to armed intervention, should promote
commerce and when a question arose, consult with other
American republics.^

The views of Welles were well

taken by President Roosevelt, and he incorporated
some of the ideas in a major speech on Pan American Day
in April 12, 1933 and thus launched the Good Neighbor
policy.
In addition to Welles, the influence of Josephus
Daniels, Roosevelt's old mentor at the Department of
Navy, was also significant.

In his new position as

^Charles G . .Griffin, "Welles to Roosevelt: A
Memorandum on Inter-American Relations, 1933,” Hispanic
American Historical Review, XXXIV (May 195*0, PP190-192.
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ambassador to Mexico, Daniels helped to guide President
Roosevelt to take a milder, more humanitarian position
in the area of United States-Caribbean relations.-’0
The

old "big stick" and "dollar diplomacy" of the past had

to be replaced with a better policy.
The actual practice of"good neighborliness" was
probably best exemplified initially by the new Secretary
of State Cordell Hull at the Montevideo Conference
in 1933*

Hr. Hull, long a student of international

commercial relations, had been concerned about the
adverse effects of high tariff walls which the United
States had bult around itself.

At the same time, it

had "withdrawn from the market as a customer of certain
Latin American nations..

.

As a result, Hull went to

the conference with the objective in mind that an
attempt to resolve the economic ills of the world could
be successful if tariff walls were brought down.

The

Resolution on Economic, Commercial and Tariff Policy,
also known as the Hull Plan, was one of the accomplish
ments of the Montevideo Conference.

For its part, the

^°E. David Cronon, "Interpreting the Good Neighbor
Policy: The Cuban Crisis of 1933," Hispanic American
Historical Review, 39 (November 1959)» PP* 560-567.
-^Benjamin Muse, "The Montevideo Conference,"
Speech, July 7, 193*1, before the Institute of Public
Affairs, University of Virginia, in folder 3^8,
Monetary and Economic Conferences - Montevideo Conference
Box 78, Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress.
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United States through the Resolution, announced its
desire to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with
the nations of the world.
The American success at the Montevideo Conference
was in part due to the efforts of Secretary Hull
himself.

His dignified, yet sympathetic and friendly

manner, enabled him to win respect and admiration from
CO

the other delegates.-'

The fact that he represented a

new administration, not identified with the old
imperialism, helped to convince the wary Latin American
delegates of his sincerity.-'-'

As it turned out, the

conference proved to be a notable juncture in United
States-Latin American relations.

As soon as it ended,

the State Department set about to establish a course for
stable relations for the future and remedy the wrongs
<5Zl

of the past.-'

Among the problems which needed to be

remedied was the bothersome issue of non-recognition.
However, before any positive action was taken by
the United States on the non-recognition matter, the
policy was subjected to a great deal of criticism at
home and abroad.

The criticisms emanated from different

52Ibid.
-'■'Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy,
pp. 1^-18.
L

Laurence Duggan, The Americas:
The Search for
Hemisphere Security (New Yorks Henry Holt and Company,
Inc. 19^9)» P« 6 5 .
J
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corners of the United States and for different reasons.
President Lawrence A. Lowell of Harvard University
attacked the policy during a speech on February 1, 1933*
He agreed with other critics that the policy lowered
the stature of the United States in the family of
nations and that it continued the outdated big stick
practices of the p a s t O n

April 30, 1933# an investor

from Maryland wrote an angry letter to Secretary Hull in
which he suggested that the State Department recognize
the Salvadoran government uso U. S. bondholders may
receive their interest.”

He blamed the problem on "old

pot belly Hoover and his crazy religious gang of
bigots."

He further warned that the situation be

corrected "at once" or else "Roosevelt will be blamed,"-^
Other correspondence with the State Department, in less
threatening tones, also urged recognition of General Martfnez for economic ressons.-^
On the other hand, one of President Roosevelt's

-^Stimson Diary, February 1, 1933®
-^Mr. Embebee (Berlin, Maryland) to Hull, April 30,
1933. file 8l6.51c39/229, R.G. 59, N. A.
-^Memorandum of conversation between Col. J. F. H.
Johnson (President of Botany Worsted Mills) and Edwin C.
Wilson, April 14, 1932, file 816.51c 39/138, R.G. 59.
N. A; Matthew Salsinger to State Department, April 24,
1932, file 8l6.51c39/l44, R.G. 59. N. A.

appointees, also urged the State Department to
recognize SI Salvador.

Josephus Daniels, Ambassador

to Mexico urged that recognition be granted "with a
view to restoring the friendly relations which pre
viously existed between the United States and El
Salvador."-^

While these requests for recognition

came from individuals not directly involved with
Salvadoran affairs, the bulk of the inquiries regarding
recognition came from individuals acting directly as
agents of General Martinez.
Immediately after taking office, General Martinez
actively solicited the aid of various individulas in
an attempt to sway the State Department: to grant
recognition.

He

requested the executives of American

companies in El Salvador to express to Washington
their satisfaction with the de facto g o v e r n m e n t 7
The efforts of Salvadoran "agents" to gain
recognition from the United States were based upon
the following rationales:

(1 ) that General Martinez
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•"Memorandum of conversation between Col. J. F. H.
Johnson (President of Botany Worsted Mills) and Edwin C.
Wilson, April 3>, 1932, file 816.51c39/l38, R. G. 59,
N. A. Matthew Salsinger to State Department, April 2^,
1932, file 816'.51039/1^, B. G. 59, N. A.
Ambassador Josephus Daniels (Mexico) to Hull,
June 16, 1933, file 8l6 .01/302, R. G. 59. N.A.
-^McCafferty to Stimson, February 5» 1932, file
816.00 General Conditions/28, R. G. 59* N.A.

was not involved in the 1931 coup and therefore he
became president by virtue of his being vice-president;
(2) Articles 81 and 92 of the Salvadoran constitution
guaranteed him the position; the constitution of El
Salvador was the ultimate law in the country and the
United States had violated it through the use of the
1923 Treaty;

(3) the danger of Communism was real;

(4) the general population supported the de facto regime
and wanted the government to continue because of its
efficiency and honesty;

(5) the 1923 Treaty could be

circumvented if he were allowed to serve as vice pre
sident for a period then rise to the presidency after
the interim head (first designate) stepped dox^n.
The arguments were used by Salvadoran representa
tives in an effort to gain recognition for General
Martinez.

Antonio A. Vidaurre, Salvadoran Minister

to Costa Rica, attempted to convince American Minister
in San Jose, Charles Eberhardt of the Communist threat.
He pointed out that the January 22 uprising was insti
gated by non-Salvadorans,

Moreover, he believed the

successful efforts to quash the Communists deserved
/

recognition from the United States,

^

In another

Memorandum from Minister Charles Eberhardt
(Costa Rica) to Stimson, February 25, 1932, file 816.01/
110, R. G. 59, N. A.
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instance Justice Gustavo Guerrero of the World Court
and Salvadoran delegate to the 1907 conference, spoke
with Secretary of State Stimson in an effort to con
vince him that General Martinez was not involved in the
1931 revolt which placed him in office.
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The result

was a negative response from the United States in each
instance.
The most active representative of the cause of
General Martinez, however, was a Costa Rican.

Luis

Anderson, a prominent international lawyer and also a
delegate to the 1907 conference, attempted to convince
many influential Americans of the constitutionality of
General Martinez's actions.

He brought his case before

the United States Minister in Costa Rica, as well as
Senators and State Department officials in Washington.
While they sympathized with his arguments, the American
position remained unchanged.

The efforts of all of

General Martinez's agents failed to convince the State
Department officials of the need to grant recognition.
The 1923 Treaty remained paramount.
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Stimson Diary, April 22, May 3» 1932.
^2
Memorandum of a telephone conversation between
Senator William King and Assistant Secretary of State
Francis White, February 20, 1932, file 8l6 .01/119,
R. G. 59» N. A. Senator King had been asked by his
friend Luis Anderson to seek recognition for General
Martinez® His efforts failed. Eberhardt to Stimson,
February 25, 1932, file 816.01/110, R. G. 59, N. A.

82
While the United States felt morally hound to
the treaty, European nations did not.

Eased on

reports from their representatives in El Salvador, the
threat of further disorders due to continued Communist
activities seemed real indeed.

They x?ere convinced

that General Martinez was the only one ahle to keep
the nation peaceful and economically stable.

Britain

among the European nations took the initiative in this
re-examination of the recognition matter.

The British

Charge* in San Salvador, Robert Goldie, was very much
Impressed with General Martfnez* s suppression of the
Communists and his control of the nation, but was
fearful that continued non-recognition meant that his
control would be gradually undermined and instability
would return.

The British had unofficially granted

what was tantamount to recognition when the British
Minister in Guatemala, on September 5. 1932, addressed a
telegram to the Salvadoran Minister of Foreign Affairs
requesting provisional recognition while the new British
Charge’ in San Salvador awaited his credentials by m a i l . ^
Another important matter which the British had to con
sider in the recognition issue was economic.

A commer

cial treaty between the two nations was due to expire on

^McCafferty to Stimson, October 4, 1932, file
8l6 .00 General Conditions/3 6, R. G. 59. N. A.
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September 23, 1932.

The British Minister in Guatemala

"forced” his Charge* in San Salvador to recognize
General Martinez because he was "bluffed" into believing
that recognition was a prerequisite for a renewal.

6 h

On September 23, 1932 the British officially recognized
EL Salvador.

Shortly thereafter, the treaty was renewed

for another year.
France was likewise anxious to renew a Preferential
Tariff Treaty.

In addition, she wanted to sign a

special convention for the protection of rights to
names of certain products sold in El Salvador.

Both

objectives were reached by France after she granted
recognition to the government of General Martinez on
September 19* 1932.

Charge’ McCafferty observed that "it

seems fairly certain that the recognition of the Martinez
regime by France has been used as a bargaining considera
t i o n. . . " ^

Other European nations follox'red the actions

of Britain and France shortly thereafter.
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Minister Sheldon Whitehouse (Guatemala) to
White, October 19, 1932, file 816.01/258, H. G. 59,
N. A. Whitehouse accused the British Minister to
Guatemala of being "a complete jackass" and held him
responsible for hurrying up the British recognition
of El Salvador.
^McCafferty to Stimson, October 4, 1932, file
816.00 General Conditions/3 6 , E. G. 59, N. A.
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Among El Salvador's sister states, Mexico and
Costa Rica took the initiative in the attempt to get
recognition.

Mexico, by virtue of the "Estrada

Doctrine" did not withhold recognition at all and thus
helped to encourage General Martinez to resist American
pressure.

Ironically, Costa Rica, formerly the major

advocate of the non-recognition article of the 1923
Treaty, was in 1932 the leader in calling for its
abrogation.

New leaders had emerged in Costa Rica

who shared Martinez's fear of Communism in Central
America.

Leonidas Pacheco, Costa Rica's Foreign

Minister, urged the other Central American nations to
denounce the 1923 Treaty which "though noble in its
intents, failed to accomplish the goals it had set u p . " ^
When her neighbors refused to cooperate, Costa Rica
decided to act independently and formally denounced the
treaty on December 24, 1932.

Two days later, El Salvador

likewise denounced the treaty.
With the denunciations, the beginning of the end
had come for the 1923 Treaty and the United States was
placed in a very delicate situation.

Honduras, Guatemala

and Nicaragua looked to America for leadership on the
matter, but the United States could not officially act

^ N e w York Times, November 19* 1932.

until the Central American nations took the initiative*
The impasse was finally broken after Costa Rica
officially recognized El Salvador on January 1, 193^»
The following day a plan for recognition, drawn up by
Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles, was sent
to American ministers throughout Latin America for
their consideration.

The procedure was as follows:

...That agreement be reached between the
Presidents of Guatemala, Honduras and
Nicaragua providing in effect that, in
view of the denunciation by Costa Rica
and El Salvador of the treaty and pending
a revision of that treaty, the three
Presidents declare that their Governments,
while regarding the treaty as being in
force with respect to the relations main
tained by the three states with each
other, do not regard it as being in force
with respect to the relations of those
states with Costa Rica and El Salvador.
Following the signature of such an agree
ment, the three Governments in question
would extend recognition to the Martinez
Government; the United States would extend
recognition simultaneously.
The agreement
between the three Presidents would also
provide for the calling at a later date
of another Conference of the Central
American states to consider a revision
of the General Treaty of Peace and Amity...
Our thought is to broach this plan Informally
to President Sacasa of Nicaragua through
Minister Lane, with the suggestion that
Sacasa, if the idea appeals to him, either
might put it forward as his own initiative
with the Presidents of Guatemala and Hon
duras ...
It would be our consistent purpose
throughout the suggested negotiation to
have the initiative taken by the Central
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American States and to have any sugges
tions emanating from us regarded as
strictly confidential...°7
The decision to finally grant recognition was justified
by the American Charge* in San Salvador who wrote to
Secretary Hull that "the Martfnez regime has shown
itself honest and conscientious and has endeavored to
carry on the government in an efficient manner in
spite of the great, difficulties brought on by the
world depression."

On January 26, 193^ the United

States officially recognized General Martfnez as
President of El Salvador.

Thus, a source of diffi

culty in the relations between the United States and
El Salvador was removed.

While some improvement

subsequently occurred, the economic problems brought on
by the depression created additional difficulties
between the two nations.

But by then the Good Neighbor

policy had become well established as the guiding light
for Salvadoran-American relations.

^ A c t i n g Secretary William Phillips to American
Legation (Chile), January 2, 193^, file 816.01/3^ A,
R. G. 59, N. A.
ZT Q

McCafferty to Hull, January 4, 193^, file
816.00/93^, R. G. 59, N. A.
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SUMMARY

Throughout the first thirty years of the twentieth
century, in diplomatic relations with new Latin American
governments, the United States traditionally emphasized
the use of the formal act of recognition.

This seal of

approval from the United States had over the years
become so important that without it no nation in Cen
tral America could be expected to survive.

The collapse

of the Tinoco regime in Costa Rica in 1919 and the
Orellana regime in Guatemala in 1930 were both attribu
table to the non-recognition policy of the United States.
Thus, recognition and acceptance into the world community
was of vital importance for new governments in the area.
Because of the significance of this sanction by
the United States, the new governments faced the diffi
cult task of trying to determine their national priorities
vis-a-vis their neighbors.

What was good in the eyes of

the United States or for that matter, the whole of
Central America, was not necessarily good for the
individual state.

If the fundamental premise in the

foreign policy of every nation is the preservation of
national integrity, then

the fulfillment of requirements

for acceptance into the community of nations must remain
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secondary to national self-interest.

The effectiveness

of the foreign policy of a nation must therefore he
judged by how well its leaders preserve the integrity
and sovereignty of the nation.
On December 20* 1931s El Salvador faced a serous di
lemma.

Because of the 1923 Treaty, the United States

refused to grant recognition to the government of
General Martinez.

Yet, the Salvadoran constitution

guaranteed General Martfnez the right to hold his office.
Moreover, because the Salvadoran Congress (in 1923) had
ratified the treaty with certain reservations on the
non-recognition article (II), General Martfnez concluded
that it did not apply in his case.

Despite these

rejoinders, the United States maintained its non
recognition position and stood by Article II of the
1923 Treaty.

Indeed, Article II was included to prevent

such occurrences as the coup of 1931 in El Salvador.
But in 1923» the treaty authors depended upon the fact
that the existence of United States military and economic
power (and the willingness to use it) was adequate to
force any would-be rebel to take heed before acting.
But by 1931 the traditional big stick policy of the
United States had been mellowed somewhat and America
was no longer willing to use force to enforce its policies.
Thus, the State Department was itself placed in an
awkward position of standing by a policy but not willing
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to take the next step of using force to carry out its
wishes.
Thus, the non-recognition policy had become an
albatross around the neck of the State Department and
was subjected to criticism from many sides.

Even

Secretary of State Henry Stimson expressed his doubts
(to his diary) about the efficacy of such a policy
although he never publicly stated it.

Likewise,

Haymond Leslie Buell of the Foreign Policy Association of
New York, a noted authority on Latin America and
Lawrence Dennis, a former diplomat assigned to Central
America, also criticized the non-recognition policy.
Dennis1 article in Foreign Affairs accurately pointed out
the problem of the eventuality of a revolutionary
government defying the United States and still managing
to survive.

Such was exactly the case of General

Martinez's regime.

Still, the United States, because it

had become the staunchest supporter of the 1923 Treaty,
had no choice but to maintain its non-recognition
position.
Because of this stand, the United States became the
subject of criticism throughout Latin America.

The

press of Mexico was especially vehement in its attacks on
American policy.

On the other hand, Mexico self-

righteously proclaimed that because of its Estrada
Doctrine, it did not judge the acceptability of a new
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government.

El Salvador's Immediate neighbors, because

they had been signatories to the 1923 Treaty and because
of internal political considerations, stood by the
United States position®

The pressure on El Salvador

was intense, especially from Guatemala which urged the
United States to use force to oust General Martinez.
The tension which had arisen out of the non
recognition issue manifested itself in the strained
economic relations between the United States and El
Salvador.

The most significant act was the 1932 Sal

vadoran default on its 1922 loan from the United States,
although it was probably justifiable because of the
dramatic drop in coffee prices in the previous year.
There were, however, other acts of economic harassment
of American firms with government contracts which the
Salvadoran government voided illegally and on very short
notice causing the companies great losses.

While the

American losses were extensive, the loss of lives
suffered by the Salvadorans in the matanza was even worse.
Some attribute it to the non-recognition stand of the
United States.
Radical leftists had been in El Salvador since
the early 1920's agitating the campesinos on the coffee
fincas.

To be sure, they had just causes to bring out to

the open because for years the finqueros had exploited
their workers.

On January 22, 1932 the leftists,
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convinced, that the unrecognized government was unstable
and therefore ripe for a revolt, organized the campeslnos
to attack fincas and towns in the western, coffee growing
region of El Salvador.

General Martinez, however, was

ready and immediately launched a massive counterattack
on a scale far beyond what was necessary to quell the
rebellion.

As a result, more than ten thousand peasants

were killed in the bloody matanza which ensued.
Because the action was shielded behind a struggle
against the expansion of Communism, the harsh reality
of the massacre x^as softened in the eyes of the American
officials.

Although they sympathized with their anti

communist neighbor, they still refused to recognize his
government.

In his efforts fco gain recognition General

Martfnez also utilized the services of intermediaries
to plead his cause to American officials.
recognition was granted.

Still, no

It was not until the enunciation

of the "Good Neighbor" policy that a change of position
occurred.
With the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt came
the change in the United States policy toward Latin
America.

The big stick and dollar diplomacy of old

were replaced as were the men associated with such poli
cies.

Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles took charge of

United States foreign policy toward Latin America.

They

were forced to act favorably on the Salvadoran issue by
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other nations not bound to the 1923 Treaty but in the
past, out of respect for the United States, had
supported the non-recognition policy.

By late 1932

however, economic realities along with fears that
continued non-recognition only increased the danger of
further instability, caused the European nations to
act in contravention to United States policy.

In

September of 1932 Britain and Prance led the other
European nations and recognized El Salvador.

By

December 24, 1932 Costa Rica officially denounced the
treaty and two days later El Salvador followed suit.
Thus, with the denunciations, the end had come for
the policy.

On January 26, 1934 the United States

recognized the Salvadoran government and ended a very
difficult period for the two nations.

CHAPTER IV

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Perils of a One-Crop Economy
One of the premises of the emerging Good Neighbor
policy under Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt was the
notion that United States power would be used less to
advance the interests of private investors in the
Western Hemisphere.

This was tested in Latin America

during the early 1930‘s when many nations defaulted on
their obligations to American bondholders.

The economic

difficulties caused by the worldwide depression became
the focus of attention in relations between the United
States and Latin American nations.

Relations with El

Salvador were no different.
El Salvador was a one-crop agricultural country,
its economy based on the production and export of
coffee.

As late as 19^0, it could still be said that

“with the exception of Venezuela, where petroleum pre
dominates, no other country in Latin America is so
dependent on the export of a single product than
93

4

El Salvador."1

While it produced sufficient food

crops for its needs, industrial development other
than that related to agriculture was virtually
negligible.

As a broad but true generalization, it

may be said that El Salvador exported coffee and
imported everything else save basic foodstuffs for
the bulk of its people.

Exports of coffee in great

measure determined the value of Salvadoran imports
since there were few other sources of foreign
exchange.

Moreover, shifts in the prices of/or

markets for coffee were immediately reflected in both
the foreign and domestic trade of El Salvador.

2

Because of the small nation1s economic dependence on coffee, it suffered greatly from the
collapse in price during the economic crisis of
the 1930’s.

Between 1929 and 19^0, the price of

coffee dropped more than seventy percent from 20.39
cents per pound to 6.17 cents per pound.

■^United States Tariff Commission, The Foreign
Trade of Latin America, Part II Commercial Policies
and Trade Relations of Individual Latin American
Countries .^Section 12. El Salvador (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 19^1), p. 5»
2Ibid.
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Table I

Decline In the Price of Coffee, 1929-19^0^
Period

1929

Price
(F.O.B.) 20.39
(cents/
TirtllwH I

1932

1936

1937

1938

1939

19^0

9.11

7.70

8.87

6 .9^

6.93

6.17

The significance of coffee to Salvadoran-American
relations centered on the fact that after 193^* the
bulk of El Salvador's coffee exports were to the
United States.

Moreover, the proportion of coffee in

the total exports of El Salvador increased substan
tially from sixty-nine percent in 1920 to ninety-five
h
percent in 193^.
Although the percentage decreased
somewhat in the period just before World War II, it
remained relatively high, averaging above eighty
percent of the total exports.

3
-'United States Tariff Commission, Latin America
as a Source of Strategic and other Essential Materials.
A Report on Strategic and Other Essential Materials,
and Their Production and Trade, with Special Reference
to Latin American Countries and to the United States.
Eepbrt^no'. 1 W , Second^Serres~Twaihin^on^;
Government
Printing Office, 19^1), p. 256.
^Brannon, El Salvador, esquema estadfstlca de la
vlda naclonal, pp. 23-24.
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Unlike some of the other coffee growing nations
of the world, El Salvador was fortunate in that much
of the coffee it produced belonged to the mild, "blue"
variety (coffea arabica) which commanded a higher price
than Brazilian coffee.

American importers used the

mild coffee as a blend to temper the stronger type
imported in large quantities from Erazil.

As a result,

El Salvador enjoyed a relatively secure market in the
United States.

Moreover, El Salvador's major export

entered the United States free of duty.-'’ The 1926
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Eights
facilitated the trade between the two n a t i o n s B e t 
ween 1926 and 1932 the United States purchased an
average of twenty percent of El Salvador's total coffee
exports annually.

At the same time, however, the bulk

of its coffee exports went to Germany, Scandinavia,

^United States Tariff Commission, The Foreign Trade
of Latin America, p. 5? Wallich and Adler, Public
Finance in a Developing Country;
El Salvador- A Case
Study, pp. 28. 203; Ellis to Eull,' November 28, 19^1,
Item no. 7008, Office of Strategic Services, R. G. 226,
N. A.
^Translation of a Report by Dr. Juan Ernesto
Vasquez, Delegate of El Salvador to the Meeting of
Finance Ministers of the American Republics, held at
Guatemala City, November 14-21, 1939* Military Intel
ligence Division, February 1940, Item no. 4000, Folder
3860-End, Eox 819, El Salvador 3850-4130, G-2 Regional
File 1933-1944, R. G. 165, N. A.
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and other European nations which purchased an average
of fifty-four percent of her total coffee exports
each year.

7

These European nations preferred the

milder tasting coffee from El Salvador and Colombia
to that of Brazil.

While El Salvador had no difficulty

in selling its coffee to the United States and Europe,
the price at which it was forced to sell during the
depression was disastrous for the economy.

The price

of coffee had been articifially stabilized by Brazil
during the 1921-1930 period by means of a valorization
plan whereby the government withheld from the market
surplus stocks when the crops were large and prices
low.

These stocks were later released when crops were

small and prices rose.

While the plan-helped to

stabilize coffee prices, it also stimulated production
in other coffee producing nations and encouraged the
development of new coffee lands in Brazil thus increasing
future supply and aggravating the problem.

The stabi

lization plan ended in 1931 when Brazil imposed a
prohibitive tax on new coffee tree plantings and an
export tax to provide funds for the purchase and des
truction of large coffee stocks.

The result was a severe

drop in the price of coffee in world markets.

With

7
Wallich and Adler - Public Finance in a Develop
ing Country;
El Salvador - A Case Study, p. 31•
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the onset of the severe coffee price crash between
1929 and 19319 when the price of the commodity dropped
more than forty percent, the foundation of El SalvaO
dor's economy was all but shattered.
In an effort
to save the faltering economy President Araujo sent
the fiscal representative, William Renwick, to New
York to negotiate a short term loan using liquor
a
revenues as security.
However, before the negotiations
were completed disgruntled, Salvadoran military forces
had taken matters into their own hands with the
December 1931 coup d'etat.

As a result of the revolu

tion, President Araujo was driven out of the country
and a new government under General Martinez took
control of the shaky Salvadoran economy.
The new government faced severe economic problems
brought on by the depression as well as the financial
maladministration of the preceding administrations.
The crisis was exacerbated by a "Communist" uprising

Q

United States Tariff Commission, Heport no. 1*J4,
p. 258. The price of the commodity dropped in spite
of Brazil's valorization efforts. During the period
between 1931-1932 Brazil destroyed more than thirtytwo percent of its coffee production to keep the price
artificially high.
9

'Memorandum of a conversation between Edwin C.
Wilson and William Renwick. Wilson to Stimson, Decem
ber 5. 1931, file 8l6.00/820* R. G. 59, N. A.

99
in January 1932 which caused panic among the coffee
planters in the western departments*

Because of the

economic crisis, many planters were unable to pay
their debts and were in danger of losing their mort
gages on their flncas.

The rebuilding task faced by

the new regime was indeed difficult.

General Mart£nez

was fortunate to have had the able assistance of
Miguel Tomas Molina, Minister of Finance, who set out
to reestablish confidence in the financial integrity
of the country.
the economy.

Several measures were taken to stabilize

First, a drastic cut was made in the

budget to balance it with the anticipated reduced reve
nues.

Secondly, legislation was passed declaring a

moratorium on all operations with interest for a
period of four years.

Moreover, interest rates were

reduced by forty percent and extensions were granted
to delinquent loans.

Thirdly, to appease the campesinos.

General Martinez reorganized and expanded the land
distribution program.10

Lastly, General Martinez, in

his effort to stabilize the economy, defaulted on his
nation’s obligations to foreign lenders.
On February 23, 1932 El Salvador stopped payments
on its 1922 loan from American and British investors.

10

McCafferty to Stimson, September 26, 1932, file
816.00/902, R. G. 59» N. A.;
Interview with Ambassador
Serrano, December 1975, San Salvador.
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It was to toe the first of several payment suspensions
during the regime of General Martinez.

The default was

mitigated however* toy the fact that SI Salvador was
only one of many Latin American countries to fall
toehind on its financial obligations to United States
bondholders.

Moreover* SI Salvador was not the first

to suspend payments; Eolivia defaulted on January 1*
1931; Peru on April 1* 1931; and Chile on June 1* 1931*
By 1935. of a total of $1,538,^31.980 outstanding loans
in Latin America* $1,175,383,^00 were in arrears.
This represented over seventy-six percent of the total
amount in default.11

During the 1930’s, eight out of

ten Latin American nations with obligations to American
bondholders defaulted.1^
The failure of El Salvador to live up to its
financial obligations was significant in United StatesE1 Salvador relations not only because it further
complicated the non-recognition matter, but because it

11

Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the
Study and Investigation of the work, Activities.
Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganiza
tion Committees. Pursuant to Section 211 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 193^. Part V Protective
Committees and Agencies for Holders of Defaulted Foreign
Government Bonds (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1937). P* 6.
12
Dr. Max Winkler (President and Director of Re
search, American Council of Foreign Bondholders, Inc.)
to Roosevelt, May 11, 1935, 0. F. File M 9 ^ . F . D. R.
Papers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library.

had the potential of developing into a much more
difficult problem*

The dilemma stemmed from a clause

in the 1922 loan contract.

Article XVT of the finan

cial agreement stipulated that if a default occurred,
the Fiscal Agent (Manufacturers Trust Company of New
York) would then be authorized to create a customs
administration and appoint a collector general for
customs subject to approval by the Secretary of State
and and the Salvadoran government.

Because El Salvador1

economy depended wholly on foreign trade, the implemen
tation of such an arrangement would have placed the
total financial administration of El Salvador in the
hands of an American.

The State Department hoped to

avert such a delicate situation, and decided not to
honor its contractual obligation to act on behalf of
American creditors.

It did not want to Intervene in

the affairs of El Salvador.

The parties which had

negotiated the 1922 contract had not forseen this even
tuality.

The Effect of Default on Salvadoran-American Relations
The default by El Salvador was more than just an
effort to stabilize the nation's finances.

It may also

have been an attempt by General Martinez to test how
far he could go with the new American policy of non-
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Intervention.

Although the total government revenues

were down substantially in comparison to the preceeding
five years, the income from customs duties were adequate
to service the loans, although barely so.

13
J

In El Salvador, as in other Latin American coun
tries, social and economic dislocations brought about
by the depression of the 1930's caused a wave of economic
nationalism to sweep through the nation.

In an effort

to find an ogre to blame for their problems, many in
Latin America resorted to the standard accusations of
exploitation and imperialism.

In some countries the

protestors found the very visible American companies
to be easy targets.

Although there were no American

companies in El Salvador with the tarnished image of
a United Fruit Company or a Standard Oil Corporation,
Salvadorans found that they could vent their anger at
the fiscal representative of the bondholders as well as
the American diplomats because of the non-recognition
position taken by the United States.

Thus, the default

on the bonded debt was seen by some Salvadorans as a
protest against economic dependency on the United
States as well as a realignment of their national

^ W a l l i c h and Adler, Public Finance in a Developing
Country:
El Salvador - A Case"Study, pp. 46^17;
New
York Times. March 20, 1932; David R. Raynolds, Rapid
Development in Small Economies: The Example of El Sal
vador (New- York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19^7)* PP»" 81-82.
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priorities.

Some of them believed that the terms of

the 1922 loan were too burdensome and jeopardized the
national integrity of the nation.

According to Victor

Barriere, former Director of Budget and son-in-law of
General Martinez, "the terms were onerous because it
placed the collection of public funds in the hands of a
foreign authority.

The collection of taxes is an act

of sovereignty that cannot be delegated to any power...11
Moreover, he added that "it was a matter of patriotic
pride not to accept the presence of a fiscal represen
tative in El Salvador collecting the public funds
1A
directly."
Sensing this feeling in El Salvador, along with the
realization that many other nations had done the same
without serious reprecussions, the State Department was
loath to carry out the dictates of Article XVI of the
loan contract.

Under the terms of the agreement, the

State Department was obliged to select and transmit to
El Salvador the name of one of the collector general
nominees recommended by the fiscal representative.
The dilemma faced by the State Department was based
on how the transmittal of the name would be perceived
by El Salvador.

Washington feared that it would be seen

14Interview with Sr. Earriere, December 1975»
San Salvador.

10^

as tacit recognition of El Salvador's government *

On

the other hand, it was feared that the failure to
approve and transmit the .name would be interpreted by
American bankers and bondholders as an abandonment of
the State Department's contractual obligations.
The
the
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The State Department, however, refused to follow
the advice of its legal counsel and took the position
that since the United States did not recognize the
government of General Martinez, it could not transmit the
recommendations of the fiscal agent.
It could in no
16
way participate in the proceedings.
The decision was

16
-\Legal Advisor (J. R. B . ) to Wilson, February 26,
1932, file 816.51039/131, R. G. 59, N. A.
16

Fred Lavis, "The El Salvador Bondholders Protective
Committee Report," January 1 9 3 7 * file 8 1 6 , 5 1 C 3 9 / ^ 9 3 »
R. G. 5 9 , N. A.

105
made after weighing the possible consequences of
various actions,

To force a collector general on El

Salvador, the smallest of the continental Latin
American nations, was bound to be seen as outright
"imperialism" especially since defaults were commonplace throughout the world.

17
1

Furthermore, it had

become the policy of President Hoover and Secretary of
State Stimson not to use force, or any semblance of
force, in the maintenance of contracts between American
citizens and foreign nations or their citizens.

1R

While the State Department's decision not to
become involved was aimed at improving the American
image and keeping friendly relations with Latin America,
it was not seen in that light in some quarters.

In

Guatemalan government circles, for example, it was
believed that the American desire to force the govern
ment of General Martinez to resume payments on the bond
obligations was the main reason behind her refusal to

■^Winkler to Roosevelt, May 11, 1935. 0. F. File
No. 4l9^» F. D. R. Papers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt
Library; Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy
of the United States: An Historical Interpretation
iNew York: Hareourt Brace and Company, 1943), pp. 336342.
In the years that followed, only two Latin American
nations with financial obligations (Argentina and
Venezuela) did not default on their Indebtedness.
-* Q

x Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active
Service in Peace and War (New Yorks Harper and Brothers,
194&J, P* 181.
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grant recognition to that government, 7

In America, the

action taken by the State Department resulted in angry
protests from bondholders who concluded that their own
government had defaulted on its obligation to support,
them.

It was their firm belief that the State Depart

ment during the 1922 negotiations had promised to assist
the bondholders in case of default.

As a result, letters

were sent to Congressmen and Senators pleading for
intercession with the State Department.

Other letters

were sent directly to the Secretary of State which
indicated the bondholders’ disappointment with the
Department's efforts.

An angry bondholder, Matthew

Salsinger of Maryland, sent the following letter to
the State Department:
Sirs
I purchased these "A” bonds because the
State Department allowed the name of this
country to appear in the contract as arbiter
and collector (in case of default).
I lived
in Salvador and know that the country got
full value for the funds in roads, sanitation,
watersupply, sewage, etc.
Now, when the government of El Salvador
gives notice of default, the State Department
advises 'We, (The U.S.) have no relation to
the loan except to arbitrate or point to the
collector of customs... Thus,' I as bondholder
to a party and contract which I have no power,

^ M i n ister Sheldon Whitehouse (Guatemala) to
Edwin C. Wilson, October 19, 1932, file 816.01/258,
R. G. 59 , N. A.
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and as a citizen of the U. S., to enforce20
am allowed to do what I can for myself...
In a reply to an inquiry from another bondholder,
Mrs. James Marshall in London, Edwin G . Wilson care
fully explained the exact role of the State Department
during the 1922 loan negotiations as well as its final
contractual obligations.

He pointed out that 11the

United States has no relation to this Salvadoran loan
except with respect to facilitating the arbitration
and determination of disputes that may arise between
the parties, and the appointment of a collector of
customs in case of a default.”

Furthermore, he pointed

out the disclaimers issued by the Department in 1923 to
correct erroneous statements in the advertising and press
releases which gave the impression that secret agree
ments had been made by the Department of State.

He

noted that "the impression was incorrect as the agreement
was negotiated between the Government of Salvador and
the representatives of the bankers concerned.
no sense a treaty."

It is in

He concluded that the State Depart

ment could in no way intercede on behalf of the bond
holders.^

20

Matthew Salsinger (through his attorney C. B.
Richards and Co. of New York) to State Department,
April 24, 1932, file 816.51039/1^, H. G. 59, N. A.
21

Wilson to Mrs. James Marshall, September 2,
1932, file 816.51C39/200, R. G. 59, N. A.
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The Quest for a Debt Settlement
While the State Department was unwilling to
intercede on "behalf of the bondholders, there were others
who willingly gave them assistance.

Immediately after

the default, American financial interests formed bond
holders protective committees modeled after the British
"Council of Foreign Bondholders."

But unlike their

predecessors in England, which had been in existence
since 1868, the American committees were driven by differ
ent motives.

Whereas the English protective committee

functioned as a non-profit organization, the American
committees were formed to take advantage of a profit
opportunity.

22

Although the organizers were experienced

financial men, they were Inexperienced in default
negotiations.

This had been the first time, since the

United States became the world’s creditor, that major
loan defaults had occurred.
To further complicate matters for the holders of
Salvadoran bonds, two rival bondholders committees were
formed.

One, "The Protecting Committee for the Republic

of El Salvador," was headed by Montgomery Schuyler,

22

Securities and Exchange Commission, Report.
Part V, p. I k l .
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president of \he Yorkville Bank in New York and formerly
United States Minister to El Salvador.

He was Joined

by J. Lawrence Gilson of Manufacturers Bank and Trust and
Henry B. Price, head of Minor C. Keith Inc.

The rival

group was the "El Salvador Bondholders Protective
Committee," headed by F. J. Lisman, president of a
financial firm bearing his name which had been the
major distributor of the outstanding Salvadoran bonds.
Along with him were R. V/. Hebard of R. W. Hebard and
Company, a construction firm with large government
contracts in El Salvador as well as a large holder of
the bonds.

Also in the group was Fred Lavis, president

of I.R.C.A.2-^

Lisman asserted that as a partner of the

house of issue, he was under a "moral obligation" to
assist the holders of the defaulted securities.

As

it turned out, his moral obligation was a pretext for
profit making.

ok

The American bondholders were therefore placed
in a quandary as to what line of action to pursue.

23

Securities and Exchange Commission, Report.
Part I, p. k S k ;
New York Times, March 2 k , 1932,
March 25, 1932.
2k

Securities and Exchange Commission, Renort.
Part V, p.141. The British bondholders formed their
own committee which worked closely with their American
counterpart.
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On the one hand, their own government refused their
requests for assistance and maintained a hands off
policy and on the other, two committees, each purporting
to have their best interest at heart, sought their
cooperation.

The primary objective of each of the

committees was to convince the holders of the bonds to
deposit their certificates in the respective depository
banks.

During the early stages of the solicitations

the committees failed to gain the trust of the bond
holders who refused to part with their certificates.
Gradually however, the bondholders, seeing no other
alternative, deposited their bonds with the committees.
Lisman's group had the advantage in that Lisman*s
company had the list of bondholders available whereas
Schuyler's did not.

As a result, within five months

after the committee was organized, the Lisman group had
acquired over twenty-one percent of the outstanding
certificates while Schuyler had less than five percent.
The State Department quickly realized that the existence
of two rival committees only made the negotiations with
El Salvador more complex.

Therefore, at its urging, the

two committees merged; the name of F. J. Lisman’s com
mittee prevailed and Mr. Lawrence Gilson became the
Committee’s chairman.^

25
^Securites and Exchange Commission, Report.
Part V, p . 2 8 5 =
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The problem with defaults during the 1930’s was
only one of the many economic crises faced by the
New Deal of President Roosevelt.

But it was one

which the President believed could have been avoided.
In fact, he was especially resentful of the way that
bankers’ loans were used to advance private interests
in Latin America during the free-lending years of the
1920’s.

Such loans were usually associated with

exhorbitant rates and excessive commissions which did
not endear the United States to her southern neighbors.

27
'

President Roosevelt blamed some of the problems faced
by the United States during the 1930‘s on such past
mistakes and sought to correct them through the practice
of non-intervention as embodied in the Good Neighbor pro
gram.

He felt that it was ’’important to remove any legit'

28
imate grounds of criticism.’’

Thus, one of the founda

tions of his New Deal’s foreign policy toward Latin
America was the continuation of President Hoover’s
non-intervention policy.

The position was maintained

during the numerous defaults throughout the 1930’s and

1940’s.

2^Callcott, The Western Hemispheres
Its Influence
on United States Policies to the End of World War II.
p. 290; Wood, The Flaking of the Good Neighbor Policy,
pp. 130-131.
28Stimson Diary, March 28, 1933.

In addition to the desire to develop the Good
Neighbor concept, another reason may have existed for
the American tolerance of what could be considered a
challenging attitude by some of the Latin American
leaders.

Because the depression had brought economic

instability to many countries of the area, the New
Dealers realized that only strict discipline enabled
some of the Latin American governments to maintain
political stability.

As a result, they tolerated

what were considered totalitarian regimes as they
appeared throughout the region.

The government of

General Martfnez fell into such a classification,
especially in light of the 1932 matanza.

Moreover, his

challenge to the United States on the matter of the 1923
Treaty made him stand out among the Central American
leaders.

It was believed in some quarters that he

defaulted on the 1922 loan not only because of the
obvious economic reasons but also to test the resolve of
the Americans.

Although his authoritarian measures in

El Salvador clashed with the basic American principles
of democracy, the New Dealers tolerated him and others
like him»
According to historian Frederick Pike, it is
possible that such tolerance stemmed from the fact that
the United States itself, "in its desperate search for
remedies to the depression leaned toward the use of
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corporatist tactics in the early days of the New Deal;
therefore it could respond with tolerance and forebearance when Latin American governments introduced
corporatist and/or socialist experiments...as they
moved toward ’statism’ and controlled economies."2^
Some who examined Roosevelt’s early New Deal closely,
saw many similarities to Mussolini’s corporate form
of government.

Fortune magazine noted that, "the

Corporate State is to Mussolini what the New Deal is
30
to Roosevelt."-'

Moreover, a noted economist, Calvin

E. Hoover of Duke University said in a speech before
the American Economic Association in 1934 that
"Roosevelt's philosophy of government-business cooperation
followed the pattern of Italian Fascism..

31
.

James

MacGregor Burns in his study of Roosevelt's politics,
Roosevelt;

The Lion and the F o x , observed that "the

NRA, with its functional representation of business and
labor groups, and the AAA, dominated by the big farm
groups, showed some likeness to the corporate state

29
'Frederick B. Pike, "Corporatism and Latin
American-United States Relations," The Review of
Politics. 36 no. 1 (January 1974), p. l46.
3°Fortune, X (July, 1934), 137-138, in John P.
Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, The View from America
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1972), p.l64.
31

Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, p. 164.
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fashioned by Benito Mussolini with its syndicates of
32
workers and employers.”-'

Thus, the New Dealers could

not be too critical of the Central American governments
for their authoritarianism, and as a result
...those who devised and first implemented
the Good Neighbor Policy seemed willing
to allow Latin Americans a much freer hand
in dealing with the economic interests of
United States citizens.
Thus, the Roosevelt
administration refrained from directly
assisting the Foreign Bondholders* Protective
Council in its efforts to force Latin Ameri
can governments to resume payments on foreign
debt.33
For the most part, the State Department attempted
to maintain a neutral position in the bondholders
matter.

But it was not always easy and it was espe

cially difficult for the men in the field.

In an effort

to give the impression that they spoke with authorization
from the State Department, the Bondholder Committee
representatives, whenever in El Salvador, endeavored
to associate the American legation with their negotia
tions.

Moreover, the Committee made sure that the

Department was kept informed of all activities during
the negotiations, although the State Department had
publicly stated that it could not participate in any

32

James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt;
The Lion and
the Fox (New York; Hareourt, Brace & World, Inc.),
p. 198.
33
-^Pike, "Corporatism and Latin American-United
States Relations," p. 1^6.
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way other than to facilitate matters.

The beleaguered

American Minister in San Salvador reported that the
Bondholder Committee representatives always attempted
to associate the Legation with their efforts and that
...each of the representatives has promptly
reported to the Legation upon arrival in
the country, frequent calls have been made
upon the Minister, the Legation has been
.kept informed of even minor steps in pro
cedure, copies of all correspondence between
the Government and the Committee or its
representatives have been brought to the
Legation personally by the representative
of the Bondholders* Protective Committee.
In a small place like San Salvador
such tactics unfailingly serve to connect
the Legation with the proceedings, in the
minds of, the Government, the press and the
public.3^
Apparently, the Committee's tactics succeeded because
the Salvadoran bondholders were among the first to have
a resumption of the loan service.

Debt Payment Arrangements
On July 29, 1932, just six months after the default
began, El Salvador and the Bondholders Protective
Committee signed an agreement whereby the Salvadoran
government, represented by Roberto Aguilar, agreed to
remit to the selected New York bank fifteen percent of

'ih,

Corrigan to Hull, April 3, 1936, file 8l6 .53.c39/
448, R. G. 59, N. A.

its customs collections from August 1, 1932, through
December 31. 1932, and twenty percent from January 1,
1933 to December 31, 193^®

The amount pledged was

substantially less than the seventy percent of the
customs collection agreed to under the original contract
in 1922«

Because the amount remitted was not adequate

to pay for all three series of bonds, the Committee was
forced to allocate the available sums to the holders
who had deposited their bonds to its hands. ^

Because

some bondholders refused to entrust their certificates to
the Committee, they did not receive any payments on their
investment.

The holders of Series A bonds received full

payment on their interest due.

Holders of Series B

(English) and C received their interest partly in cash
and partly in four percent deferred interest certificate.
Of the $251,387*33

remitted by El Salvador during the

life of the Aguilar agreement $176,290.33 went to the
bondholders and $75,097®50 went to the Committee for fees
and e x p e n s e s . A l t h o u g h the bondholders received less
than they were entitled to, they were more fortunate than

-^White to Bonsai, July 29, 19^1, file FVJ 816 .51/
1085, H. G. 5 9 , N. A.
•^Charge1 d 1Affaires R. Quincy Stanton (El Salvador)
to Hull, April 27, 1935, file 816.60/977, R® G. 59, N. A.;
Wallich and Adler, Public Finance in a Developing Country;
El Salvador— A Case Study, pp. 224— 225; New York Times,
June 1 6 , 1933®
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many other holders of Latin American certificates who
failed to receive any payments at all.

The severity of

the depression's impact on the price of coffee was
sufficient reason for many nations not to resume payments.
Although El Salvador was just as badly affected by the
economic crisis, it was the first of the Latin American
37
nations to resume payments on its indebtedness.
However, after less than a year under the Aguilar
agreement, the Salvadoran government once again sus
pended payment on its external debt.

On January 1^,

1933» the fiscal representative was ordered by the
Salvadoran Minister of Finance Miguel Tomas Molina, to
deposit all his collections from customs duties into
a special account in the Banco Agricola Comercial.
According to Molina, it was not really a suspension
but "a temporary measure pending negotiations for a
qo
new agreement for postponement of payments.’*-5
American
Charge1 W. J. McCafferty speculated that **the suspension
may have been carried out in order to help defray the
cost of expanding the Salvadoran military forces along
with the added costs incurred in the effort to secure the

^

Hew

York

T i m e s , June

26,

1933-

-^McCafferty to Stimson, January 18, 1933» file
816.51C39/216, R. G. 59, N. A.
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recognition of the de facto regime by the United States
and other Central American Republics.**-^

as

a result

of the new payment suspensions the Committee sent Fred
Lavis to Join the Eritish Bondholders* representative
J. C. Armstrong in San Salvador in an effort to nego
tiate a satisfactory readjustment agreement.

It was

the first of three journeys to El Salvador by Hr. Lavis
during the nest three years on behalf of the American
bondholders.

40

The result of his initial effort was suc

cessful and a temporary settlement was signed on May 5»
1933*

21 Salvador agreed to transmit to a selected

New York Bank9 twenty percent of its customs revenues
for the two year period from January 1, 1933 to Decem
ber 31» 1934 in lieu of the remittances provided for
under the original 1922 loan contract.

The sum was used

to pay for interest on the issues as well as for committee
fees and expenses.

Under the 1933 plan, those bondholders

who had deposited their certificates with the Committee
received substantial payments.

During the life of the

1933 agreement, El Salvador paid the bondholders approx
imately $2 ,200,000

39Ibid.
40

Ibid.; Securities and Exchange Commission, Report.
Part V, p. 149.
41

Securities and Exchange Commission, Report.
Part I, pp. 202-203-
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The temporary settlement lasted only until 1935
when again, the interest payments on all three series
were suspended®

After prolonged negotiations between

the Bondholders Committee, represented by Fred Lavis
and Douglas Bradford, and El Salvador, represented by
its Minister of Finance Dr. Rodrigo Samayoa, a
"permanent*' readjustment agreement was signed on
April 27, 1936.

Under the agreement the interest

rates on the bonds were permanently reduced to a more
tolerable level.

The interest on Series A bonds was

reduced from eight percent to 5*5 percent, Series B
bonds from six percent to four percent, and Series C
bonds from seven percent to 3*5 percent.

Along with

the interest rate reductions, the Salvadoran government
insisted that the total amount which could be utilized
11 O
to service the loan each year be limited to $850,000.
Although it "scrupulously avoided the appearance of
taking any part in the negotiations or of making any
endeavor to determine their direction," the State
Department through its Legation in San Salvador, played
an important role in facilitating the negotiations

11p

White to Bonsai, July 29, 1941, file FW 816.51/1085,
R. G. 59» N. A.; Ylallich and Adler, Public Finance in a
Developing Country: El Salvador— A Case S~budy, p." 224.'
^ C o r r i g a n to Hull, April 3, 1936, file 816.51C39/
448, R. G. 59. N. A.
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The so-called permanent settlement, however, lasted
only two years when again the loan service was suspended.
But unlike the earlier suspensions, which were partly
due to political and nationalistic motives, the No
vember 27, 1937 default was due strictly to economic
pressures.

On November 2, 1937 Brazil, in an effort to

stimulate exports, decided to modify its valorization
program and cut the tax on its exports by seventy-five
percent®

The decision had far-reaching effects since

the valorization plan of Brazil had helped to maintain
the price of coffee at higher levels than the market
would have allowed.

To accomplish its modified valori

zation plan, Brazil’s National Coffee Institute burned
and dumped into the sea millions of bags of coffee.

44

In the period from late 1937 and throughout 1938 Brazil
produced over 2,940,000,000 pounds of coffee but des
troyed over 1,913»000,000 pounds or sixty-five percent
of its total production.

Although the proportion of the

amount destroyed had increased more than twenty-two per
cent over the previous year's figures, the price of the
commodity went down dramatically.

Still the degree of

price decline was much less than would have been the
case had there been no valorization plan.

44

Brazil's

United States Tariff Commission, Report no. 144,
p. 258; Frank D. McCann, Jr., The Brazilian-American
Alliance 1937-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1973), P . 24.
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decision to end export limitations on its coffee caused
the price of the commodity to drop by thirty percent
Ac
from the previous year’s price. ^
The effects on El Salvador’s economy were farreaching.

It became immediately apparent in early

November 1937 that with the price of coffee at about
equal to the cost of production, Salvadoran exports
could be expected to drop substantially.

In turn, the

country's power to purchase imports would likewise
l a

be cut drastically.

As a result, the Salvadoran

coffee industry became panic-striclcen.

In order to

assuage the fears of the businessmen, the Salvadoran
cabinet met in emergency session and announced on
November 10, 1937 the government plans for assistance.
The Minister of Finance, Dr. Rodrigo Samayoa, assured
them that:

(1) no speculation would be allowed and

further, that the rate of exchange (2.5-1) of the colon
would not be modified in relation to the United States
dollar,

(2) the Salvadoran minister in Washington had been

ordered to discuss the matter with the representatives

^ M i l i t a r y Intelligence Division, Report no. 4000,
June 1939. folder El Salvador 3860-End, Box 816, R. G.
165, N. A.
Minister Robert Frazer (El Salvador) to Hull,
December 9 , 1937. file 816,51039/324.
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of Brazil, Colombia, and other coffee exporting coun
tries of the world,

(3 ) hank credits would he granted so

that coffee growers9 activities would not he interrupted
in any way,

(^) commercial hanks were ordered to

assist the government in credit and exchange control
and (5 ) hank officials, government leaders and coffee
producers would meet regularly to discuss the problems
they faced.

h y
'

The most effective measure taken by the

government however, was the drastic reduction on the
coffee export tax which was cut by sixty-seven percent
retroactive to November 2, when Brazil's actions had
caused world coffee prices to collapse.

The Salvadoran

export tax x^as reduced from $2.57 per 100 kilograms to
.95 cents per 100 kilograms and remained at that level
until 19^3•

To counteract the serious loss of revenue

which resulted from the sixty-seven percent reduction
of the export tax, on January 1, 1938, the government
again suspended debt service on the 1922 loan.

In 1937-

1938 the debt service represented twelve percent of SI
Salvador's national budget.

The funds saved in this man

ner ($850,000 annually) were then freed to provide
financial assistance to the coffee producers and exporters.

^ V i c e Consul Joseph S. Maleady (El Salvador) to
Hull, November 10, 1937, file 816.6133/53, R. G. 59, N. A.
ho

Minister Walter Thurston (El Salvador) to Hull,
March 30, 19^3, 816.51/1139, R. G. 59, N . A.

124
Furthermore, the added financial strength helped to
stabilize the colon at the exchange rate of 2,5 to 1
dollar as established in 1 9 3 4 . ^
Throughout 1938 and 1939 the debt service suspen
sion was continued although Dr. Samayoa assured the
fiscal representative that service would be "again
considered as soon as feasible."

The American Charge'

in San Salvador, Walter ¥. Hoffman noted that the
finances of 31 Salvador had stabilized by the middle of
1939 and that the Salvadoran government could service
the external debt without making too great a sacrifice.
All that would have to be done would be to eliminate the
"increase" in expenditures by the government.

He also

noted, however, that political considerations were given
priority and "domestic spending cutbacks were not."
It became more expedient for General Martinez to use the
§850,000 saved annually for internal expansion programs
in order to gain more support from people who might
otherwise be alienated were he to promote a program of
rigid economy in favor of the foreign bondholders.-^
As World War II expanded, the default by the Salvadorans

^ F r a z e r to Hull, December 9 , 1937. file 816.51039/
324, R. G. 59. N. A . ; New York Times, February 21, 1938.
-^Hoffman to Hull, July 11, 1939. file 816.51/1009,
R. G. 59, N. A.
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became less of an issue to Washington although nego
tiations between SI Salvador and the Bondholders'
Committee continued on a very low level.

But SI Sal

vador simply would not resume payments while other
nations, which had defaulted on much larger sums, did
nothing to alleviate the financial burdens of the
American bondholders.

Moreover, it became clear to Sal

vadorans that better terms might possibly be obtained if
further negotiations were carried out.
Also, during the war, another avenue was explored
by the Salvadorans in their effort to ease their fi
nancial obligations to American bondholders.

Because

of the default, the open market price of the Salvadoran
bonds dropped substantially.

As a result, El Salvador’s

Minister to Washington, Dr. Hector David Castro, was
advised by the head of the Export-Import Bank (Mr. Pier
son) to "purchase its own bonds at as low a price as it
*51
could get.. .because everyone else was doing it."-^

El

Salvador did not begin to "repatriate" the bonds until
194-2 when it began to repurchase them in the open market
a a price of "approximately 20 percent of their prin
cipal amount."

The bonds had been bought by speculators

v Copy of a memorandum of interviews by Mr. H.
Gardner Ainsworth of the Legation with Hector Herrera,
President of the Mortgage Bank, and William Renwick,
fiscal representative in Thurston to Hull, March 30,
194-3, file 816.51/1139, H. G. 59, N. A.
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during the lowest ebb of the 1938 default at substan
tially lower levels than twenty percent of principal.-^2
After the repurchases by El Salvador, the
Bondholders’ Committee realized that the likelihood of
debt service resumption was minimal inasmuch as the
reason given by El Salvador for its failure to comply
to its financial obligation was the lack of government
funds.
As a result, the Committee decided that it could
no longer serve the bondholders effectively and dissolved
itself on April 30, 1943®

It was replaced by the Foreign

Bondholders' Protective Council in the representation
<3
of the Salvadoran bondholders . J
Throughout the period of its existence, from
March 1932 through April 1943 , the Bondholders Committee
was able to get a relatively large sum for its clients
through the three agreements of May 1933, December 1934
and April 1936.

Total remittances made by El Salvador

for the bondholders under the agreements, exceeded
$ 4 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 The amount was especially substantial
when compared to the negligible sums the Bondholders’
Council was able to get for its bondholders.

At the same

62
Joseph Carter (Secretary of Bondholders Committee)
to Chief of Financial Division Frederick Livesey (State
Department), March 1 9 , 1943, file 816 .5l/ll38-§, R. G.
5 9 , N. A.
53Ibid.

^Ibid.

127
time however, the Committee was criticized for the
large sums it deducted for its services.

A comparison

of expenses by the two organizations reveal that the
Salvadoran bondholders had to pay a premium price for
the services of their Committee.

The Bondholders’

Council, from 1933-1936, expended a total sum of
$252,953*39 while representing the bondholders of several
Latin American nations.

On the other hand, the Sal

vadoran Committee representing only the bondholders
of one country expended during the same period $400,000.
The reason for the large difference in charges was that
the Lisman Committee assessed its bondholders fifteen
percent for its services while the Council limited its
charges to one percent of the face value of the amount
received frcm.the Latin American nations.-'-'
In an investigation of the bondholders problems in
1937. the Securities and Exchange Commission admonished
the Lisman Committee and singled it out as "an outstanding
example of the manner in which a committee may exercise
its power to... deal with the security holders arbitra
rily and oppressively...”-^

In soliciting the deposit

55White to Bonsai, July 29, 1941, file FW 816.51/
1085, R. G. 59, N. A.
-^Securities and Exchange Commission, Report.
Part I, pp. 664-667.
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of certificates, the Committee stressed that the fee for
services would he limited to one percent of the
principal amount of "bonds deposited.

However, when El

Salvador refused to bear the burden of the committee
fees plus expenses, the one percent was raised to
fifteen percent by simply amending the original agree
ment.

Anyone who wished to withdraw his certificates

had to pay a penalty fee of $10 per $1,000 deposited
and was denied any of the benefits which later accrued
to the depositors.

tin

'

Thus the bondholders were forced

to accept the amendment to the original agreement.
On another matter the Committee was criticized by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the State
Department and Foreign Bondholders Protective Council
for the manner in which it dealt with certain bond
holders—

those who did not deposit their certificates

with the Committee.-^

It was the position of the Lisman

Committee that such bondholders were not entitled to
share the benefits which accrued to those who deposited

57Ibid.
-^ I b l d ., p. 668;
Securities and Exchange Commission,
Report. Part V, pp. 459-^60;
Memorandum of Conversation
between Francis White (Foreign Bondholders* Protective
Council) and Philip Bonsai, Chief of the Division of
American Republics (State Department), July 23, 19^1.
file 816.51/1085, R. G. 59, N. A.
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with the Committee which represented about ninety-five
percent of all bondholders.

The position of the

Committee did not change under the criticism and the
State Department ultimately altered its position to
coincide with the Committee1s.

John Cabot of the State

Department1s Division of American Republics agreed that
the non-depositors be excluded because to pay them would
probably have resulted in "numerous withdrawals of
deposited bonds, which would probably wreck the last
hope of a return to the Agreement of April 1936."-^
He did not wish the non-depositors to "secure all the
advantages of the past agreement, and any prospective
one, made by the Committee, while having none of the
responsibility or expense."^0
On yet another matter, the Securities and Exchange
Commission criticized the members of the Lisman Committee
for personally profiting on the problems of the American
investors whom they represented.

Committee members used

the inside information available to them to buy and sell
Salvadoran bonds.

Between March 1932-September 1935 Lis

man 's company bought $392,500 of Salvadoran Bonds and
CD's and sold $396.500 at a profit of $5.5^8 .9 8 .
During the same period Fred Lavis bought and sold the

-^John Cabot to Philip Bonsai, July 25, 19^1,
file FW 816.51/1085, R. G. 59. N. A.
6oibid.
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bonds and netted $56^*00 in profits.

H. W. Hebard like-

wise profited in the same manner.
Despite all of the criticisms the Salvadoran
Committee was able to accomplish more for its bondholders
than the Council was able to do for its clients.

While

he agreed with the criticisms* John Cabot also noted
that the Committee "through self-interest secured a
hard boiled realistic settlement which was of benefit
to the bondholders* while the Council went in for
C.p

ineffectual legal hair splitting and got nowhere.”
The fruitless efforts of the Council after 19^3 when
it replaced the dissolved Committee, bore out the truth
of Cabot's statement.

Although the debt issue took a

backseat to the war during the early 19^0*s, negotiations
did take place although on a smaller scale.

In the

summer of 19^3, a Salvadoran economic mission headed
by Arturo Bustamante, Undersecretary of Finance, and
Victor Barriere, Presidents of the Salvadoran Court of
Accounts, met with Dr. Dana Munro of the Bondholders
Protective Council.

61

The meetings were held during the

Securities and Exchange Commission, Report.
Part V, p. 1^9.
A?
Cabot to Bonsai, July 25, 19^1, file FW 816.51/
1085, R- G. 59, N. A.
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month of July and the first week of August 19^3*

The

objective of the Salvadoran mission was to obtain a
readjustment of the loan.

The discussions however,

became strained when the Salvadorans insisted that the
terms be readjusted lower in the same manner that the
Colombian debt was restructured.

J

Senor Bustamante

pointed out that El Salvador "could hardly be expected
to do better than Colombia, which was a great, rich
country."

Dr. Munro retorted that Colombia was in many

ways "less developed than Salvador and that the Colom
bian debt...was very much greater than that of
Salvador."

6k

The new proposal offered by El Salvador would have
replaced the existing series of bonds with a new thirty
year bond bearing interest at three percent.

It also

provided for the abolishment of the office of the fiscal
representative.

The Bondholders Protective Council

could not accept the new terms and as a result, the
negotiations ended in f a i l u r e . ^

Further negotiations

^Interview with Sr. Barriere, December 1975* San
Salvador.
6k

Memoranda of conversations with Sr. Bustamante and
Sr. Barriere of the Salvadoran Economic Mission in
Dana Munro (Bondholders Protective Council) to Frederick
Livesey (Chief, Financial Division, State Department),
August 1 7 , I9k3, file 816.51/1175, B. G. 59, N. A.
65Ibid
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were carried out in later years but the loan payments were
not resumed until 1946 and then only after the terms were
readjusted favorably for the Salvadoran government.

66

The problems with the 1922 loan had taught General
Martinez a lesson in economics which he attempted to im
part to his fellow Salvadorans.

In the "Martinez Doctrine"

which he proclaimed in June 1937 before the Salvadoran
Congress, he stated:

"I propose as the keystone of the

national policy that the government never again contract
new loans."

The quotation was placed on a bronze plaque

in the hall of Congress .

^

Areas of Economic Cooperation
While the loan default created some tension between
the United States and El Salvador, other developments
occurred which helped to facilitate closer economic ties
between the two nations.

During the period between 1920

and the early 1930’s, the bulk of El Salvador's trade had
been carried out with European countries.

Germany and

the Scandinavian countries were large buyers of El Sal
vador’s "mild" coffee.

Table II Indicates the destination

of El Salvador's coffee exports during the 1929-1938

^ W a l l i c h and Adler, Public Finance in a Developing
Country;
El Salvador - A C a s e S t u d y , p p . 224-225.
^ N e w York Times, June 4, 1937»
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Table II

Coffee Exports from El Salvador
to Principal Markets 1929-1938 88
(In thousands of pounds)

Percent of
coffee in
total exports
Total coffee
exports

1929

1932

19.36

1937

1938

93

92

89

91

87

103,137

87,423

United States

18,928

12,058

6 0 ,646

90,856

75,265

Germany

34,759

31,254

16,555

17,582

12,781

Norway

9,161

9,314

8,669

11,316

13,473

Sweden

9,530

6,022

7,241

7,171

8,150

Italy

9,418

10,909

679

4,392

1,032

France

1,980

4,686

3,870

4,400

1,094

Finland

1,331

318

1,056

1,686

1,990

10,542

8,969

1,443

943

881

7,488

3,893

8,768

10,725

34,405

Netherlands
All other

Percent to the
United States

68

18.4

13.8

108,927 149,071 149,071

55.7

60

50.5

United States Tariff Commission, Report no. 144,
p. 263.

13**
period.

During the early part of the period, El Salva

dor was the principal supplier of '‘mild" coffee to
Ge r m any.^

As also indicated in the table, by 1936,

there had occurred a pronounced shift in the trade
figures whereby the United States became the primary
destination of exports from El Salvador.

The basic

reason for the shift was the German introduction of the
compensation or ASKI system.

ASKI was the symbol for

Auslander-Sonderkonten fur Inlandszahlungen (Foreigners'
Special Accounts for Inland Payments).

Germany's use

of blocked accounts began in 1933-193** as an effort
to collect debts owed to it by nations in central
and eastern Europe.

Because of the accumulation of

a large amount of unpaid claims and the shortage of
foreign currency in Germany as well as her own require
ments for raw materials, she was forced to insist on
70
payment either in money or in kind.'
agreements began.

Thus, clearing

Under the system developed, payments

for products exported to Germany were in a currency
called "Sondermark," redeemable only in Germany, as pay
ment for German goods.

Thus, Salvadoran exporters who

shipped coffee to Germany, instead of receiving drafts

6q
7Uni ted States Tariff Commission, Report no. 1*|4,
pp. 261,263.
70

Securities and Exchange Commission, Report.
Part V, p. 437.
'
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in New York, were advised that a blocked credit had
been opened in their accounts in German banks.

The

credit on their accounts were used to pay for German
71
goods.'
ASKI system did not work well for El Salvador
because it exported much more than it imported from
Germany.

In the years from 1930-1934 El Salvador

sent an average of 29.60 percent of its total exports
to Germany.

During the same period it imported only

9.8 percent of its total imports from Germany.

72

Under

the compensation system in order for El Salvador to make
full use of the credits earned through exports, she
would have had to increase her imports from Germany
threefold.

As a result of the imbalance El Salvador,

in search for new markets, turned to the United States.
Germany turned to Costa Rica and Colombia for her new
supplies of "mild" c o f f e e . ^

Thus, the German compen

sation system, together with the free-trade program of
Cordell Hull brought about the increased trade with the
United States during the 1930’s.

71
' Translation of a Report by Dr. Juan Vasquez,
M.I.D., February 1940, Item no. 4000, folder 3860-End,
Box 819, El Salvador 3850-4130, R. G. 165, N. A.;
McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance 1937-1945, p. 24.
^^Walllch and Adler, Public Finance in a Develop
ing Country;
El Salvador - A Case Study, pp. 31-32.
73
^United States Tariff Commission, Report no. 144,
p. 26l.
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The basis of the commercial relations between the
United States and El Salvador was governed by the Treaty
of Friendships, Commerce and Consular Rights of 1926 and
by the Commercial Agreement of 1937®

The latter agreement

was a reciprocal trade pact which provided for certain
tariff exemptions for products each nation imported from
the other*

For El Salvador the primary exemption was her

export of coffee*

Since coffee represented over ninety

percent of her exports, the agreement clearly had a favorable effect on El Salvador's trade.

Eetween 1928 and 1938

the Salvadoran coffee exports to the United States
Increased substantially.

r>h,

Tables III and IV indicate

some of the principal exports and imports between the
United States and El Salvador during the years 1930-1940.
During the war years, as was the case with other
Latin American countries, El Salvador's trade shifted
substantially from Europe to America as the naval blockade
successfully kept trading vessels out of European waters.
The nations at war curtailed the importation of coffee
by their civilians.

Table V shows the volume of El

Salvador's exports to the United States during the war
years 1940-1944 which adequately compensated for the lost
European market.

74

Translation of a Report by Dr. Juan Vasquez,
M.I.D., February 1940, Item no. 4000, folder 3860-End,
Box 819, El Salvador 3850-4130, R. G. 165, N. A.
1
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Table III

Principal Exports by El Salvador to the United
States (in thousands of dollars), 1930-1940

Coffee
Ealsam*
Sisal
Total
Exports
to
United
States

1930a

I932b

1934°

1936d

1938®

. f
1940

2,501

1,077

2,470

4,806

5,550

6,906

43

25

35

55

44

59

145

23

1

110

12

17

2,875

1,143

2,527

5,026

5,673

7,003

^Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United
States for the Calendar Year 1930. Compiled by Division
of Foreign Trade Statistics”H[tfashingtons Government
Printing Office, 1931), P» 679.
•u

Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1932. pp. 342-3^3.
°Foreign Commerce and Navigation. Calendar Year
1934, p. 343.
^Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1936. p. 4ll.
eForeign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1228. p. 393.
f
Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year

m o , friw .----------- --- --------

*Balsam— medicinal gum used as a base for perfumes
and medicines.
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Table IV

Principal Imports by El Salvador from the
United States (in thousands of dollars),
1930-1940

1930s

1932b

1934°

1936d

1938e

194cf

Wheat &
Flour

610

379

312

98

262

210

Cotton
Cloth

805

650

763

420

384

254

Cotton
Material

180

175

220

179

215

468

4,457

2,289

3,130

2,795

3,525

4,682

Total
Imports
from
United
States

cu.iva.

1930, p. 679.
b Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1932, PP. 342-343.
c Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1934, P. 343.
d Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1936, p. 411.
6 Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1938, P. 393.
f
Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1940, p. 336.
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Table V

Salvadoran Exports to the United States
(in thousands of dollars), 1940-1944

1940a

194lb

1942°

1943d

1944e

Total

7,003

7,209

11,900

14,492

14,537

Coffee

6,906

7,021

11,691

14,214

1^,255

98

97

98

98

98

Percent
Coffee

Another factor contributed to the improved economic
relations between the two nations during the period.
On November 28, 1940 the Inter-American Coffee Conven
tion was signed by the United States and fourteen coffee
producing nations under which for a three-year period,

a.X Ui C1K XX
lo4o, p. 336.

iNiCtVXpdul'JU « v-»ctJLC?xiu.cij. •LCciX

0Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1941., p . 362.
GForeign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
1942, P. 293
^Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year
19^2. Volume 1, Section 3, F1. 23.
Foreign Commerce and Navigation, Calendar Year

140
annual export quotas were set for each producing country,
both for shipments to the United States and for ship
ments to all other markets outside the United States.
The agreement was designed to stabilize and improve
the markets by keeping the price of coffee at normal
levels.

Under the agreement, SI Salvador was allocated

79»365»600 pounds which could be exported to the United
States,
pounds.

75

In 1941 the quota was raised to 80.7 million
The United States for its part, did not guarantee

any fixed or minimum prices, but it did agree to limit
its coffee importations for the 1940/41 coffee year to
15.900,000 bags (132 pounds each) and it assumed the
responsibility for setting up the machinery for the
control of imports.

By so doing, the United States made

it possible for the coffee growing nations to keep the
price of coffee at normal levels.

In the case of SI

Salvador, the 1940/41 crop was sold to the United States
for approximately 38 *525»000.

Had the Coffee Convention

not been in effect, the price at which the crop would
have sold could not have been over 33.500,000.

Thus,

with the price of coffee artificially maintained, the
American people indirectly subsidized the Salvadoran

75

United States Tariff Commission, Report no. 144,
p. 259.

1^1
economy.

Without the Convention the price of the

commodity would surely have gone d o w n . ^

But the

Coffee Convention was also beneficial to the United
States because it helped to accomplish its goal to
preserve the political and economic stability not only
of El Salvador but also of the whole of Latin America.

^ ^ i c e Consul Overton Ellis (El Salvador) to Hull,
November 28, 19^1. Item no. 7008, Office of Strategic
Services, R. G. 226, N. A.
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SUMMARY
One of the problems faced by El Salvador during
the 1930's was the result of its dependence on coffee as
the foundation of its economy.

As such her economic

stability depended on the price of the commodity remain
ing stable.

Although she produced the mild coffee which

commanded a higher price in world markets, to a large
degree its price was still determined by the action of
the Brazilian government which had artifically normalized
world coffee prices with a valorization plan.

In 1931.

when other economic pressures forced Brazil to abandon
its price support program, the price of coffee tumbled
precipitously.

El Salvador was affected in a direct

manner and the foundation of its economy was shattered.
In an effort to stabilize her economy the govern
ment of El Salvador enacted several measures, one of
which was the suspension of her debt payments to
American bondholders on February 23. 1932.

The default

had far-reaching effects on United States-Salvadoran
relations which were already strained by the American
non-recognition of General Martinez's government.
The State Department acted to avoid further
deterioration of relations between the two nations
by not carrying out its contractual obligation under

1^3
the 1922 loan agreement.

Under the contract it was to

select a person to be the collector general from among
those recommended by the fiscal representative and then
transmit the name to El Salvador for final approval.
The problem arose when Washington, fearful that such a
transmission might be misinterpreted by El Salvador as
tacit recognition, decided not to carry out its obliga
tion.

The State Department was reluctant to act because

so many other Latin American nations had also defaulted
and to force a small nation to submission would certainly
be seen as outright imperialism by many.
While Washington1s decision may have improved
America's image in Latin America, it greatly angered the
American bondholders who felt that they had been aban
doned by their own government.
Left to fend for themselves, the bondholders were
organized by American financial interests who saw a
profit opportunity arise.

After some initial confusion,

the Salvadoran Bondholders- Committee was formed to act
as the representative body for most of the bondholders.
The Committee headed by Lawrence Gilson of Manufacturers
Bank and Trust Company of New York and Fred Lavis of
I.B.C.A., was able, through hard-headed negotiations,
to reach a settlement ifith the government of El Salvador.
Although the State Department remained neutral throughout
the negotiations, it aided the bondholders by facilitating
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the discussions.

The New Dealers of Roosevelt moreover,

helped matters by not pressuring El Salvador too much
and by tolerating its actions despite the fact that it
sometimes embarrassed the Americans through General
Martinez's resistance to non-recognition.
The effort0 of the Committee paid off on July 29,
1932 when an agreement was signed whereby El Salvador
agreed to resume payments on the debt.

Although the

subsequent payments were less than the original agreement,
the bondholders were satisfied because they knew that
El Salvador was the first Latin American nation to make
such resumptions after default.
nations were not so fortunate.

Bondholders for other
The Aguilar agreement

of 1932 however lasted only until January 14, 1933 when
again the debt service was suspended.

Another settlement

was made by May 5» 1933 a*nd it lasted until 1935 when
again it was suspended.

A firmer agreement was not

signed until 1936, but although it was labled a "permanent"
agreement, it did not last after November 27, 1937.
On November 2, 1937 Brazil shook the coffee industry
when it again modified its valorization program and lowered
the

t a x

on its coffee exports.

drop in coffee prices.

The result was a severe

The effect on El Salvador was

immediate and in reaction General Martfnez again suspended
debt service on the 1922 loan.

The 1937 suspension lasted

for over eight years and it was not until 1946 that debt
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repayments were a g a in resumed.

By then relations between

El Salvador and the United States had improved consider
ably.
Although the Committee was strongly criticized by
some bondholders and the Securities and Exchange Commis
sion for some of its activities, it was able to do more
for its bondholders than other organizations which
attempted to do the same job for other nations.
While the default created some moments of appre
hension in the overall relations between the United
States and El Salvador, there were other areas of coopera
tion which helped facilitate closer ties between the two
nations.

One was the action of Germany when it instituted

the compensation or ASKI system of trade.

While this

system worked well with other Latin American nations
(especially Brazil) it did not for El Salvador.

As a

result, El Salvador's trade shifted from Germany and
Europe to the United States.

Secondly, trade agreements

such as the Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1937 and the
Inter-American Coffee Convention of 1940, helped to
facilitate closer economic ties between the two nations.
Lastly, as the war in Europe expanded, economic relations
between El Salvador and the United States grew closer
together.

CHAPTER V

THE LATER YEARS*.

TOTALITARIANISM AND WAR

The Movement Toward Totalitarianism
By the middle of 1937, after recognition was no
longer an issue and the bondholder problem was
"permanently" settled, Salvadoran-American relations
improved considerably.

The State Department seemed

satisfied with the American relationship with El
Salvador.

The American Minister, Dr. Frank P. Corrigan,

wrote in glovring terms of the regime under General
Martfnez:
President Maximiliano Martfnezfs admi
nistration has gained the approval of the
greater part of the people. He has not been
a Dictator in the opprobrious sense. He
permits free expression of opinion if he
considers it well intentioned and not sub
versive. He is personally democratic and
approachable.
The economic condition of the
country has greatly improved during his
incumbency.
The adoption of a sound money
policy through the establishment of the Cen
tral Reserve Bank and the strengthening of
the national credit by the completion of a
satisfactory settlement of the external debt
are outstanding achievements of his adminis.
tration, the value of which is being appreciated.

1Corrigan to Hull, May 29, 1937, file 816.00/100A,
R. G. 59, N. A.

1A6

1^7
However, Dr. Corrigan’s comments on the democracy under
General Martfnez and the settlement of the external
debt proved to be somewhat premature as the political
and economic climate changed in the ensuing months.
When Brazil decided to end limitations on its coffee
exports on November 2, 1937. the price of the commodity
plummetted.

The effect on El Salvador's economy was

such that by late November, the debt service on the 1922
loan was again suspended and the tension between El
Salvador and the American bondholders returned.

The

other matter regarding the democratic ideas of Martfnez
was likewise altered when the Salvadoran leader began to
openly praise the achievements of the totalitarian govern
ments in Europe.
Two months after his May letter, Dr. Corrigan's
opinion of General Martfnez's regime changed appreciably.
In another letter to the Secretary of State he expressed
a desire to use the moral influence of the office of
Minister to discourage the "beginning of a Dictatorship,"

2

In a telegram reply Assistant Secretary Sumner

Welles strongly suggested that there be no involvement in
any way in the internal affairs of the Salvadoran
3
government . ^

2Corrigan to Hull, July 29, 1937. file 816.00/1010,
E. G. 59, N. A.
-^Welles to Corrigan, August 13, 1937, file 816.00/
1010, E. G. 59, N. A.
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By the middle of 1938* the complexion of General
Martinez’s regime had become patently more totalitarian.
In a dispatch to the Secretary of State the American
Minister to Guatemala* Fay Allen Besportes, related that
...the British Minister to Guatemala advised
me yesterday that he had just received confi
dential reports from El Salvador giving
further evidence that President Martfnez of
that Republic has turned Fascist in the letter
and the spirit.^
By early 1939, Dr. Corrigan’s fears (expressed in his
letter of July 29, 1937) had materialized as General
Martfnez repealed the 1886 Constitution in order to
perpetuate himself in office.

In opposition to his

continulsmo. some of his early supporters abandoned his
upro-Patria Party” and joined the opposition.

Such was

the case of General Manuel Castaneda, one of General
Martfnez's earliest associates, who had helped him crush
the 1932 uprising.

Miguel Tomas Molina, who had helped

to re-establish economic stability during the early
1930’s, Dr. Maximiliano Brannon, Sub-secretary of Finance,
and Augustfn Alfaro, Chief Audit Officer, all left the
government to protest its totalitarian nature.

Although

formerly in full accord with General Martfnez, they
agreed with the extension of his Presidential term and

^Minister Fay Allen Desportes (Guatemala) to Hull,
August 19, 1938, file 816.00/1052, R. G. 59, N. A.

his continuation of a de facto dictatorship.

Later,

General Castaneda further accused his former chief of
being the most "anti-democratic" leader in the Americas
and of having delivered sections of the economy to
"Nazi-Fascist I m p e r i a l i s m . T h u s , what had begun as
admittedly an authoritarian but benevolent government
had evolved into what many considered to be an oppressive,
dictatorial regime.

The tactics used by General Martfnez

were viewed by American diplomats as fascist in nature.
This characterization, combined with significantly
increased imports from Germany in the years 1935"!937.
along with the presence of German and Italian advisors
in San Salvador, seemed to give credence to the belief
that the influence of the Axis powers in El Salvador was
considerable.

The characterization however, was not

wholly accurate.
The government of General Martfnez had developed
over the years as a military regime which emphasized the
practice of self-discipline.

The previous administrations

had failed in the effort to establish a representative
democracy and were blamed for the economic and political

^Translation of a memorandum from, "The Executive
Committee of the Salvadoran Popular Union" to the
American Legation, January 20, 1939. file 816.00/1065,
R. G. 59. N. A.; Thurston to Hull, February 3. 1 9 ^ .
file 816.00/1190, R. G. 59, N. A.

150
crises of 1930-1931•

Moreover, the military leaders,

along with General Martfnez, were convinced that the
only way El Salvador could weather the crises of the ear
ly 1930's was with the establishment of a disciplined
population and a centralized government.

It was a

rationale for the establishment of a "corporatist"
system of government.

The success of General Martfnez

in suppressing the "Communist” uprising in 1932 reinforced
a belief in the need for a strong central government to
deal with such dangers.

Further support came from other

dictatorial leaders with governments not unlike his own.
Men such as Getulio Vargas (Brazil), Jorge Ubico (Guate
mala) , Anastasio Somoza (Nicaragua), and Fulgencio
Batista (Cuba) also emerged amid economic and political
chaos in their countries.

Apparently, when faced with

anarchy or tyranny, Latin American governments opted
for the latter.

The Salvadorans were no different.

In

their desire for law and order, the people gave tacit
support to the authoritarian rule of General Martfnez.
Like many other politicians, scholars and business
men during the 1930's, General Martfnez was attracted by
the successes of Benito Mussolini and, to some degree,
by those of Adolph Hitler.
actions and theirs.

He saw similarities in his

Like him, Mussolini and Hitler had

saved their countries from Communism.

And Mussolini was

seen as a strongman, not unlike the Latin caudlllo.
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General Martfnez also supported another European
strongman whose beliefs.paralleled his, Francisco
Franco of Spain.

General Martfnez was among the first

to recognize Franco's government in 1936.
Later, shortly before his exile, General Martfnez,
in a rambling discussion with an American businessman,
expressed what had been his philosophy throughout the
1930's.

He admired fascist ideas and heralded its

bright future.

The corporate system, he said, as

originated in Italy and developed by Germany, was the
system of the future and that it was the desirable
system for El Salvador.^
As early as 1933. General Martinez's ideas regarding
the corporate state had become evident to the American
Charge' in San Salvador W . Quincy Stanton who noted in
a dispatch to the Secretary of state that
The Administration is showing 'Fascist'
leanings - Central American model - with
the emphasis upon supremacy of the: 1. Military
unit, 2. a greater degree of Corporate State
convening the coffee and sugar export control
projects, 3» relatively heavy State participa
tion in economic interests... *1-. suppression
of popular legislative activities, 5 . the
necessity of maintaining the present regime
at all costs..•

Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., Central America, A Nation
Divided (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 215•
7
'Memorandum of conversation between a prominent Amer
ican businessman in San Salvador, Ricardo Kriete and
General Martfnez on May 2, 19*j4 in Thurston to Hull,
May 4, 1944, file 816.00/1323. H. G. 59. N. A.
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Patently, the philosophy of the
Salvadoran regime is not exactly comparable
to the European Fascists, for one reason
because of the scanty industry in this
country and the predominance of agriculture
or for the inferior racial quality of its
population.8
At the time, however, General Martfnez was no different
from other leaders throughout the world who sought to
find answers to the problems brought on by the depression.
Eulers from Vargas to Ubico to Eatista compared the
capitalist and democratic system vis-a-vis other economic
and political systems and borrowed from each those
elements considered vital for a country to survive the
depression.

For some, fascism was preferable to Communism.

The early economic successes of Hitler and Mussolini made
the corporate state system appear very attractive indeed.

German and Italian Inroads in Latin America
In 1933. as Hitler rose to power he found himself
heading a nation on the verge of collapse.

Germany was

burdened with huge debts it could not meet and was
seriously weakened by a very unfavorable balance of
trade.

But Hitler's efforts to restore Germany's

Q
Charge’ d ’Affaires W. Quincy Stanton (El Salvador)
to Hull, July 1, 1933. file 8l6.00 General Conditions/^,
R. G. 59. N, A.
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industrial and military prowess was hampered by a
shortage of raw materials, a scanty supply of internation
ally acceptable currency, and high tariff walls set up
by Western Europe and the United States.

Thus, Germany

had to turn to Southeastern Europe and Latin America
for its raw materials as well as markets for its manu
factured goods.

In Latin America, by the use of

imaginative trade practices (compensation system)
Germany's market share and economic influence grew
o
rapidly over the next few years.7 In El Salvador the
effect of the trade offensive was clearly visible in the
increased volume of imports from Germany.

As indicated

in Figure I, during the period from 1930-193^ the
average percentage of imports from Germany represented
o n l y

n i n e

percent of El Salvador's total imports.

During

the 193^-1937 period the average rose to twenty-five per
cent of El Salvador's total imports.

While some of this

increase affected American interests, the bulk replaced
imports from Asian and-other European countries.

Even

larger increases occurred In other Central and South
American nations notably Guatemala, Brazil and Argentina.

^Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The United States
Army in 'World Wa.r IIs The Western Hemisphere, the Frame
work of Hemisphere Defense (Washington;
Department of
Army, i960), p. 207;
Percy Bidwell, "Latin America,
Germany and the Hull Program," Foreign Affairs XVII
(January 1939)» passim; Alton Frye, Nazi Germany and
the American Hemisphere, 1933-19^1 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1967). PP* 173-195-
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FIGURE I
Percent Distribution of Salvadoran Imports
by Country of Origin, 1930-1944.10
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Wallich and Adler, Public Finance in a Develop
ing Country: El Salvador - A Case Study, p. 32.
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While Germany's compensation system allowed, it to
substantially increase total trade with, many Latin
American countries, it was not a complete success in El
Salvador#

Because exports far exceeded imports from

Germany in monetary terms, the ASKI system did not work
favorably for El Salvador#

As a result, by 1939 it

diverted most of its exports from Germany to the United
States as indicated by the graph in Figure II#
Italy's trade with El Salvador suffered during the
1930's except possibly in the area of military hardware#
Whereas the Salvadoran coffee exports to Italy averaged
approximately 9#5 million pounds annually during the
years 1929-1932, it averaged less than 3-2 million
pounds in the period 1936-1938#11

The military equip

ment purchases by El Salvador was better.
Early in 1938, Captain Juan Nunez, Chief of El
Salvador's Air Force, announced the purchase of four
Caproni bombers from Italy.

The fourth was purchased

"knocked down" to serve as parts.

The planes were ad

vanced light bombers to be used as either scout or
pursuit aircraft as well as for bombing purposes.
The planes were purchased for $39»000 each with payment
made partly in cash and in coffee payable over an

11

United States Tariff Commission, Report no. 1^4,
p. 263.
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FIGURE II
Percent Distribution of Salvadoran Exports
by Country of Destination, 1930-1944.^
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V/allich and Adler, Public Finance in a Develop
ing Country;
El Salvador - A Case Study, p. 31.

15?
extended period of time.

The coffee value was determined

by the price of coffee on the date of shipment of the
planes.1-*

The $39,000 price included the costs of

sending a Salvadoran pilot and mechanic for three months
to Italy and of sending an Italian pilot to El Salvador
to train other pilots.
El Salvador's Minister of Defense, General Andres
Menendez, had initially tried to purchase similar planes
from the United States but failed in his efforts.
Although the American planes cost less at $38,000 apiece,
the negotiations collapsed because the American company,
North American Aircraft Corporation, refused to accept
coffee as part payment.

Moreover, the company refused

to pay for the expenses of training Salvadoran pilots and
mechanics.

With all of the extras the Italian planes

were actually two-thirds of the cost of the American
1

planes.

JLl.

The Italian government was obviously eager

to sell the planes even though it made little money on
the transaction.

As the war developed, the United States

softened trading conditions in the effort to win the
support of the Salvadorans and other Latin Americans.

■^Vice Consul Overton Ellis (El Salvador) to Hull,
February 4, 1938, file 816.248/35. H. G. 59. N. A.
^ E l l i s to Hull, February 17, 1938, file 816.248/38,
R. G. 59, N. A.
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In addition to the economic inroads by the Axis
powers in SI Salvador, they also experienced some
success in spreading Nazi-Fascist ideas through the
exchange of military missions*

Italy, in a bid to gain

more influence in the area, accepted for training four
aviators from SI Salvador at no cost to the Central
American nation.

They were Capt. Julio Sosa, L t . Fran

cisco Ponce and two second-year students from the Military
15
Academy. ^

Moreover, two officers, Captains Oscar Osorio

and Manuel de J. Cordova of the Artillery Regiment, were
also sent on August 5. 1938, to Italy for training at the
Academy of War at Torino.

The training mission coincided

with the Salvadoran order to purchase Italian armaments
which included thirty-two tractor-drawn seventy-five (75)
mm guns and shells.

The weapons cost :
)12,500 each for a

total of $^00,000 and a like amount for ammunition.

The

order was to have been paid with twenty percent in cash
and eighty percent in coffee.

16

In the ensuing year

however, the order was cancelled due to Italy's inability to

1^Naval Attach^ Captain F. H. Lamson-Scribner to
Navy Department, M.I.D., August 17, 1938, Item no. 1003300, fdlder 3360-End, Eox 819, El Salvador 3850-4l30,
R. G. 165, N. A . ; Edwin Lieuwen, United States Policy
in Latin America; A Short History (New York;
Praeger,
Inc., 1964), pp.~190-19 1 .
1

6

Lamson-Scribner to Navy Department, M.I.D.,
August 1 5 , 1938, Item no. 906-200, folder 3860-End,
Box 819, El Salvador 3850-^130, R. G. 165, N. A.; Frazer
to Hull, July 23, 1938, file 816.2460, R. C-. 5 9 , N. A.
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fulfill its obligation.

Furthermore, Italy's efforts

to reduce coffee consumption at home due to the worse
ning crisis in the Mediterranean resulted in the
deterioration of the once friendly relationship with
El Salvador.

17
‘

Although he was still a proponent of

fascist ideas, General Martfnez, anxious to buy guns,
turned toward the United States for his supplies.

As

the European war developed, he was able to acquire the
needed weaponry from the United States.
On another front, the Axis powers were able to
make additional inroads in Latin America.

They were

able to gain some influence in cultural matters after
they offered "numerous and generous fellowships" to
Latin American students and professors to study in their
schools and subsidized their own professors for placement
on the faculties of Latin American universities.

In some

Salvadoran schools, Spanish priests with fascist views
were brought in iiith the blessings of the government and,
at one school in San Salvador, the children were even
taught to give the fascist salute.

1 ft

Another Spanish

priest held an Important position in El Salvador— that

17Ellis to Hull, July 12, 1939, file 816.2 k / 6 6 ,
E. G. 59, N. A.
1 ft

Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United
States; An Historical Interpretation, p. 32&;
New York Times, January 17, 1938.
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of confessor to Sra. Concha M. Martfnez, the wife of
General Martfnez,

Padre Mario Casariego arrived in El

Salvador during the early part of 1939 after studying
for the priesthood in Home,

Like many Spaniards in El

Salvador he disliked Americans and used his position
to win over Sra, Martfnez to his cause.

According to a

report by Captain C, E. Massey, the Military Attache' in
Balboa, Canal Zone, Padre Casariego, because of his
influence on Sra, Martfnez, had often been referred to
as the "Rasputin" of El Salvador,1^

General Martfnez

himself was not influenced by the Catholic priest as he
was an avid Theosophist and Mason,

However, he was

influenced by a German friend, Hugo Rinher, who was also
a Theosophist and "crystal gazer,"

The basis of the

friendship between General Martfnez and Rinher, however,
remained on the level of religious and occult matters.

20

Probably the most significant influence of the
Axis powers in El Salvador was on the military.

For

years German military advisors had been an important
part of the Salvadoran military administration.

Other

1^Military Attache1 Captain C. B. Massey (Balboa,
Canal Zone) to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, December 14,
19^3, Item no, 2600, folder El Salvador 2400-2950, Box
817, El Salvador 2400-3020, R. G. 165, N. A,
Of)

Frazer to Hull, January 19, 1939, file 816.00/1052,
R. G. 59, N. A.;
Interview with Sr. Barriere, December
1975, San Salvador.

l6l
Latin American military organizations had likewise
utilized German military know-how.

21

Moreover, it was

not uncommon for these nations to have an officer from
Germany or Chile to head sections of the local
military units.

As an example, in 1932 the chief of

El Salvador's Guardia Nacional was General Armando Llanos
of Chile.

22

By 1938, however, the negative effects of

the European and African exploits of Germany, Spain and
Italy caused some observers to cast a suspicious eye at
the appointment of a German or Italian military officer
in the armed forces of El Salvador.

Such was the case

when General Eberhardt Bohnstedt was appointed by
General Martfnez to be the director of the Escuela Milltar
on April 24, 1 9 3 8 . ^

The appointment alarmed some peo

ple because Bohnstedt was a retired Colonel from the
German Army and had been under contract to the Salvadoran
government for several years as an Instructor and technical advisor to the military.

24

Moreover, his rise to

the directorship was seen as a bad omen because at about

21

—

Interview with Sr. Penate, December 1975. San
Salvador.
?p

McCafferty to Stimson, May 18, 1932, file 816.00
General Conditlons/31, R. G. 59. N. A.
2-^Mew York Times, April 25, 1938.
pLl

Frazer to Hull, September 8 , 1939, file 816.29/51,
R. G. 59, N. A.
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the same time, Colonel Ernesto Eara was removed from
the post of Military Chief of the Department of
Chalatenango.

The removal was significant to some because

Colonel Bara was of French descent and had served in the
French army during World War I.

The implication

which surfaced was that General Martfnez was gradually
easing in Nazi sympathizers into the military and
government offices while at the same time forcing out
those who were pro-Allies.
case.

This, however, was not the

The selection of Bohnstedt was based strictly on

General Martfnez*s admiration of his excellent military
training and not because of his political orientation.

26

The appointment of another German to a high
government post in San Salvador caused some consternation
among certain American observers.

Baron Wilhelm von

Hundelhausen was appointed as the manager of the important
Banco Hlpotecario (Mortgage Bank) of El Salvador when it
was organized in 1935«

His selection, like that of

Bohnstedt, was based strictly on his training and other
qualifications.

He was in fact chosen by the bank's

president, Hector Herrera, who had become acquainted

2^New York Times, April 25, 1938.
26

Interview with Ambassador Serrano, Sr. Earrlere
and Sr. Penate, December 1975. San Salvador.
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with, him while studying in Germany during the early
1930's.

The motivation behind the selection of Hundel-

hausen was simply a desire to have the best qualified
person at the post Just as General Mart fries, In his
efforts to form the Salvadoran Central Reserve Bank,
looked to English and American bankers for organizational
advice.

27
1

By 1938, however, because of the Axis activities in
Europe, American concern with the German presence in
Latin America became more evident.

Thus, Germans who

held high ranking positions in government were suspected
of being Nazi agents or subversives.

Although there was

some basis for suspicion, much of the alleged "dangerous"
activities of Germans in El Salvador were exaggerated.
Just as during the 1932 revolt anyone who advocated social
reform or disagreed with General Martinez's regime was
tagged a Communist, during the late 1930's and early
19^0*s anyone with a German name or who advocated strict
discipline was labeled a Nazi or Fascist agent.

The

American Military/- Attache's were especially active in
seeking out alleged German and Italian agents and their
sympathizers.
The man considered to be the number one Nazi agent

27
'Interview with Ambassador Serrano and Sr. Barriere 9
December 1975* San Salvador.

In El Salvador was Baron von Hundelhausen.

Cmdr. Vf. R.

Phillips, Naval Attache' in Barboa, Canal Zone, related
some information regarding Nazi plans to the American
Legation In San Salvador In which it was alleged that
Hundelhausen had held a meeting at his house In
November 1937®

Hundelhausen was reported to have

presided over a Nazi party meeting which considered the
/

"possibility of Nazis in Central America using their
strength to assist Martinez in upsetting the government
of Honduras and making himself president of both countries
and from there to absorb the rest of Central America.
It was also stated at the meeting that there were 25,000
Nazis in the Bunds of Central America and that Martfnez
pQ
was a favorite of the Nazi administration in Germany."
Baron Hundelhausen was also accused of being the major
source of German propaganda which circulated in El
Salvador in the form of handbills, pamphlets, fly leaves
and newspaper ads.

Most of the propaganda material

originated in Guatemala City where the German minister
29
conducted his activities freely. 7

Another German,

pa

Military Attache Cmdr. W. R. Phillips (Ealboa, Canal
Zone) to Legation (El Salvador), August 11, 1938, file
816.20A ? , R. G. 59, N. A.
29
7Confidential memorandum (unsigned) to Roosevelt,
January 7, 19^1, Box 5^» Presidents* Secretary File, South
and Central America, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library;
Frazer to Hull, September 8, 1939, file 816.20/51; Frazer
to Hull, October 13, 1939, file 8l6.5017/2, R. G. 59, N. A.
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Reinhold Weitz of the Agenta Unldos in San Salvador
was alleged to have been the chief of the Nazi laborang
and lived ’’like a millionaire on a salary of $150®00
30
per m o n t h . A s

the war developed, the American

Military Attaches carefully watched the activities of
approximately five hundred German, Italian and Japanese
aliens in El Salvador.
Aside from the aliens in El Salvador who supported
Nazi-Fascist ideas, sympathizers were also to be found
among Salvadorans themselves.
in the army officer corps®

This was especially true

Of the military officers,

two individuals stood out as prominent pro-Nazi sympathi
zers, General Lufs Andreu and Colonel Juan Merino®
Both held very important posts and were of great concern
to American officials in El Salvador.

General Andreu

was the Department Commander of La Union, the site of
El Salvador’s most Important port facility on the Gulf
of Fonseca.

Colonel Merino was the Commandant of the

National Police of El Salvador.

Other individuals who

sympathized with pro-Nazi ideas were the Chiefs of
Police of the Departments of Santa Ana and Santa Tecla

•^Phillips to Legation, August 11, 1938, file
816.20/47, R. G. 59, N. A.

166
as well as the Commandant of the port of Acajutla.

31

While these men were fascist in orientation, they did
not work to subvert the Salvadoran government for
Germany.

Indeed, their only connection with Germany was

the similarity in their ideas on discipline and
authority.-^2
Because all. of the above-mentioned individuals
were appointees of General Martinez, there was no ques
tion as to where he stood on the Axis matter especially
during the last part of his first full term and the
early part of his second term in office 1938-19^ 1 .
When newspapers attacked the influence of the Nazis and
F a s c i s t o n the Salvadoran government, their editors
were reprimanded by General Martinez.

In 1938 Napoleon

Viera Altamirano, editor of Dlario de Hoy was exiled for
criticizing the growth of Axis influence in El Salvador.

33

The pages of Diario Latino and La Prensa Graffca, two
leading Salvadoran dailies, show clearly the effect of

Military Attache' Lt. Col J. H. Marsh (El Salvador)
to M.I.D., December 6 , 19^1* Item no. 3020, folder
Stability Report, Box 181, El Salvador 3020-3850, R. G.
165. N. A., Frazer to Hull, October 20, 19^-1, file
816.00/1088, R. G. 59, N. A.
32

—
Interview with Sr. Penate and Ambassador Serrano,
December 1975* San Salvador.
J

^ N e w York Times, August 1, 17* 1938.
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censorship as nothing critical of the government was
ever published during the later stages of the Martfnez
regime.

Despite government censorship the newspaper

editors were still able to express their opposition by
clever manipulation of their articles or cartoons.
They accomplished this by printing censored items upside
down or by purposely leaving the editorial spaces blank.
They were further able to make back-hand slaps at
General Martfnez by simply not covering important events
or by not mentioning his name at all for months at a

time.^
The successes of the Axis forces in Europe caused
General Martfnez to be more open in his support of their
ideas.

When Italy joined the war in June 10, 1940, about

three hundred men dressed in Italian ''Blackshirts"
paraded through downtown San Salvador.

When the Salva

doran spectators reacted unfavorably with boos and hoots
they were immediately suppressed by government t r o o p s . ^
Despite General Martfnez?s position regarding the
Axis powers, the majority of Salvadorans, among them
government officials, sympathized clearly with the allied
cause.

34

Efforts by Axis-leaning Salvadorans to spread

Dlario Latino. 1939-1941, passim.

^ N e w York Times. June 15, 19^0.
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their ideas in the schools by the importation of Fascist
Spanish priests were met with a great deal of opposition
by Salvadoran teachers,,

A union of teachers was organized

to fight the spread of Fascist ideas Just as had been
done against Communism during the early 1930’s.

The

opposition to Nazi-Fascist ideas was not limited only to
organized protests or editorial "backhanded*1 newspaper
attacks,

It also took the form of physical abuse for

certain individuals,

Baron Hundelhausen, manager of the

Banco Hipotecario and honorary German Consul In San
Salvador, was subjected to physical threats.

His home and

car were stoned by bands of roving youths and he was
Insulted grossly whenever he passed the University,

The

threat of bodily harm called for a guard around his
house.

37

The climax of open resistance to the threat of
Nazi-Fascist influence was the public outcry for the
resignations of General Bohnstedt and Earon Hundelhausen
from their respective positions as the heads of the
Escuela Militar and the Banco Hipotecario.

Their

resignations in September of 1939 brought a sigh of

•^Interview with Sra. Lolita Barauna, May 1975»
New Orleans;
New York Times, January 17, 1938•^Frazer to Hull, September 21, 1939, file 816.00
N/8 , R. G. 59, N. A.
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relief from American officials In San Salvador.

The

American opposition to their presence had been well
known by the Salvadoran government.

The tide of

opinion gradually drew the government’s position over
to the pro-Democratic side.
Even General Martfnez, himself an admirer of German
and Italian achievements, was a Salvadoran nationalist
first, above and beyond whatever sentiments he may have
had regarding fascist ideas.

Thus, although he tolerated

Nazi-sympathizers and was himself a practitioner of
totalitarian measures, he took every opportunity to
reiterate pro-democratic, pro-United States, pro-Pan
American, and anti-totalitarian p r i n c i p l e s H e was
also enough of a politician to be able to drift along with
the changing tides of time.

When he saw that the senti

ment among Salvadorans was toward the Allied cause, he
too espoused their sentiments.

He even allowed the

resignations of General Bohnstedt and Baron Hundelhausen
although he considered them valuable men.

Moreover, in

June 19^0, a law was passed which prohibited the dissemi
nation of foreign propaganda.

As a result, Nazi

-^Frazer to Hull, September 8 , 1939* file 816.00 N/8 ,
R. G. 59, N. A.
to Hull, October 20, 19^1, file 816.00/1088,
R. G. 59, N. A.
■^Frazer
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activities were forced underground.

In July 19^0, the

withdrawal of Baron Hundelhausen was requested by the
government and he left El Salvador a short time there
after.

to

He was replaced as manager of the Banco

Hipotecario by a pro-American, brilliant young man,
Dr. Alfonso Rochac.
Among General Martfnez1s top cabinet officers, his
Minister of Foreign Relations, Miguel Araujo, was
probably the strongest opponent of Fascist influence in
El Salvador.

He openly denounced the totalitarian

powers and publicly voiced his disapproval of the local
German diplomatic representatives.

The man who replaced

Hundelhausen as German Consul was Richard von Heynitz,
formerly Secretary of the German Legation in Guatemala.
His patently pro-Nazi views irritated Araujo to the
point that he refused to meet with him and insisted
that all communications be in written form.

Heynitz's

relations with Salvadoran officials became so unpleasant
that not long after his arrival in San Salvador, he was
found dead.

He allegedly committed suicide.

hi

But El

Department Report to Hull, (date missing, probably
January 19^1), "Latin American Totalitarian Activities,"
folder 331, Latin American-London Conference-Naval
Conference, Box 7 6 , Cordell Hull Papers, Library of
Congress.
4l

Although no investigation was conducted into his
death, it was suspected that he did not commit suicide.
Ibid.
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Salvador's eventual alignment with the Allied cause was
probably due more to economic factors than to the
strong pro-Allied positions of Foerign Minister Araujo
and the majority of the Salvadoran people.

American Reactions to the Spread of Fascism
The rise of Fascist ideas in Europe had an impact
on the United States as well as Latin America during the
1930's.

The crises brought on by the depression caused

many American to reassess their economic and political
systems.

Some turned to Socialism for their answers

while others leaned toward Fascist ideas.

Many business

men saw in Mussolini's Italy the answers to the problems
h, 2
of America.
The man who became the "dean" of the Amer
ican Fascist movement was a former diplomat to Central
America, Lawrence Dennis.

He utilized his personal

experiences in dealing with American involvement in Latin
America as the basis for his call for a reassessment of
the economic and social structure of American society.
He concluded that the system could be saved only if stern
discipline was Imposed.

That discipline was available

through Fascism.^
i±2

Dlggins, Mussolini and Fascism;
America, pp. 164-165, 190.

The View from
‘ ”

43
"ochlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt:
of Upheaval, p. ?4.

The Politics
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The New Deal proponents themselves had to resort
to "corporatist" measures during the early days in an
effort to turn the tide of the depression.

Hence, they

could not be too intolerant with their "good neighbors"
when they too resorted to the use of such tactics in
their struggle to bring stability to their countries.
In Central America, Jorge Ubico and General Martfnez
were the leading practitioners of such harsh measures
in their efforts at continuismo.
During the early 1930’s, while the American offi
cials in El Salvador were concerned with the inroads
made by Germany and Italy, their concern did not trans
late into any kind of action.

Their inactivity on the

matter stemmed from the early unconcern by Washington
of the impending Axis threat in the area.

The extent

of the State Department's preparedness was limited to
the acquisition of field reports on Nazi-Fascist
activities.

By 1938 however, because of the worsening

European crisis, the State Department was aroused enough
to realize the potential threat that Nazi influence
presented in the Western Hemisphere.

The primary fear

was that
...given the opportunity and the support of
arms and leadership, one or more of their

h-L

Pike, "Corporatism and Latin
States Relations," p. 146.

American-United
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transplanted colonies would in time start
an Axis-inspired protest against an existing
government in Latin America (the pattern de
signed and executed in the Sudetenland in
1939); that it soon would find occasion
for local rebellion; and it thus would
provide in the American hemisphere a
ready-made bridgehead for intervention
and later full-scale Invasion from Europe.
This, it was reasoned, could lead to a
military occupation which, once established,
would be far more difficult to dislodge
than to have prevented in the first place.
Of the local Nazi's hopes and intentions,
there were rumors sufficient to make
American diplomatic agents uneasy and
thereafter to arouse in the State Depart
ment anxiety over a military coup that
might be close at hand, and against which
there was in 1938 no implemented plan of
protection.^5
As the European war became more imminent the United
States began a military program in Latin America to
compete with the Axis efforts.

In the ensuing competi

tion for the favor of the Latin Americans, the United
States pulled out all stops in its efforts, even to the
point of underbidding (at a loss) the Germans and
Italians.

Hence, the United States military forces

were able to offer professional instruction to the Latin
American armed forces at almost no cost to them.

The

^Mark Skinner Watson, United States Army in World
War II: The War Department, Chief of Staff; Pre-War
Plans and Preparations (Washington;
Department of the
Army, 1950), p. 8 7 .
LA

Lieuwen, United States Policy In Latin America;
A Short History, p. 191;
Bemis, The Latin American
Policy of the United States:
An Historical Interpre
tation, pp. 355-356.
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resultant monetary loss to America was compensated for
by the Increased influence that it was able to exert
on the governments through the military hardware sales.
As a result^ the United States was able to gain the
cooperation of the Latin Americans in its efforts to
build a hemispheric defense against the Nazi-Fascist
47
threat. '
At the December 1938 Lima Inter-American Conference,
the United States attempted to thwart the growing Axis
menace in Latin America.

One of the primary objectives

of the American delegation at the Conference was to line
up the democracies against the totalitarian states of
Germany, Italy and Japan.

The United States also hoped

to have adopted a treaty to assure continental security
or at least to implement the previously approved Euenos
Aires declaration of Pan-American solidarity of 1936.
The first American goal against totalitarianism was
vigorously resisted by the Latin American delegates, many
of whom represented dictatorial governments.

They simply

did not want their form of government interfered with
just because it differed from that in the United States.
Moreover, they did not want to destroy their trade rela
tionships with Germany and Italy, the targets of the

47

Whitaker, "From Dollar Diplomacy to the Good
Neighbor," p. 17 •
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American attacks at the Conference.

They were unwilling

to destroy themselves economically just to please the
United States.

48

The United States had more luck in the

Implementation of its second goal to assure continental
security.

After weeks of heated debate the Declaration

of Lima was signed on December 24, 1938.

The treaty

stated that in case the peace, security or territorial
integrity of any American republic was threatened by
foreign intervention, it would be of concern to all and
that the proper response would be determined through
c o n s u l t a t i o n s on this matter the Central Americans,
almost all "totalitarian," voted wholeheartedly with
the United States.-^
As the European conflict worsened, the American
influence on El Salvador increased.

The belligerent

nations took steps to curtail the importation and
consumption of coffee by rationing the product.

The

48

Speech by William Castle, former Assistant Secre
tary of State, before the Inter-American Congress,
sponsored by the Graduate Faculty of Political Philosophy
of Fordham University in New York City, April 22, 1939»
file Addresses and Speeches, Castle Papers, Herbert Hoover
Library, West Branch, Iowa.
4q
7James W. Gantenbein,. (ed.) The Evolution of Our
Latin American Policy: A Documentary Record (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1950), pp. 356-3^0.
Samuel Guy Inman, "Lima Conference and the Totali
tarian Issue," ’Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Sciences.'CCIV t'Julv 1939^. p. 12.
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Increased trade with the United States, tools: up the
slack in the lost trade with Europe.

El Salvador sold

over sixty percent of its major export (coffee) to the
United States.

Thus, the United States was guaranteed

a greater degree of Influence than Germany by virtue
of its greater purchases of coffee®

Further, because

most Salvadorans were anti-Fasclsts, the Axis influence
*>1
was considerably diminished . J

Sal'vadoran-Amerlcan lielat ions During World War II
Like the other nations of the Western Hemisphere,
El Salvador was directly affected by the outbreak of
war in Europe.

Being an export-oriented nation, El

Salvador suffered from the disruption of normal commerce
with Europe.

The loss of the German coffee market and

the cessation of the flow of merchandise from Germany
was immediately felt by Salvadoran business interests.
The government efforts to guard against undue price
raising and profiteering helped to keep the majority of
the Salvadoran population from suffering unduly from
the effects of the war.^2
The United States too was affected by the war in
Europe, and at the height of German Successes in Europe

Martin, "Nazi Intrigues in Central America," p. 72.
■^Frazer to Hull, October 20, 19*4-1. file 816.00/
1088, R. G. 59, N. A.
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The Americans began to mobilize their efforts to combat
the Axis advances in the Western Hemisphere.

The ob

jective was as enunciated at the consultative meetings
of Foreign Ministers at Panama in 1939? and. Cuba in
1940, and generally stated at the Lima Conferences to
develop a unified stand among the nations of the hemis
phere against the Axis powers.

In the Central American

region the paramount concern of the United States was
the security of the Panama Canal.

On August 1, 1940,

President Roosevelt approved a statement of policy which
provided for the followings
a) For arming the countries named to the
extent Indicated, as determined in each case
by our estimate of their requirements...
...Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba,
Haiti and the Cominican Republic.
To insure internal stability.
b) For providing these arms on financial
terms these republics can meet.
c) For assistance in the matter of military,
naval and industrial p e r s o n n e l . 5 3
The policy provided two avenues for American activities
to combat the Axis menace.

One was against Internal

subversive activities, and the other a joint cooperative
effort among the nations of the Western Hemisphere for

-^Conn and Fairchild, The United States Army in
World War II, p. 213.
---------------- ----- --------
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the defense of one "by all.

The joint effort included

measures to maintain the stability of the monetary and
commercial relationships of the American republics.
In this regard, the Congress of the United States pro
vided loans through the Export-Import Bank to provide
the countries with the means to maintain their exchange,
to develop transportation systems and to strengthen
<L l

defenses.
In El Salvador the objectives of the United States
focused on the economic, military and cultural areas.
The goal there, as in the rest of Central America, was
to preserve the stability of the country and as a result,
help to maintain the security of the Panama Canal.
Because of Britain’s war efforts (blockade), German and
Italian trade with El Salvador diminished considerably
while trade with the United States increased dramatically.
Between 1940-1944 El Salvador directed an average of
77.2 percent of her total exports to the United States.
This presented an average increase of 13.6 percent over
the previous five years.

A marked increase in imports

from the United States also occurred during the same

54

Department Report to Hull, (date missing, probably
January 1941), "Latin American Totalitarian Activities,”
folder 331. Latin American London Conference-Naval
Conference, Box 7 6 , Hull Papers.
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period as American manufacturers replaced German and
other European s u p p l i e r s . M o r e o v e r , with', the signing
of the Inter-American Coffee Agreement in 194-0, El
Salvador's economy over the next three years was
virtually saved from what would certainly have been a
severe setback.

The American decision to purchase only

a limited amount of the Latin American coffee production
each year served to maintain the price at levels which
allowed El Salvador to make a healthier profit than
would have been available without the limitation.-^
In the military arena, the degree of cooperation
between El Salvador and the United States, likewise
Increased as the war in Europe intensified.

American

advisors began to arrive in San Salvador in the summer
of 294-0.

Captain Maxwell D. Taylor of the United States

Army and Marine Major Clayton C. Jerome were sent in to
consult with Salvadoran military officers.-^

The result

of the American assessment of El Salvador1s military

-^Translation of Report by Dr. Juan E. Vasquez, M.I.D.
February 194-0, Item no. 4-000 folder 3860-End, Box 819,
El Salvador 3850-4-130, E. G. 165, N. A.
Ellis to Hull, November 1 9 , 194-1, O.S.S., Item
no. 7008, R. G. 226, N. A.
-^Hull to Frazer, June 5, 194-0, file 810.20 Defense/
67A, printed in Foreign Relations, 194-0, V. p. 107*
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preparedness indicated that at full strength the nation's
standing army during peacetime numbered only six
thousand men, but that it coiild quickly be raised to
forty thousand if necessary*

However, according to the
✓
Minister of National Defense, General Andres Menendez,
the army was poorly armed except for the ten thousand
Enfield rifles purchased from the United States in June
1940 . ^

The rifles proved to be useless to the Salva

doran army because the two million rounds of ammunition
they had ordered did not arrive until a year later.

By

late 1941, the United States could send only five hundred
thousand rounds to El Salvador.

Still, in spite of its

deficiencies, the conclusion of the American Military
Attache' in Costa Rica was that the Salvadoran army was
the best of the Central American nations. ^
For its part, El Salvador cooperated with the
American effort when it signed agreements which permitted
American vessels to enter Salvadoran ports freely while
on patrol duty along the Pacific coast of Central
America.

60

Likewise, the Army Air Corps was granted

-^Frazer to Hull, July 22, 1940, file 816.24/79,
R . G . 5 9 s N . A.
59Ibid.
60
uFrazer to Hull, January 5, 1940, file 740.0011A
Neutrality Patrol/6o, printed in Foreign Relations. 1Q40.
V, p. 107.
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permission to conduct photographic air missions over
El Salvador..

6 *1

The use of air space over Central

America had been granted by the nations of the area for
the purpose of ferrying planes from the United States
to Panama.

Permission to stop at airfields or land in

other areas in case of emergency was also granted by El
62
Salvador and the other Central American governments.
Although the official Salvadoran position regarding the
war was neutral, like many other Latin American nations,
Salvadoran actions indicated that they were very much on
the side of the Allies.
Probably the best indication of the change of
direction taken by El Salvador during the war was the
appointment of an American officer to be the director
of the Escuela Militar.

On March 27, 19^1, L t . Col.

Robert L. Christian was given a two-year contract to head
the Salvadoran military school which, only two years
previously, had been under the directorship of a German
officer.

The American influence continued throughout the

war as Lt. Col. Rufus E. Byers replaced Lt. Col. Christian
on May 21, 19^*3> with a two year appointment.

Both

^ C h a r g e 1Gerhard Gade (El Salvador) to Hull, Septem
ber 11, 19^-0, file 810.20 Defense/6^
printed in
Foreign Relations, 19^0, V, p. 107®
*
f\ o

Conn and Fairchild, The United States Army in
World War II. p. 312.

182
Christian and Byers were fluent in Spanish and in their
capacities each had precedence over Salvadoran officers
of the same rank.

During the same period the United

States legation in San Salvador became fully staffed
with military attaches from the Army and Navy departments.
Also, to more intensely investigate the activities of
suspected aliens or subversives, the legation acquired
the services of a legal attache in August 1942.
Since ideas and viewpoints were essential elements
in hemispheric defense, the United States and El Salvador
also conducted a cultural relations program.

An exchange

of students and professors between the two countries
was actively promoted.

By travel grants and scholarships

outstanding Salvadorans were able to visit the United
States.

By the same token American students and lec

turers were sent to El Salvador to exchange ideas.

An

association of prominent Salvadorans and Americans in
San Salvador was formed to serve as a clearing house of
Information on educational institutions and facilities

"Agreement Between the United States of America
and El Salvador," Executive Agreement Series 214, March 27,
19^1» Executive Agreement Series 328, March 21, 1943
(Washington: Government Frinting Office, 194l, 1943).
64

Frazier to Hull, September 3» 19^2, M.I.D., Item
no. 3500, folder 3500-3840, Box 818, El Salvador 30203850, R. G . 165, N. A. According to John Taylor of the
Military Division of the National Archives, the Legal
Attaches were representatives of the Office of Strategic
Services.
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in El Salvador and the United States.

The association

also provided financial aid to exchange students from
both countries.^

The cultural program was part of the

State Department's efforts to curtail the Nazi-Fascist
influence throughout Latin America and to a large degree,
was very successful in El Salvador because of the
cooperation of the Salvadoran government.
The objectives of the cultural, program were, of
course, part of the overall propaganda efforts by the
United States.

Much of the work in this area was super

vised by the office of the Coordinator of Inter-American
Affairs in San Salvador.

A 19^2 assessment of the pro

paganda methods utilized and their effectiveness
suggested that, 1) motion pictures which showed antiNazi themes were the most effective, 2) radio broadcasts,
despite weak transmissions, were also very effective
in generating a favorable opinion, 3) bribery accomplished
certain objectives in a very direct manner,

4)

occasional

flights of United States army planes over the country
were very effective in generating a feeling of security

^Department Report to Hull, (date missing, probably
January 1941), "Latin American Totalitarian Activities,"
folder 331. Latin American-London Conference-Naval.
Conference, Box ? 6 , Hull Papers; State Department Bulletin.
June 28, 1941, Vol. IV, No. 105, Publication 1616
(Washington;
Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 768.

18^

and at the same time

showed American air power which

the powerful Axis radio broadcasts minimized.

It was

further pointed out that printed material was not a very
effective means of propaganda because of the high rate
of illiteracy, although illustrated magazines were very
popular.
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The propaganda measures, coupled with the

well-publicized increase in American purchases of Sal
vadoran coffee proved to be very effective in winning the
support of the Salvadoran people.
One of the reasons American countermeasures
against the Axis push succeeded so well was the willing
ness of Congress to fund the programs.

After the

bombing of Pearl Harbor, El Salvador joined the United
States in declaring war against Japan on December 8,
19^1*

On the following day, El Salvador received a

$1,6^0,000 armaments and munitions loan through the
Lend-Lease program.

(Three days later on December 12,

19^1» El Salvador declared war on Germany and Italy.)
The terms were so attractive that the ''Martfnez Doctrine"
prohibiting external loans was temporarily abandoned.
Under the Lend-Lease program El Salvador was required
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Military Attache Major C. P. Baldwin (El Salvador)
to War Department, M.L.D., October 7, 19^2, Item no. 2900,
folder El Salvador 2^00-2950, Box 817, El Salvador 2^003020, R. G. 165, N. A.

to repay only

$ ^ , 8 8

at no interest.^

percent of the loan over six years
El Salvador also received a $500,000

grant to develop facilities to improve health and
sanitation.

Such facilities as water supply, sewage

disposal and disease control were to be improved.

In

addition, American technical experts were sent to El
Salvador to assist in the implementation of the projects
The work was done through the office of the Coordinator
for Inter-American Affairs.

The largest sum of money

granted to El Salvador during the war came from the
Export-Import Bank.

The money, $2.9 million, was used

for public works programs such as in the construction of
the Pan American and other highways, bridges, streets
and improvements in the water supply systems In the
interior.^

^Hull to Minister Eector David Castro (Washington)
December 9» 1941, file 8l6.24/118a, R. G. 59, N. A.;
Acting Chief, Treaty Division Wallace McLure to Hull,
January 31» 1942, file 816.24/1261, R. G. 59, N. A.;
Department Report to Hull, (date missing, probably
January 1941), "Latin American Totalitarian Activities,"
folder 331 Latin American-London Conference-Naval
Conference, Box 76, Hull Papers.
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"Health and Sanitation Program Agreement Between
the United States and El Salvador." Executive Agreement
Series 367. Way 4, 5 , 1942 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1944).
^ F r a z e r to Hull, August 26, 1941, file 816.51/1081
R. G. 59, N. A.
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The loan from the Export-Import Bank had been in
negotiationfor several months prior to December 1941,
Two matters complicated the loan.

The first was the

reluctance of the United States to grant the new loan
while El Salvador was still in default on its 1922 loan.
No payments had been made since January 1938.

It was

felt that if El Salvador could afford to undertake its
new loan obligations, it should first meet its old
70
obligations.'

The other matter which complicated the

loan proceedings was the American desire to exert its
influence on El Salvador to oust certain Nazi sympathizers
in government.

The American Minister in San Salvador

suggested that
...consideration might profitably be given when
discussing these loan applications,
...of cleansing the Salvador government of
a number of its ardently pro-Axis officials,
certain of whom are in key positions. An
oral assurance that this matter would be
attended to could no doubt be relied on...
The writer feels that one good turn
deserves another, and can perceive no reason,
when we are giving so much, why we should not
exact one or two of the things we want in
return.™

Frazer to Hull, November 12, 1941, file 816.51/
1098, R. G. 59, N. A.; Frazer to Hull, September 26,
1941, file 816.51/1092, R. G. 5 9 , N. A.
"^Frazer to Hull, August 26, 1941, file 816.51/
1081, R. G. 59, N. A.

Frazer's advice was heeded by the State Department and
as a result, the negotiations with the Export-Import
Bank bogged down.

In October 1941 General Martfnez

finally backed down and removed one of the two men who
were personae non grata to the United States.

On

October 21, Col. Juan Merino, Chief of the Salvadoran
National Police, was "kicked upstairs" to the post of
Minister to Nicaragua.

His replacement was a pro-

American officer, Col. Rudesindo Monterrosa .
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1

Two

months later, on December 2, 1941> General Lufs Andreu,
the Commander of La Union, was transferred to a less
strategic location in the department of San Vicente and
he too was replaced by a pro-American officer, Col. Jose^
Angel Avendano .

73
1^

The ouster of the two military officers

was not only a conciliatory gesture by General Martfnez
but a risky one as well because both .men were popular
within the military without which General Martfnez could
not have ruled.

With the concessions by General Martfnez,

the loan was granted by the United States.
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Military Attache' L t . Col. J. H. Marsh to War
Department, October 25, 1941, Item no. 3850, M.I.D.,
folder Stability Report, El Salvador 3020-3850, Box 818,
R. G. 165, N. A.
'
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Marsh to War Department, December 6 , 1941, Item
no. 3020, M.I.D., folder Stability Report, El Salvador
3020-3850, Box 818, R. G. 165, N. A.
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El Salvador also contributed to the war effort in
other ways besides allowing the United States access to
its airports, sea ports and certain other privileges.
General Kartinez joined some of his neighbors and backed
the Roosevelt-Churchill agreements to "destroy anti7k
democratic doctrines."'
Ey January 1942, El Salvador
had become an active participant in the Allied effort
to intern and deport Axis nationals suspected of subver
sive activities.

Several hundred German and Italian

nationals were eventually deported to camps in the
United S t a t e s . ^

By early 1942, only four hundred eighty

German, Italian and Japanese nationals were left in
El Salvador and of these twenty-six Germans, twenty-three
Italians and two Japanese— all male— were interned at
the National Police Headquarters.

They were quartered

in a dormitory on the second floor of the Police head
quarters building but were permitted to make occasional
visits, without guard, to points within the city limits.^

^ N e w York Times, December 2, 1941.
7<
^Interview with Sr. Penate, December 1975. San
Salvador.
Harsh to War Department, January 24, 1942, Item
no. 3020, N.I.D., folder Stability Report, El Salvador
3020-3850, Box 818, R. G. 165, N. A.
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An unsigned, memorandum to the liar Department, citing an
P.B.I. Report as its source, criticized the x-xay the
internment process was handled protesting that the
prisoners were treated with hid gloves and almost with
deference by the Director of Immigration, Col. L. Dreyfus.
The Immigration chief made no effort to hide his
sympathy for the German and Italian detainees and
allowed them regular visits 'ey their families and ser
vants who came laden with food.

The visits often took

the appearance of being a festive occasion.

Thus, the

report urged that the detainees be immediately removed
77
to the United States.

Other measures taken against the

Axis nationals were less stringent but nonetheless
served to harass them— their telephones were disconnected,
nQ

conversations were reported and travel was restricted.
Although no Salvadoran troops were ever sent to
the battlefront during World War II, Salvadoran men
contributed directly to the war effort by serving as
laborers in the maintenance of the Fanama Canal.

The

security of the waterway was one of the high priority

77
''Unsigned memorandum to War Department, Way 27,
19^2, Item no. 3100, K.I.D., folder 3000-4000, El Salvador
2400-3020, Box 817. R. G. 1.65, N . A.
^ W a r s h to War Department, January 24, ip42, Item
no. 3020, K.I.D., folder Stability Reoort, El Salvador
3020-3850, Box 818, R. G. 165, N . A.
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items in America's defense plans.

Among the contin

gency plans itfhich received serious consideration by
the United States Army was the expansion of the canal
and its lochs to accommodate larger warships.

Some

consideration was also given to the construction of
additional lochs as a precaution against tombing hits
on the existing lochs.

During the 1940-1944 period, a

total of 19,675 contract worhers were brought into
Fanama from Central America and the ttest Indies to carry
out the initial phases of the expansion projects as well
as for the normal maintenance of the passageway.

More

than half of the total number of workers were from 51
Salvador.^

The worh on the canal did not win friends

for the United States.

For some, the assignment to

worh there was the penalty for wrongdoing.

Soldiers

charged with misconduct were punished with a stint at
80
the canal.
Most of the Salvadoran worhers sent to

70

^Stetson Conn, Rose C. Sngleman, Byron Fairchild,
The United States Army in World War II; The Western
Hemisphere, Guarding the United States and its Outposts
(Washington : Department of A r m y , 1964), p. 322;
Clipping from Diario Nuevo. San Salvador, March 8 , 1944,
Item no. 4810, folder miscellaneous, El Salvador 47305060, Box 821, R. C-. 165, N. A.
on
Interview with Sr. Penate, December 1975, San
Salvador.
Sr. Penate was punished for misconduct in
the army and sentenced to the Canal Zone for six months.

i-
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work at the canal returned home with a myriad of com
plaints about their stay in the camps which were "like
cemeteries.!!

Nevertheless, the Salvadoran efforts at

the Canal Zone were significant in that thousands
of American troops were freed from doing "non-essential"
jobs.81

The Fall of the Martfnez Regime
Throughout the war, the matter of General Martinez's
loyalty to the Allied cause remained in doubt.

Although

he outwardly supported the Allies and cooperated in
the American effort to establish a secure Western
Hemisphere, he privately stated his desire to see the
Axis powers win.

This was especially so during the

early stages of the war before the United States had
Op

turned the tide against Germany.

His position however,

was almost an isolated one in El Salvador.

Most of the

population and even in his own administration officials
were openly in favor of the allies.

General Martinez

81

Ibid.; Clipping from Diario Nuevo, San Salvador,
March 8 , 1944, Item no. 4810, folder Miscellaneous,
El Salvador 4?30-506o, Box 821, R. G. 165, N. A.
82
Department Report to Hull, (date missing, probably
January 1941), "Latin American Totalitarian Activities,"
folder 331» Latin American-London Conference-Naval
Conference, Box 7 6 , Cordell Hull Papers; Frazer to
Hull, October 20, 1941, file 816.00/1088, R. G. 59, N. A.

192
was further out of tune from other Salvadorans when in
late 1'9^3 he began to implement his plan to retain
office after the expiration of his third term on January 1,
19^5®

He began to enact certain repressive measures

to harass the opposition.

Individuals who were known to

be against him found that they could not get passports,
new automobile licenses, or telephones.

Moreover, they

were followed by uniformed or secret police.

It became

apparent that their democratic rights were slowly being
eroded.

General Martinez had completely lost his earlier

benevolence and had become a one-man government with a
cabinet full of yes-men.

In January 19*4, a Constitu

tional Assembly once again convened to alter the 1939
Constitution in order to grant General Martinez yet
another term.

By then the changes in the political

atmosphere in El Salvador had become critical.

While

General Martinez may have been able to get away with
authoritarian conduct early during his rule, by 19*4 the
atmosphere had changed.

The Salvadorans' aversion to

General Martinez1s tactics in 19*4 nay have partly been
brought about by the same worldwide revulsion with
totalitarianism and dictatorships of the likes of Hitler
and Mussolini.

Vice-Consul Joseph E. Maleady assessed

the situation in the following manners
tyC"’•*>....

The President has now reached the point
where he may be classified as 'the entire
government.'
While this has been true for
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a long time, it is even more pronounced at
present since he now hates to receive any
advice that is not in line with his pre
conceived ideas and opinions.°3
On April 2, 19*14, the years of pent-up frustrations
finally erupted when the younger officers, dissatisfied
with low salaries and General Martinez's autocratic
methods, openly rebelled®

In the disturbances which

followed, bands of roving youths marched to the
American Embassy and attempted to persuade the Ambassa
dor to show some sign of recognition for their efforts
against dictatorship.

Ambassador Thurston, however,

abstained from making any comments on the events.

84

General Martinez was on a picnic at La Libertad
with his family when the uprising began that Sunday
afternoon, April 2, 1944.

Two truckloads of rebel

troops were dispatched to capture General Martinez and
his family.

An indication of the apparent ineptness of

the revolutionary forces was the failure of the two
truckloads of soldiers to capture their quarry inspite
of the fact that there was only one road to the beach.
Upon his return to San Salvador General Martinez re
grouped his loyal troops in the National Guard and

^ S u r v e y of Salvadoran politics by Vice Consul
Joseph E. Maleady (El Salvador) in Thurston to Eull,
February 3, 1 9 ^ . file 8l6 .00/1190, E. G. 59, N. A.
84Thurston to Hull, April 2, 1944, file 816.00/1721;
April 4, 1944, file 816.00/1236, R. G. 5 9 , N. A.

19^
Police.

Ey late Sunday evening the forces loyal to

General Martinez had secured the city and by the
following day, April 3» 19*4, all resistance from
o n:

the rebel forces had ended.

D

Throughout the intermittent fighting during the
revolt about one hundred deaths occurred, and while
the citizens of San Salvador were concerned, there was
no great fear or panic in the city.

The Diplomatic

Corps met on Monday the afternoon of April 3 in
Ambassador's Thurston's office to discuss the situation
and to decide what action if any to take,

Nhile the

meeting was talcing place a tank passed by the Embassy
with its machine guns firing.

The purpose of the shoot-

ing by the tank was to clear the way toward the Embassy
where the driver, Col. Tito Calvo, sought asylum.
Col. Calvo parked his Lend-Lease tank in front of the
Embassy and along with two other officers asked the
American Ambassador to grant them political asylum.
After he was turned down by Ambassador Thurston, he
asked the other diplomats from Mexico, Guatemala,
Nicaragua and Costa P.ica for protection.
to grant his request.

All refused

After receiving assurances from

General Martinez that the prisoners would be given the

^Thur s t o n to Hull, Aoril 11, 19^4, file 816.00/
1259, B. C-. 59, N« A.

IQ K

benefits of Salvadoran law, Ambassador Thurston
reluctantly relinquished Col, Calvo, Lt. Mancia, and
2nd Lt, Gavidia to General Martinez's soldiers.88
Ambassador Thurston was justifiably apprehensive
about turning the rebels over to General Martinez,
The memory of the 1932 mat^nza was still fresh in the
memories of many people.

In a telegram to the Secre

tary of State, Ambassador Thurston expressed his fears
that
...in view of the apparently wide scope
of military and civilian participation
in the uprising and the bitterness it
must have aroused, there exists the
danger of rather general retaliatory and
punitive action by the government and I
anticipate that we may be urged to inter
pose on humanitarian grounds.
His fears were realized when on April 10, 1 9 ^ »

ten

officers were executed by firing squad for their role
in the rebellion.

88

The executions suppressed the

uprising but did not end the protestsj it was only the

88Thurston to Hull, April 5, 19^4, file 816.00/12^9,
E. G. 59, N. A.
^ T h u r s t o n to Hull, April
H« G • 59» M. A.

19^(4, file 816 .00/1236,

8®Thurston to Hull, April 12, 19^4, file 816.00/1256,
R. G. 59. M. A. Second Lt. Antonio Gavidia Castro, who
was executed along with Col. Calvo was alleged to be the
illegitimate son of General Martinez.
Interview with
Sr. Pelfate and Ambassador Serrano, December 1975» San
Salvador.
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beginning.

The death of Col. Tito Calvo and the others

inspired other Salvadorans to resist the actions of
General Martinez.
On April 28, 19*j4, a strike by students at the
National University and doctors and interns at the
89
main hospital took place to protest the executions. ^
By May the strikes had

spread to other institutions.

The campaign of strikes and passive resistance were
designed to compel General Martinez to resign.

By

May 5* 1 9 ^ . virtually all employees of banking
institutions were on strike and almost all the shops
and businesses were c l o s e d . ^

The whole city of San

Salvador seemed to be on strike against General Martinez.
As the strikes spread to other parts of the country, it
reached such massive proportions that it would have taken
another matanza to stop it.

This time General Martinez

did not have the necessary support nor the desire to
initiate one.

Furthermore, he did not have the

"communist11 ogre to blame for the troubles.
With no one to turn to, his army helpless before
such massive resistance, General Martinez, upon the

^ T h u r s t o n to Hull, April 28, 1 9 ^ ,
1289, H. G. 59, N. A.
^°Thurston to Hull, May 5, 1 9 ^ ,
R. G. 59, N. A.

file 186,00/

file 816.00/1299,
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advice of his Cabinet, stepped down on May 9* 1944.
91
Two days later, he fled with his family to Guatemala.'

91

7 Interview with Ambassador Serrano and Sr. Barriere,
December 1975. San Salvador;
Thurston to Eull, May 9,
19^4, file 816.00/1317;
May 11, 1944, file 816.001/
Martfnez, May/77.
G. 59. N. A.
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SUMMARY
During prolonged periods of political and economic
crisis many people are willing to tolerate authoritarian
ism in order to achieve some degree of peace and order.
When given the option between anarchy and tyranny most
will choose the latter.
El Salvador experienced such a dilemma during the
early 1930’s when the economic depression and Communist
revolt created an atmosphere of fear and apprehension.
As a result, the authoritarian, but "benevolent" rule
of General Martinez had the support of most Salvadorans
and the grudging toleration by the United States despite
disagreements on some economic matters.
Ey the late 1930’s however, the benevolence of the
earlier period had disappeared as General Martinez began
to implement his plan to perpetuate himself in office.
Els efforts at contlnulsmo in 1939 resulted in opposition
from prominent Salvadorans who had formerly been his
strongest supporters during his earlier terms in office.
General Manuel Castaneda, who had been his right-hand
man during the 1932 rebellion, even accused him of being
the most "anti democratic” leader in the Americas.

More

over, his authoritarian tactics of the late 1930’s led
observers to conclude that his rule was fascist in nature.

199
Actually the accusations of fascism were more
exaggerated than deserved "because although some of
his practices could admittedly be labelled authori
tarian General Martinez was far from being an advocate
of the Axis powers' cause in Latin America.
in the climate of the

However,

late 1930's when Hitler

and

Mussolini made everyone conscious of totalitarianism,
it did not require too much disciplinarian action to be
grouped into the fascist league.

Other Latin American

leaders practiced similar tactics and were likewise
accused of harboring fascist sympathies.

Eut then

again, so did many other people throughout the world
who, in seeking the answers to the problems of the 1930’s,
also turned to the ideas of Mussolini.

Many Americans,

even those among the New Dealers, sought to find the
answers in corporatist ideas not unlike those practiced
in Italy,

Therefore, when General Martinez looked toward

Europe for his ideas, he was not alone in his
for the answer to his

search

problems.

Other factors helped to facilitate the ideological
orientation toward Germany and Italy.

Between 193^ and

1937 the trade between El Salvador and Germany rose
substantially as Germany launched a major trade offensive.
Likewise the Italians were successful in selling a number
of planes to El Salvador and at the same time training
Salvadoran pilots to fly and service them.

The Axis
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nations were also able to carry on a successful exchange
of professors as well as send military advisers to
El Salvador,.

The appointment of General Eohnstedt to be

Director of the Escuela Ml11tar was especially signifi
cant and contributed a great deal to the accusation that
General Martinez was a fascist sympathizer.

Likewise,

the appointment of Earon Eundelhausen, a German and
suspected Nazi, to be Director of the Banco Hlpotecarlo
caused further consternation among American diplomats
in San Salvador.
In addition to the aliens, there were also Salvador
ans whose ideological orientations were toward fascist
ideas.

General Luis Andreu and Colonel Juan Merino were

important officers in General Martinez’s military.

Their

positions further gave credence to the allegations that
General Martinez’s government was fascist oriented.

More

over, General Martinez's conduct toward all who opposed
his ideas convinced many of his real political orientation
toward fascism.

As a result, the Salvadorans, the major

ity of whom were pro-allies, successfully applied pressure
to oust Eohnstedt and Hundelhausen.

Both resigned in

September 1939*
The United States had not taken any direct action
on the Axis inroads in Latin America until 1938 when the
European arena became inflamed.

As a result, the United

States initiated several steps to counteract the Axis
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influence.

One measure was an Increase in military aid

to Latin American nations* while another was the con
vening of a Pan-American Conference to declare opposition
to the spread of Axis ideas.

In Salvadoran-American

economic relations* no stimulus was necessary since
most of the European markets for Salvadoran products had
disappeared and the United States became the primary
market for Salvadoran exports.

As a result* United

States influence in El Salvador increased significantly.
In 19^0 American arms were sold to El Salvador's army
which, although small, was considered to be the best in
Central America.

On March 27, 19^1, Lt. Col. Robert

Christian became Director of the Escuela Milltar. which
only two years previously had been under the directorship
of a German officer.
America's influence was also felt on the economic
front.

On December 9» 19^1 * after El Salvador declared

war on Japan, the United States granted it a Lend-Lease
armaments and munitions loan valued at $1.6 million
dollars.

Other loans through the Export-Import Bank were

also granted after General Martinez consented to the
American suggestion that he oust General Andreu and
Colonel Merino, two pro-Nazi sympathizers.
In addition to cooperating with the American efforts,
El Salvador also contributed by providing the Panama Canal
with most of its workers during the war.

Also, El Salvador
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participated in the internment and deportation of German,
Japanese and Italian nationals.
World War II altered the ideas of many people in the
world.

The attitude toward authoritarianism changed.

The worldwide revulsion to totalitarianism, as reflected
in Mussolini and Hitler, also affected the Salvadoran
people.

When General Martfnez again sought to perpetuate

himself in office in January, 1944, the Salvadorans led
by a rebellious faction of the military resisted.

After

an abortive coup was crushed, a massive strike ensued
and General Martfnez, no longer willing to carry out
another matanza. stepped down.

On May 11, 1944 he fled

with his family to Guatemala.
The United States, asked to intervene for "humanitar
ian reasons," had learned a lesson and refused to become
involved in the internal affairs of El Salvador.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

During the critical days of April and May 1944,
the American Ambassador to El Salvador, Walter Thurston,
wrote to his superior in the State Department that he
feared the government reprisals to the uprising would
be violent and bloody.

The last rebellion against

General Martfnez in 1932, had resulted in the massacre
of over ten thousand Salvadorans.

The Ambassador sug

gested that the United States might be asked to "interpose
on humanitarian grounds."

In reply, the Secretary of

State, not wishing to become embroiled, emphasized that
the problem was an internal matter and no authority to
intercede would be granted.

However, he did permit his

Ambassador to "discreetly" mention to General Martfnez
that the eyes of the world were upon El Salvador and to
warn him that "severe or inhuman reprisals would seriously
injure the standing of the Salvadoran government with our
2
press and public opinion."
In yet another appeal to

1Thurston to Hull, April 4, 1944, file 316.00/1236,
R. G. 59* N • A.
‘“Hull to Thurston, April 6, 1944, file 816.00/1236,
R. G. 59, N. A.
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grant assistance, Thurston forwarded to the Secretary
of State a letter by Agustfn Alfaro, a prominent
Salvadoran, to Overton Ellis of the United States
Embassy in San Salvador.

In his letter, Alfaro pleaded

for American intercession against continuismo and
repression by General Martinez„

Senior Alfaro noted that

the United States gained the trust and friendship of
the Salvadorans by its aid and encouragement during
the war along with other good neighborly policies.

He

feared that this hard-earned friendship would be lost
if, during this time of need, the United States did not
come to their aid.-^

As the situation worsened, the

diplomatic corps in San Salvador approached the American
Ambassador and requested that the United States directly
intervene to avoid bloodshed.

The Peruvian Charge"

d* Affaires, speaking on behalf of the diplomatic corps,
threatened that "United States prestige would be damaged
if it merely stood by impassively while a popular move
ment took p l a c e T h e

State Department reply to all

requests for intercession was negative.

The United

States would not intervene in the internal affairs of

^Thurston to Hull, April 21, 1 9 ^ , file 816.00/1277,
H. G. 59, N . A.
^Thurston to Hull, May 5, 1 9 ^ . file 8l6.00/1303,
R. G. 59, N. A.
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El Salvador.

The policy of strict neutrality was to

be maintained.-*
This reaction in 19^4 was far different from the
one taken by the United States in 1931-1932 when it
took a very active part in the crisis before and after
the coup which brought General Martinez to power.

By

the end of his term in office, Salvadoran-American
diplomatic relations had undergone a complete transformation.

It had evolved from Charles Curtis1 inept inter

vention during the 1931 coup to Walter Thurston’s cautious
neutrality during the 19^)4 rebellion.

The desire to

help was still there in 19*^4, but the lessons had been
learned.

Intervention in the internal affairs of another

country had often led to unforeseen complications and in
too many instances in the past the United States found
it difficult to extricate herself from the entanglement.
As another Ambassador, George P. Kennan, later observed,
participation in the internal affairs of other nations
was inadvisable because
...even benevolence, when addressed to
a foreign people represents a form of
intervention into their internal affairs
and always receives, at best, a divided
reception.®

-*Hull to Thurston, May 6 , 19^*4, file 816.00/1303,
R. G. 59, N. A.
6
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By 19^4 however, the relationship between the small
Central American country and its large "neighbor to
the north," had matured substantially after going through
a difficult period during the 1930's,,
A nation’s foreign policy is predicated on the
fundamental premise that the national interest is
paramount when determining goals, objectives and cor
responding courses of action.

The national interest

is often difficult to define so that policymakers often
act according to what they perceive to be the best
interests of their people.

General Martinez fully

believed that the best interests of Salvadorans was in
preserving territorial integrity and the nation's
sovereignty from a large foreign power.

At the same

time, he also recognized that in protecting the national
interest, he should not lose sight of his nation’s
dependence on coffee exports to the United States,
Therefore, his was a delicate balancing act to keep
outside political considerations from dictating internal
economic policies.
In the same manner, the proponents of the Good
Neighbor policy of the United States also determined
that the national interest be given top priority in all
considerations.

For example, in advocating his free-

trade policies, Secretary of State Cordell Hull fully
expected the United States to benefit in the long run.
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a chance to feather their nests at our expense . ”

7
'

Castle was obviously referring to the matter of loan
defaults.

Many bondholders too, believed that the

United States had not given them adequate support in
their effort to get payments.
When the goals and objectives of two nations are
complementary, the diplomatic tasks of their representa
tives become less difficult.

In Salvadoran-American

relations during the period of General Martfnez 19311944, goals were not as divergent as those between other
nations.

Each complemented the other.

El Salvador

had ’’mild” coffee which United States importers wanted
to purchase in order to blend with the stronger Brazilian
product.

In turn, El Salvador desired recognition in

the world community, and the United States could be ins
trumental in. helping her to achieve it.

Furthermore, the

United States had the means with which to meet El Salva
dor’s need for financial assistance.
However, complementary goals were not common during
the early 1900’s.

Curing that time, although Salvadoran-

Amerioan relations began on a cordial footing, the
foundations for future problems were being laid.
American concern for the security of the Panama
Canal prompted moves for political stability in the area.

"^Speech by William Castle, April 22, 1939. file
Addresses and Speeches, Castle Papers, Herbert Hoover
Library.
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To accomplish this goal the United States believed it
necessary to promote democratic practices, especially
among the nations of Central America and the Caribbean.
At the same time, the United States did not hesitate to
use its "moral influence" in this regard.

In some cases,

this prompted direct intervention in the internal affairs
of the countries involved.
In an attempt to maintain stability and to prevent
recurring coups d ’etat, the Central American nations,
with the encouragement of the United States, concluded
the 1907 and 1923 Central American Treaties of Peace and
Amity.

Though noble in its conception, the treaties

failed in their objectives.

They served to keep those

who were already in power secure in their positions,
notwithstanding the questionable nature of their rule.
The Salvadoran Congress took exception to Article II
of the 1923 Treaty, which dealt with non-recognition of
revolutionary governments.

But since no one could

foresee the future implications of such an inflexible
treaty, no serious issue was made of it at the time.
Another matter during the 1920‘s which later
complicated relations for El Salvador and other Latin
American nations was the free-lending practice of American
bankers.

In dire financial straits, El Salvador needed

the funds that American bankers offered.

Both sides

entered into arrangements under false assumptions.

Amer-
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lean bankers made loans with the belief that the United
States Department of State fully backed them and, in a
sense, guaranteed their payment.

They advertised this

misconception to prospective bond buyers in spite of
the fact that the State Department disclaimed any guaran
tees for repayment of the debts.
In 1922, El Salvador borrowed over sixteen million
dollars from American and British bondholders, one of the
first Latin American nations to receive such a loan.

The

terms were onerous even by the standards of the day.

But

El Salvador was on the verge of bankruptcy and badly
needed the funds.

Fortunately for the small nation, her

coffee production was adequate to keep up the maintenance
of the loan service.

It was not until the depression of

the 1930’s that serious problems arose from the loans.
To further exacerbate matters, El Salvador had
the misfortune to receive American diplomats whose poor
attitudes toward their assignments and the people they
were to deal with left much to be desired.

Montgomery

Schuyler exemplified this attitude best in the conduct
of his duties as minister.

He is remembered by some in

El Salvador as a man Mmuy duro, muy violento.”
not make many friends among the Salvadorans.

He did

One of his

successors, Minister Charles B. Curtis suffered a similar
experience because of his poor performance during the
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Salvadoran Congress, in 1923* had ratified the treaty
with certain reservations regarding the non-recognition
provision, General Martfnez concluded that Article II
did not apply in his case.

He received moral support

from Mexico and other Latin American nations, most of
whom believed that because he had firm control of his
government and the popular support of the people, he
qualified for de facto recognition.

The United States,

however, maintained its non-recognition position and
stood by Article II of the 1923 Treaty.

Indeed,

Article II was designed to prevent such occurrences
as the coup of 1931 in 31 Salvador.

Eut in 1923, the

treaty's authors tacitly depended on United States mili
tary and economic power, and the willingness to use it
to force any would-be rebel to reconsider before acting.
Eut by 1931t conditions had changed and America was no
longer willing to use force to carry out its policies.
Thus, the applied doctrine of non-recognition had
become a burden to the State Department.

A major

debate ensued in the United States over its usefulness.
Some credited the policy with having provided stability
by discouraging potential revolutionaries.

Others

contended that the provisions of the 1923 Treaty served
to perpetuate tyrannical rulers in power.
Department faced a dilemma.

The State

It could not recognize

General Martfnez because of the 1923 Treaty provisions,
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yet despite non-recognition, the regime was stable and
destined to grow stronger.

In early 1932, General

Martfnez was strong enough to crush violently a Communist
attempt to take over his government.

For his efforts

he was described by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson
as a "bulwark” against Communism.

Although the United

States sympathized with its anti-Communist neighbor, it
still refused to recognize his government.
The change came with the "Good Neighbor" policy
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The Americans were

influenced to act favorably on the Salvadoran question
by nations not bound to the 1923 Treaty.

In late 1932,

lt was apparent that continued non-recognition of SI
Salvador only increased the danger of greater instability.
Eritain and France, eager to do business in El Salvador
under normal economic and political conditions, led the
other European nations to recognize the regime of
General Martfnez in September of 1932.

On December

2b,

1932, Costa Rica officially abrogated the 1923 Treaty
followed two days later by El Salvador.

On January 26,

193^* the United States recognized the de facto govern
ment of General Martfnez.
Facing serious difficulties in his diplomatic
relations with the United States, General Martfnez did
not allow foreign affairs to take precedence over
domestic matters.

This was evident during the coffee

price crash of 1931-1932.

In an effort to stabilize

the Salvadoran economy, General Martfnez enacted several
measures, one of which was the suspension of her debt
payments to American bondholders.

The default had far-

reaching effects on relations already strained by the
non-recognition controversy.

However, this time, the

State Department decided to avoid further deterioration
of relations by not observing its contractual obliga
tion to facilitate a settlement under the 1922 loan
agreement.

Washington was reluctant to act.

Other

Latin American nations had also defaulted, and to pres
sure a small nation to pay would have done nothing more
than add tarnish to the image of the United States in
the area.

While Washington1s decision may have improved

America's image in Latin America, it angered the Amer
ican bondholders considerably.
by their own government.

They felt "sacrificed"

Many of them truly believed

that the State Department had guaranteed the payments.
But in 1933s under the leadership of Cordell Hull
and Sumner Welles, the State Department affirmed that
it would not intercede on behalf of the bondholders.
The United States would no longer intervene In such an
overt fashion In the Internal affairs of another nation
in order to advance the Interests of private parties.
Too much of this type of Intervention had occurred in
the past and the State Department was determined not to
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continue the practice.

Despite the protests of inte

rested parties, the policy of non-intervention was
maintained and the United States over-extended Itself
to insure consistency in its Good Neighbor policy
toward El Salvador.

The State Department's participation

in the bondholders' dispute was limited to the promotion
of negotiations between the Bondholders Protective
Committee and the Salvadoran government.

Through

aggressive and persistent negotiations the Salvadoran
Bondholders Protective Committee was more successful
than other similar organizations in reaching agreements.
While the default created some moments of appre
hension in the overall relations between the United
States and El Salvador, there were areas of cooperation
which fostered closer ties between the two nations.
One was the action of Germany in 1934 when it instituted
the compensation or ASKI system of trade.
work well for El Salvador.

This did not

As a result, El Salvador's

trade shifted from Germany to the United States.
Secondly, trade agreements such as the Reciprocal Trade
Agreement of 1937 and- the Inter-American Coffee Conven
tion of 1940 were reached.

Under the 1940 agreement,

the United States subsidized over one-third of El
Salvador's coffee export.

American consumers paid for

the friendship of Latin American nations by buying their
coffee at artificially higher prices.

VJithout the
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agreement, a surplus of coffee would certainly have
lowered its market price with dire consequences for
El Salvador.
A final assessment of Salvadoran-American economic
relations reveals that the small country received major
advantages.

It was able to postpone service on the

1922 loan until after- 19^6, and then at greatly reduced
terms.

Its success in this matter was due in part to the

unwillingness of the State Department to wholeheartedly
support the Bondholders Protective Committee and Council.
Throughout most of the 1930’s El Salvador was able to
maintain a favorable balance of trade with the United
States while disposing of the bulk of its exports at
substantially higher prices.

It is clear that the

State Department let bondholders and coffee consumers
pay the price for the friendship and support of Salvado
rans and other Latin Americans, especially in the
hemisphere defense program during the war.

The United

States, however, was also able to extract concessions
in return for its economic assistance.

Cne xtfas the

ousting of two high ranking Salvadoran military officers
because of their fascist orientation.
Ideological differences also influenced relations
between the two nations.

General Kart£nez, like many

other leaders during the early 1930's, admired the
seeming success experienced by Italy under Mussolini.
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He saw similarities in the way he and Mussolini fought
Communism.

Moreover, he believed that the chaotic

circumstances which prevailed in SI Salvador called for
a highly centralized government and a planned economy
like Italy's.

The popular support that he received

encouraged him.

Apparently, the Salvadoran population,

fearful and apprehensive because of the economic
depression and the Communist threat, was willing to
accept an authoritarian but "benevolent" ruler such as
General Hartfnez.
But, while General Martinez was an admirer of
totalitarian ideas as trade with Azis powers developed
during the early 1930's, he was not above serving the
best interests of SI Salvador.

Such was the case in

1939 when he responded to pressures and ousted General
Sberhardt Eohnstedt and Earon Wilhelm von Hundelhausen
from their posts as directors of the Sscuela Militar and
Banco Hipotecario respectively.

Although a believer

in totalitarian ideas, he openly supported the Allied
cause and wholeheartedly supported the hemispheric
defense efforts of the United States.

His support of

the American efforts led to the replacement of two army
friends from public posts.

In 19^1» the ranking officers

of the Department of La Union, General

L u i s

Andreu, and

of the National Police, Col. Juan Merino, were both
dismissed under pressure from the United States.
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The difficult measures taken by General Hartfnez
were balanced by liberal financial assistance from the
United States.

The Lend-Lease program enabled El

Salvador to arm itself sufficiently to have one of the
best military forces in Central America.

Ironically,

some of the equipment acquired through this program were
used in the rebellion which led to the collapse of
General Martinez’s government.

El Salvador was also

able to receive a loan from the Export-Import Sank to
build its badly needed highway system and other public
works programs.

The United States made the loan despite

the fact that El Salvador was still in default on its
1922 loan.
Relations between the United States and El Salvador ■
during the period of study reflect the traditional
ingredients of domestic politics in a Latin American
country, the changing priorities of a powerful neighbor,
and the threat of European intervention.

They mark a

test of the Good Neighbor policy, a significant turn
in the attitude and interest of the United States in
Latin America.
A nation with a previous history of independence in
its relations with the United States since the turn of
the century, El Salvador had successfully avoided
external intervention in domestic affairs, unlike the
experience of Nicaragua, Cuba and the Dominican Republic.

However, the Martinez period represents the likely
breaking-point as extended de facto authoritarian rule
in El Salvador strained the non-recognition principle
of the United States.

This was further aggravated by

the non-payment of outstanding loans by the smaller
nation.

These difficulties in the 1930's could conceiva

bly have been the source of considerable ill**will had
the United States interfered directly in El Salvador or
had it forced on El Salvador the desired settlement on
the default matter.
adopt such policies.

The United States did not, hoxvever,
The policy declared by President

Franklin E. Hoosevelt in his 1933 inaugural address,
later identified with Latin America, withstood the test.
The Martfnez period of government 1 9 3 1 - 1 9 ^ in El Salva
dor proved the substance of President Roosevelt's
statement on April 12, 1933. when he addressed the
governing board of the Pan American Union.

He stated

that "The essential qualities of a true Panamericanism
must be the same as those which constitute a good
neighbor, namely, mutual understanding and, through
such understanding, a sympathetic appreciation of the
O

other's point of view."

The lesson was not lost through

out the Western Hemisphere.
Q
Roosevelt's Foreign Policy; 1933-19^1;
Franklin D.
Roosevelt's Unedited Speeches and Messages (hew York:
Funk and Wagnalls, 19^2), p.
as quoted in Federico G.
G i l , Latin American - United States Relations (New York:
Hare ourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., i9r^l J, p.' 156.
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